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## HOW EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP IN PROPERTY FIRST ORIGINATED: COMMUNISM.

*Cursus Theologie Universalis, juxta mentem, et in quantum licuit,  
juxta ordinem, D. Thomæ in sua Summa: auctore, Billuart; in  
4 vols., folio. Wirceburgi. 1758.*

*Annals of the Great Strikes in the United States.* By Honorable J. A. Dacus. Chicago: L. T. Palmer. 1877. 1 vol., 8vo.

*The Internationale: Communism; a Lecture.* By Rev. F. P. Garesch , S. J. St. Louis: Patrick Fox. 1872.

**A**NY argument or essay pertaining to the first origin of private dominion over the material goods of the earth, or exclusive ownership of property, could ordinarily prove interesting only to those persons who, for special reasons, are engaged in the study of ethics, or general questions of jurisprudence. The reason is this: the subject is somewhat abstract and difficult. But, as a fact, the doctrines of socialism and communism have been brought so prominently before the public mind in recent years, that every intelligent reader now desires to form for himself some clear and satisfactory notions concerning the fundamental truths on which a right estimate of those systems depends. The late movements of the "workingmen," the leaders of whom are striving to organize them into a distinct political party, their "platforms," the publications spread abroad by their master spirits, the harangues of their orators, all furnish convincing proof of the necessity for correct knowledge on these new issues which the discontented masses are

endeavoring to raise here in the United States, as they have successfully done in some other countries.

It was a source of gratification, however, for the thoughtful friends of law and social order to see the fact plainly verified both in the "strikes" or labor riots of last summer, and in all that has since occurred, that "communism," strictly so called, is an exotic in the United States, which is not likely to take root and flourish, and that the communist societies in our large cities have little or no influence; indeed, nearly all their members are from the continent of Europe. The Irish refuse to fraternize with them, withheld, no doubt, by that peculiarly strong and discerning faith which is always a supreme rule of conduct for them. The American is kept from participating in such schemes and combinations because, as it may be justly supposed, reverence for the *lex non scripta* or common law and for decisions of the courts, still retains a firm hold on his mind, and still guides his judgments of what is equitable in all things pertaining to the practical affairs of civil life.

Yet this state of things is not immutable, and we have no infallible guarantee that it will not be succeeded by a worse one. To moderate the violence of the struggle between "capital and labor," by duly balancing their conflicting interests, is a problem that has long perplexed the political economist and the lawgiver. When one party maintains that "we have a right to decide as to what wages we shall pay," and the other contends "we also have a right to decide as to what wages we shall accept," they are thereby declaring only their general right to exercise liberty of will, which is not the matter in question between them, nor does it imply any special duty which they have towards each other. The only wages which the laborer has a special and positive right to demand, is that amount which it is the special and positive duty of the employer to pay him. The two opponents are not disinterested judges, and they can scarcely be expected to decide impartially on the merits of their own dispute; perhaps no human legislation can ever determine, except within certain more or less proximate limits, on any definite and just medium between their extreme demands, in which their varying interests will become plainly and uniformly identical.

To ascertain and state correctly the whole cause of these labor disturbances, it would, first, be necessary to determine how far the popular suspicion is well founded, that the want of personal honesty in officers of the great money corporations, along with venal legislation in some of the States, is an active agent in producing these perilous results. The writer prefers to believe, however, that such a charge is not entirely just, and that it arises out of an exaggeration of facts.

It is proposed, in what herein follows, to consider only one point in the difficulties raised by socialism and communism, but it is nevertheless a salient one, namely, the origin of private or particular dominion over the goods of the earth, or exclusive ownership of property. This is a subject that carries us back to the principles on which the very organization of human society and the rights of property primitively rest.

The dominion, or exclusive ownership of property, which is now to be explained, is the right to have, to hold, and to dispose at liberty of a corporeal thing, unless it be prohibited by law.<sup>1</sup>

Dominion, as the word implies, gives a lordship or mastership over the object owned, as, for example, a house or home; and this empowers the possessor rightfully to do with it whatever he may choose, rationally; or if he do not trouble the right of another person thereby, it makes him civilly free to use it or dispose of it, even irrationally.

We may distinguish two classes of corporeal goods over which man can acquire dominion or ownership; the one, those that can be used, or fully appropriated at once, to serve his actual wants, as food and raiment; the other class may comprise such as he can preserve, claim, or hold for future use. Again, all such objects may be considered first as physical natures depending for their existence and action on the Creator. When viewed under this aspect, God alone can exercise and hold dominion over these things, since He alone can change, rule, or own them as existing and acting natures that, as such, are wholly subject. Secondly, such objects may be considered in respect to the use which man can make of them as means or instruments for the accomplishment of an end. It is only under this second aspect that man has, or is capable of acquiring, any ownership or dominion over the material goods that are made subject to him. Hence man can control and dispose of the use, not the nature itself, of things which he owns; or, in other words, his dominion over the material goods of life is not that of absolute ownership or lordship, but is by nature limited wholly to some particular and special use of those things.

Naturally and originally, the material or corporeal goods of this life belong to men in common; the rightful division of these exterior goods came about by human law, or it was made conventionally.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Dominium est jus perfecte disponendi de re corporali, nisi lege prohibeatur, Bartolus.* This is the definition generally given by writers on this matter; it directly applies, however, to that ownership of property which is in organized society, and which has its immediate origin under the laws of that society.

<sup>2</sup> “*Dominium et praelatio introducta sunt ex jure humano.*” Div. Th., p. 22, qu. 10, a. 10, et qu. 12, a. 2. Particular dominion over external goods, and superiority in

With regard to those necessary objects belonging to no one in particular, which are required for the relief of present actual wants, as food, clothing, etc., it is manifest that one coming into the possession of them can justly consume them or directly apply them to his own use; for the actual want of what is necessary to sustain life would justify his using them even if they were owned by another person. Hence, extreme present need of the means to support life even abrogates conventional dominion or ownership of property. The right of one who is in such want depends on possession or occupancy, however, only by way of necessary condition; it depends for its origin and validity on his extreme need, and on the truth that before the law of nature the goods of the earth are for the use of mankind.<sup>1</sup>

Mere occupancy, as occupancy, cannot *per se*, or of its own nature, and apart from all law or other superadded cause, found real ownership or dominion in landed or immovable property. For occupancy, as such, is only an extrinsic accident or circumstance, which can as truly and really exist when such property is not owned as when it is owned; and, on the other hand, one can as truly own land which he does not occupy at all, as land which he actually does occupy. Therefore, mere occupancy of such property is an accident which is too purely contingent and indeterminate to found that dominion which constitutes real ownership of landed property. It follows, then, that when occupancy is said by jurists to give a title, or to found dominion in property, though they attribute the effect nominally and proximately to occupancy, yet it is by means of the causes annexed to mere occupancy that

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authority of any one person over a multitude of persons, were introduced by human positive law.

"Communitas rerum attribuitur juri naturali, non quia jus naturale dictet omnia esse possidenda communiter, et nihil esse quasi proprium possidendum; sed quia secundum jus naturale non est distinctio possessionum sed magis secundum humanum condicium, quod pertinet ad jus positivum. Unde proprietas possessionum non est contra jus naturale; sed juri naturali superadditur per adinventionem rationis humanæ," p. 2. 2, q. 66, a. 2, ad. 1. Community of goods is attributed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common, and that nothing is to be owned by an individual, but because, according to the natural law, these are not distinct possessions, this comes rather by human agreement, which pertains to positive law. Hence exclusive ownership of possessions is not against natural law, but it is superadded to the natural law through an invention of human reason.

<sup>1</sup> Therefore Cajetan observes, p. 2. 2, qu. 66, a. 2, ad. 1, that while dominion over the goods of the earth was originally common negatively, they were also positively common in case of extreme necessity. But apart from special cases of the kind the dominion is only negatively common; "Hinc disce quod hujus modi propositiones, scilicet, secundum jus naturale omnia sunt communia, exponuntur negative, non affirmative," vide p. 1, qu. 14, a. 3, ad. 1. Summæ, D. Thomas. Goods are said to be negatively common when, though owned by all, yet it does not belong to the individual to determine his own share for himself.

such dominion is really and *legally* founded. One who should enter and settle in an uninhabited and unclaimed district of country might be said to acquire, concomitantly with actual occupancy, a negative dominion over the territory;<sup>1</sup> if we add, as another cause founding just right, that he cultivates a spot of land and builds a house, the fruit of his industry will surely belong to him, so far as it is something which he is capable of appropriating and possessing, but not farther. The common right of mankind to share the goods of the earth is not abrogated, either in respect to that whole district of country or the spot of land itself which he has cultivated, unless it be so determined conventionally or by law. For if we suppose this territory, with its solitary inhabitant occupying his tract of cultivated land, now to be rightfully acquired, for example, by the United States government, there appears no valid reason, coming merely from the nature of things, why this person should not become subject to all just laws, like every citizen, even including the law which imposes conditions for acquiring "the pre-emption right." Man as a member of society can acquire ownership to a particular spot of land only in the manner prescribed by the public law. Where, in fact, is there a member of civil society who now owns land independently of all positive law, and the absolute title to which he acquired merely by first occupancy?

Since there is no reason in the nature of things, or *a priori*, why one man should own a particular piece of land rather than another man, and also since men must live in society as rational beings, it follows that because the apportionment of land is not made by nature, it must be done when divisions become expedient or necessary by a positive convention or agreement, *i. e.*, by equitable general laws.

If it be determined as in Roman law that occupancy under certain conditions shall found a right of ownership in such property,<sup>2</sup> then the community will define what shall be those special conditions that must accede to mere occupancy, in order for it to establish a legal title; and it will be determined by the same authority what extent or quantity of land may in this manner be legiti-

<sup>1</sup> Cowper makes the lonely Alexander Selkirk thus declare the true nature of his dominion over all the island of Juan Fernandez:

"I am monarch of all I survey;  
*My right there is none to dispute.*"

<sup>2</sup> "Sicut divisio rerum est de jure gentium ita de jure gentium est ut quæ adhuc nullius sunt sicut de primo occupantis." Bceanus, De jure, C. 5, q. 3. Ita etiam Cardin. Toleti in 2. 2, q. 66, a. 2, et alii communiter.

Just as division of goods is from human law (the common law of nations), so it is by human law that things which as yet belong to no one, become the property of the first possessor.

mately acquired by one person.<sup>1</sup> In practice, occupancy could not otherwise, than as defined and regulated by positive law, be an equitable and peaceful mode of establishing for individual persons exclusive ownership of landed property. In the United States all unoccupied landed property within the territory of the nation is assumed to be public domain; and such land was thus regarded from the beginning of the Union. Occupancy of land in the undivided or unconveyed public domain establishes for the first actual settler or occupant, there dwelling and cultivating or improving the land, "a pre-emption right," or the first right to *purchase* the quarter of that section<sup>2</sup> which includes the settler's domicil.

The "right of eminent domain," *dominium altum*,<sup>3</sup> which is held to be inherent, remains in the State, or supreme public authority; and, therefore, when really necessary for the common good, the government can, in virtue of that original and natural right existing in the community, and exercised by the government as representing the community, condemn private property for public use, by making equitable compensation for it, in order that an undue burden be not imposed on a particular person or part of the community; also, property left without an heir-at-law reverts to the commonwealth; and all immovable property is liable to forfeiture for just taxes. This paramount right or authority over all real estate or landed property belonging to the individual citizen, being necessary for the government in the very nature of things, is therefore originally derived by the community directly and immediately from the natural law itself.

But while the goods of the earth are given by nature to mankind, the division itself of those goods is left to the rational, just, and prudent determination of mankind; and what thus pertains to mankind for its decision, does not belong to the individual to de-

<sup>1</sup> For what pertains to the manner in which a nation acquires dominion over vacant territory, and what concerns the right of discovery, as settled by international law, See Wheaton, "Elements of International Law," ch. iv.; or Vattel, "Law of Nations," book I., chap. xvii.

<sup>2</sup> A section is one mile square, or 640 acres.

<sup>3</sup> Judge Dillon, of the United States Circuit Court, in his treatise, "Municipal Corporations," ch. xvi., defines and explains this right, and the laws for applying it. He says, *ibid.*: "The maxim, *salus populi suprema lex*, has an important meaning in its application to private rights, and in limiting the absoluteness of any possible ownership of private property. . . . This (eminent domain) is a right inherent in every government. One branch of this governmental prerogative is known by the name of taxation, and the other arm of this transcendent and underlying authority is now familiarly known as the power of eminent domain. The Constitution of the United States provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." P. 438. To impose a special burden on the property of a private party for the benefit of the public would not be just; if no compensation were made it would be an unfair exaction.

cide for himself independently of the community; it is always the office of public authority to determine in such matter what is best for the common good, since in no other manner can justice, and, consequently, social peace, be maintained. There is no precept of the natural law prescribing a division of property as, *per se*, necessary for every community of mankind. Such division is not thus necessary under every hypothesis; in a state of innocence, or of integral nature, a division of property would not become necessary, nor, perhaps, even useful.<sup>1</sup> In a small community common proprietorship might even now happen to be advantageous under certain conditions.

The principle that particular dominion or exclusive ownership of property is by human convention, "dominium et prælatio introducta sunt ex jure humano," was generally taught as certain in the old universities. The opinion of the best English and American jurists concerning this matter will be found briefly and clearly enunciated in the two citations which are here subjoined; their theory, it will be noticed, agrees in substance with what was held by St. Thomas and the scholastics.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In statu naturæ integræ et eo perseverante probabilius permansisset bonorum communitas. Quia in illo felici statu, summaque hominum inter se concordia, nulla fuisset causa seu necessitas dividendi qualis est post lapsum: imo decens erat et ad dignitatem atque magnificentiam generis humani pertinens ut hujusmodi bona communiter donata communiter possiderentur. Billuart, de dominio; with theologians more generally, in Div. Th., p. 2, 2, q. 66, a. 2, ad. 1. In this state of integral nature, and it continuing, it is more probable that community of goods would be permanent. For in that happy state and perfect concord of mankind among themselves, there would be no reason or necessity for a division such as there is since the fall; nay, it would become the dignity and belong to the generous spirit of mankind to possess the goods of the earth in common as they were given in common.

<sup>2</sup> Billuart, "De modis acquirendi Dominium," thus states the doctrine of the Scholastics concerning this matter: "Divisio rerum facta est non jure naturæ, quia jus naturæ neque eam præcipit neque ad eam inclinat ut ad quid simpliciter necessarium sed ut ad quid magis conveniens tantum; non jure divino positivo, cum neque in Scriptura neque in Traditione ullum de ea extat præceptum; sed jure gentium, quatenus homines, dum attenta corruptione naturæ, quæ est sui amans, alieni negligens, cupiditati et ambitioni serviens, viderent gravia et plura incommoda sequi occasionaliter ex communitate bonorum, divisionem, non dico præceperunt, alioquin peccarent monachi, sed ut vitæ sociali et bonorum administrationi magis convenienti *communi consensu formaliter vel tacito* introduxerunt. Unde L. I. digestorum dicitur; ex hoc jure gentium discretas esse gentes, regna condita, dominia distincta, agris terminos positos." The division of things is not made by the law of nature, for the law of nature neither commands it nor persuades it as something simply necessary, but only as something more suitable or expedient; it is not from divine law, since there is no precept concerning it, either in the Scripture or from tradition, but it is by human law, inasmuch as men, considering the corruption of nature which inclines man to be selfish, unmindful of others, following cupidity and ambition, saw the grave and numerous inconveniences occasioned by community of goods. I do not say mankind prescribed it as being of natural law, for then the monastic orders would be doing wrong, but they introduced division of goods by common consent, either formally or tacitly given, as better suited for social life, and

Timothy Walker, LL.D., *Introduction to American Law*, fourth edition, p. 282, thus states and explains this matter: "We know, as a matter of history, that in the beginning God gave to man a general dominion over the earth, and all things appertaining thereto; but this would only make the first inhabitants *owners in common* of the world, and not exclusive owners of any specific part. The historical inference, therefore, is that exclusive ownership did not commence until some subsequent period, when a division of the common property was made,<sup>1</sup> either by compulsion or voluntary agreement. In other words, the right of exclusive ownership is conventional, and not divine or natural; and the same inference results from our theory of the social compact. An island or continent, for example, which no man had ever seen, would be the property of no one; but if a number of persons should be cast upon it, and take possession of it, they would own it in common until some agreement would be made concerning it, after which the nature of their ownership, whether exclusive or common, would depend upon their agreement. In either view, therefore, it would seem that the exclusive ownership of property is a social, and not a natural right."

James Kent, *Commentaries on American Law*, vol. iii., p. 501, § 378, twelfth edition, shows how the government, which represents the nation, is the source of particular ownership in property. "It is a fundamental principle in the English law, derived from the maxims of its feudal tenures, that the king was the original proprietor or lord paramount of all the land in the kingdom, and the true and only source of title. In this country we have adopted the same principle, and applied it to our republican governments; and it is a settled and fundamental doctrine with us that all valid individual title to land within the United States is derived either from the grant of our own local governments, or from that of the United States, or from the crown, or royal chartered governments established here prior to the Revolution. This was the doctrine declared in New York in the case of *Jackson v. Ingraham*, and it was held to be a settled rule that the courts could not take notice of any title to land not derived from our own State or colonial government, and duly verified by patent. This was also a fundamental principle in colonial jurisprudence. The title to land passed to in-

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for the right management of its goods. Whence it is said in the Digests, L. I., from this common law of nations distinct civil communities come, kingdoms are founded, ownership of property begins, and farms have their limits.

<sup>1</sup> "And to Heber were born two sons, the name of the one was Phaleg, because in his days the earth was divided."—I Paralipomenon, i. 79 "By these (the descendants of Noe) were divided the islands of the Gentiles in their land, every one according to his tongue and their families in the nations."—Genesis x. 5.

dividuals from the crown through the colonial corporations, and the colonial or proprietary authorities."

Particular dominion or exclusive ownership of property is from the natural law only according to the sense in which all just human law is derived from the natural law.<sup>1</sup>

When people became numerous on earth and the means of living were thereby made relatively less abundant, division of property was rendered morally necessary.<sup>2</sup> Many men are either slothful or selfish, and, therefore, considering the present actual state and character of the human race, together with the disorderly inclinations that are so often dominant over mankind, it is, in practice, more favorable to the general good that each one be left to provide for himself what is necessary, and that he become the owner of what he legitimately acquires; then, every one's rights and duties being maintained justly by public authority, there will exist fewer causes of contention or quarrelling, and consequently there will be greater peace and security. Men will labor with more alacrity, and preserve with more care the fruit of their industry, when they work for themselves or their own particular advantage, than they would if all things belonged only to the community; for, in the latter case, each would leave this task to be performed by another, and hence there would result confusion in employments, insufficiency in necessary things, discontent, and many other evils.<sup>3</sup> But, in the present actual state of man's nature, a fair and orderly division of property would not be possible, in practice, except as regulated by just law; and hence from this truth a valid argument is derived also to prove the necessity of supreme authority in human society. Consequently upon the fact of a legitimate agreement to make the division, each person in the community has the right to some

<sup>1</sup> *Est de ratione legis humanæ, quod sit derivata a lege naturæ. Et secundum hoc dividetur jus positivum in jus gentium et jus civile; secundum duos modos; sicut conclusiones ex principiis, et alio modo sicut determinationes quædam aliquorum communium.* P. 1, 2, q. 2, a. 4 et a. 5. It is of the essence of human law that it be derived from the law of nature. And under this respect positive law is divided into the common law of nations and the civil law according to two manners of deriving positive law from the natural law, namely, as conclusions from first principles and as certain particular determinations (or applications) of some common or general principles.

<sup>2</sup> "Distinctio possessionum et servitus non sunt inductæ a natura, sed per hominum rationem ad utilitatem humanae vitæ." P. 1, 2, qu. 9, a. 5, ad. 3. "In statu naturæ lapsæ nedum licita, sed conveniens fuit rerum et dominiorum divisio." Billuart, with scholastic writers generally. Distinct possession of material goods, and slavery, were not introduced by nature, but through the reason of man for the advantage of human life. S. Thomas. In the state of fallen nature the division of goods or exclusive ownership of property is not only permitted by the law of nature, but it is also something expedient. Billuart.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle uses similar reasoning in his "Politics," book ii., ch. 5, against the theory of communism by Plato, in his "Republic."

determinate and equitable share of the property first given in common by nature; but that right, if considered in itself *a priori*, can be positively determined and defined as to its particular and actual object, not by the individual for himself, for this would be to take law into his own hands, which would lead to confusion, but only by that authority which is duly empowered to provide for and protect the general good.<sup>1</sup>

It may be concluded, therefore, that man's natural reason dictated the division of property according to which each one has his own, and is defended in the possession and enjoyment of it, as a moral necessity for the common good, at least for large communities; and hence, although the actual division of property is from human legislation, yet it is founded on the natural law. Against this assertion the objection may here arise in the mind of the inquisitive reader: "What right reason dictates to be done, as something necessary for the common good, should rather be called the natural law itself than human law;" but, as just alleged, the division of property was originally made, reason dictating its necessity, "dictante lumine naturalis rationis," in order to avoid the inconveniences and evils arising from common ownership of goods; therefore "the division of property is made by the natural law." Since the natural law or right reason does not dictate the division of property to be simply and under all conditions necessary, the argument objected proves only that this division was made in accordance with the natural law, and that the necessity or expediency of it was a just conclusion from the natural law, agreeably to the sense in which all laws comprised in the "jus gentium," "common law of nations," are conclusions from the natural law. Such laws are not simply immutable, since their matter is not simply immu-

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<sup>1</sup> "Nota quod propositio, *communitas rerum est de jure naturae quoad usum*, potest dupliciter intelligi, scilicet positive et negative. Et si intelligatur positive sensus est quod jus naturale dictat quod omnia sunt communia; si vero intelligatur negative, est sensus quod jus naturale non instituit proprietates rerum, et in utroque sensu propositio est vera, si sane intelligatur. In primo quidem, scilicet, positive, verificatur in casu scilicet extremæ necessitatis, quando enim aliquis est in extrema necessitate, potest, undecumque sibi occurrit sibi vel alteri hujusmodi subvenire, quia sua tunc naturæ jure re usus est. In secundo, scilicet negative, verificatur absolute; nam, extra casus loquendo, jus naturæ non fecit aliquid esse proprium alicui, et aliud alteri." Cajetan, in p. 2. 2, qu. 66, a. 2, ad. 1. Cardinal Toleti speaks similarly in commenting on that same passage: "Observe that the proposition, *by natural law goods are in common as to the use of them*, may be taken either positively or negatively, and in both senses it is true if rightly understood; it is verified positively when one in extreme necessity helps himself with the relief which is within his reach, or when he does this for another in like want; in that case he uses what is his by the law of nature. The proposition is verified negatively, in that, apart from the case mentioned, the law of nature does not make one thing the property of one person and another thing the property of another person."

table; whereas the natural law and the strictly demonstrated conclusions derived from it are simply immutable.<sup>1</sup>

The reasons above given in proof that the goods of the earth should be divided, show its expediency and necessity as a means to secure the greater good of society; it now only remains to adduce the arguments which demonstrate the falsity of modern communism, or the theory proposing a return to common ownership of property as a measure that is expedient and even necessary for the common good of nations.

In order for the communists to advance any valid argument in proof that their theory proposes what is true or legitimate in practice, either they must show that nature dictates community of goods as necessary, or else they must prove that it is expedient and good for nations now to establish common ownership of property. These are the only arguments bearing upon the subject that can be devised or offered by them; no other assignable reasons would be pertinent.

Now, neither does nature dictate common ownership of property to be necessary, as was already explained, nor is a return to primitive community of goods possible in practice for any nation; and hence it is justly charged that this wild scheme has nothing in it which can seriously commend it to any but indolent, improvident, and vicious members of civil society.<sup>2</sup> That is neither rational nor legitimate which cannot be done without destroying peace, order, and justice in civil society; but a return to common ownership of property cannot be effected in any nation without causing the evils named, and others along with them, which would lead to social anarchy; therefore the theory of communism is false and impracticable, and it was always repudiated by the natural good sense of mankind, no nation ever having actually attempted in practice so unreasonable a system.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Some of the older philosophers and jurists put "jus positivum" in contradistinction to "jus gentium;" but they did not intend by this technical use of the terms to imply that the "jus gentium" was not a human positive law, or that it is simply the natural law. The general truth which nature teaches, and in which all nations concur, not by express agreement, but because they judge the same matter in the same manner, namely, *the goods of the earth should be divided by us*, is of the "jus gentium;" the special laws, or rules by which that division is actually made, and maintained in force, are civil laws, or positive laws, as opposed to the common laws of nations, "jura gentium." But this "jus gentium" must not be confounded with the code of positive law now styled "international law."

<sup>2</sup> It is a notorious fact that when the communists got control of Paris temporarily, in 1870, they sought, not a community of goods, but to enrich themselves individually.

<sup>3</sup> Although the *agrarian* movement under the Roman commonwealth continued, during several centuries, occasionally to excite popular commotions, and some just concessions were made to the plebeians, yet there never was a return to common ownership of property, nor were all the goods possessed by the people ever redivided.

The communist argues that "what comes by human convention can be undone by human convention; but division of property is something merely conventional, and therefore it can be undone by convention." It is not true that all things done by convention or general agreement can be arbitrarily changed by human authority; only those things can be thus changed or undone which are not thereby converted into what is evil, or which, in other words, are, by their own nature, susceptible of change, when there are due and legitimate reasons for it. There can arise no reasons to justify the re-establishment of common dominion in property, nor is it perhaps possible as a fact that any nation of mankind will ever agree to do so. The reasons originally making the division of property necessary or expedient now militate with still greater strength for adhering to separate or exclusive ownership of property; or if community of goods was not for the general welfare in the beginning of nations, still less can it now be good for nations to institute that state of things.

To answer the communist's reasoning above given, however, by asserting that individuals acquire, and actually hold, their right to particular property immediately from the law of nature, appears to be the denying of one error merely by affirming another one, but without really meeting the point of the difficulty raised. Nor will it do to affirm that community of goods or common ownership of property was, in itself, impossible from the beginning, since this would be to prove too much. In the case of monastic orders, the property of their members is actually converted into common property, no one retaining exclusive ownership of anything whatever.<sup>1</sup> It is to be observed, however, in answer to any inferences that may be drawn therefrom by the communist for the right and feasibility of reinstating primitive community of goods in nations of mankind, that there is no parity between a monastic body and a nation. Such a community does not, like a nation, include a large number of entirely different persons collected together, as it were miscellaneous; nor is it a body politic; but it is a peculiar *private* association that is governed by a special system of rules; it has none but adult members, who attach themselves to it voluntarily, and its members still owe duty to the civil government of the nation in which they dwell. For such a society which, owing to its peculiar aim, is actually adapted only to a small number of persons, the common ownership of property is indispensable, and in such a community it works harmoniously in practice, a result, however, which would not be morally possible in a large civil community. It follows, then, that the theory of communism is false, not because all

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<sup>1</sup> The first Christians also made their goods common property.

common ownership of property is evil or impossible, and not because a return to community of goods is, under all suppositions, wrong or impracticable, but for this, that division of property having been made by the nations of mankind because they found it to be expedient and even necessary for the common good, a return to common dominion in property would now, for still greater reasons, be utterly impracticable; and even if it could be actually effected, a thing that is perhaps utterly impossible, the change would be productive of the greatest evils and no real good.

Let us here recapitulate: God gave the goods of earth in common to mankind. Determinate and exclusive ownership of property was introduced by human convention or agreement.<sup>1</sup> The natural law does not dictate that the goods of the earth should be held in common by mankind; nor does it dictate that division of them is simply necessary. Right reason teaches that it is expedient, and in practice it is also necessary for the good of large communities or nations of mankind, that there should be made an equitable division of the goods given in common by nature. After the division of those goods is once actually made, because found by a community to be necessary for the common good, then *a fortiori* will it be necessary for the general welfare of such community that this condition of things be permanently maintained; by consequence, the theory of communism as teaching that common dominion or ownership of property should be re-established, is false, and in actual practice it would surely prove to be disastrous.

The doctrine of the communists concerning the rights of property is herein refuted; but some of their leaders advocate other principles still more iniquitous, which have served to bring much discredit on them and their extravagant theory in all enlightened communities of mankind. As for those among them who actually attempt to destroy marriage and the family, the legitimate answer to them is not by appeal to the canons of logic; such matter pertains rather to the authoritative decisions of criminal jurisprudence, to the bar of civil justice, where convicted culprits that violate the essential and well-known laws of social life are arraigned, to have passed on them the sentence merited by their misdeeds.

Some less extreme minds object that "a portion of the abundance possessed by the rich, who have more than they need, should in natural justice be taken from them and given to the poor, who have less than they need, for nature intends that all shall have a living from the goods which nature provides for all."

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<sup>1</sup> In order to be further assured that this is the doctrine commonly taught in the schools, see Cajetan and Cardin. Toletus, in Sum. D. Th., p. 2. 2, qu. 66, a. 2; also Biliuart, Becanus, or other scholastic authors on the same article.

This objection is a mixture of truth and error, and it presents a difficulty which it is not expedient to slur over, and which at the same time it is not easy to answer in very precise terms, for the obvious reason that it belongs to legislative power to define the specific means of meeting that emergency under its particular and actual circumstances. The general reply is, that it is the duty of public authority, and not the office of private parties, to provide for the necessary well-being of the whole community, and therefore to provide the means necessary to save a deserving and innocent portion of the people from starvation in a time of such adversity. It is true that "nature intends all to have a living from the goods which nature intends for all," but nature intends this, as so regulated and measured, that the rights of all may be duly defended. Nature does not intend to confer a private communistic authority or right on individuals of appropriating to themselves exclusively goods in which others also have a right. Hence a particular part of the community can have only that right which is consistent with the rights of others, and which, therefore, must be regulated by general laws of the community. This is one of those difficulties in human affairs, on account of which public authority, whose office it is to maintain the general good, is indispensably necessary for every civil community.

In considering the matter proposed by the above objection, it will help towards clearness of thought to distinguish different classes of poor people. Under the first may be included all industrious laboring or working people who, we shall suppose, wish to live only by upright and legitimate means, but who, here and now, cannot obtain wages that suffice for their support. It is, without any doubt, the solemn duty of public authority to protect them in their natural right to the necessary means of living.

Secondly, there is a class of the helpless and afflicted poor, comprising such, for example, as are reduced to want by sickness, or by any of the various misfortunes and disasters that may befall even the most virtuous and worthy persons. There surely never was an enlightened nation in which all the good and generous among the people did not look on it as a duty, even of private benevolence, to befriend the suffering poor and relieve their wants, though oftentimes this can be done only at the risk of being imposed on by the false stories of undeserving vagabonds. For this class of the poor public authority provides hospitals, homes, asylums, etc., in which, according to the particular form of their miseries, they may find shelter and comfort in their wretchedness.

A third class may comprise all those more or less indigent people who are idle and vicious, as thieves and lazy vagrants, the improvident and sensual drones of society that collect in the large cities,

where they haunt the dens of low pleasure and amusement, who would live above their social condition, and seek the means of maintaining themselves in their excessive habits by various dishonest arts and tricks of fraud. It is not work, even for high wages, that such people desire; their wish is to lead a reckless and self-indulgent life in idleness and debauchery. They shun the duties of life, leaving toil and the employments of industry to other hands, though they would have a full share in the fruits of that industry, despite the Scriptural behest, "If any man will not work, neither let him eat."<sup>1</sup> Even if they should come into the possession of wealth and abundance, with their dissolute and extravagant habits, and their heedlessness of the future, it would be quickly squandered in the excesses of maudlin, low-bred pleasure. It was this class of people that mainly constituted the mobs which strove to identify themselves with the "strikers" last summer, in order to have the opportunity of stealing and robbing. All they require for turbulent action or outbreaks is, that they be headed by the bold, dangerous spirits which rise up in troubled and evil times from the dark, low depths to the surface, to plan and execute desperate deeds of violence. They are practical communists; the system of communism favors them; they have nothing to lose, no home, no goods providently laid up, and any change is for them an improvement. It can scarcely be doubted, therefore, that it is chiefly on this unruly and mischievous element of society that the communists must depend for enlisting numbers into their ranks. Could any redress of social troubles possibly arise from a violent and revolutionary return to primitive community of goods brought about by this class of mankind, and that, too, with all the calamities and wrongs to persons which would be necessarily caused by such a change in the very constitution of society?

Well-administered government and wise laws are the means intended by nature for protecting and securing all classes of citizens in their genuine civil rights. But the principles of communism can remedy no evil, and remove no social grievance. Nay, to reduce that execrable theory to practice would be to substitute for occasional troubles that can be quieted by authority of just law, manifold evils that could not be endured in any but a savage nation.

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<sup>1</sup> 2 Thessal., chap. iii., v. 10.

ACTUAL SITUATION OF THE CHURCH IN COUNTRIES  
OUTSIDE OF EUROPEAN SWAY.

*Christian Missions.* By T. W. M. Marshall. New York: 1864.

*Les Missions Catholiques.*

*Bulletin Hebdomadaire de l'Œuvre de la Propagation de la Foi.* Lyon,  
France.

HAVING in previous papers studied the present state of the Church in Europe, and in countries permanently settled by Europeans, it remains for us, in order that we may properly estimate the great power she continues to exercise over men, to consider the missions she has planted throughout the world outside of the limits just mentioned. Moreover, the missionary work of our Holy Church is but little understood by the majority of Catholics, and hence failing to appreciate its extent and importance, those who could and would afford their assistance in its furtherance, withhold their aid, or extend it with a sparing hand.

The work of foreign missions is but the continuation of that committed to the first apostles. Christ sent The Twelve in the laborious work of missions, "to teach all nations." They could not during their lifetime evangelize the whole world. Their successors were to complete what they had begun. The words of our Saviour, in fact, were addressed not to them alone, but likewise to those who should tread in their footsteps; and the missionaries of our day, when they derive their powers from the true source, are really sent by Christ on their holy errand.

It is impossible to detail in a few pages the arduous labors undertaken by thousands and thousands of men animated by what is called "the zeal of souls"—*zelus animarum*. Its outburst at the first preaching of the Gospel was of itself a demonstration of its divine origin. In a short time idolatry was abolished, the Church extended itself throughout all nations, and the Cross, which had been the symbol of deepest ignominy, became the symbol of salvation, and was worshipped throughout the largest portion of three continents.

The edicts of persecution promulgated against Christianity by Roman Emperors, served only to help its dissemination outside of the empire's limits. The confines of Asia, and the heart of Africa, received the messengers of God, who, from the third to the fifth centuries, became the apostles of the far East and of the South.

Rome and Central Europe, henceforth Christian, sent their mis-

sionaries wherever the name of our Saviour was yet unknown. During the fifth century, and those immediately subsequent, barbarous nations of the North, in Britain, Ireland, and Germany, were evangelized in the midst of the convulsions that foreshadowed the downfall of the old Roman power. Western Africa had meanwhile received the precious seed of faith, which continued to expand and to flourish until, at a later period, it was for a time almost rooted out by the Vandals and the Moslems.

Charlemagne, in accord with the Popes of his age, ruled over the northern portion of Europe, and the rude Saxons were at last converted to Christ, to be followed in the tenth century by the wild tribes of Scandinavia.

Many volumes would be required to unfold in detail the history contained in this meagre outline. What firmness of purpose, what ardor, what real heroism must have been displayed in the accomplishment of such a task as this! And yet the means employed were only those of exhortation, persuasion, and the exhibition in practical form of the beauty of the Christian virtues.

During the period extending from the tenth to the fifteenth century the history of missions presents a new and surprising spectacle. The Mohammedan delusion preached at the point of the sword, and supported by the fanaticism of immense armies, spreads more quickly, and over a larger surface of territory, than the religion of Christ. The Church seems to be confined within very narrow limits. The western half of Europe is all her ostensible domain, and had it not been for the valor of Charles Martel, she might have lost even this last refuge, and been doomed to remain politically under the control of her foe. Attempts are then made by zealous servants of God to preach the faith to the Mussulmans themselves, but the case is entirely hopeless. How could they, flushed as they are with victory and such complete success, listen to the despised Christians? Among other missionaries sent to the Mussulmans, the good, the gifted, the irresistible Francis of Assisium throws himself with his usual ardor into that holy enterprise. He is received with respect by all, with favor by Mohammedan princes; but even he has to withdraw. Not a single follower of the Arabian impostor yielded to the incomparable virtues and most winning ways of Francis. Other men of God who went on a similar errand fail in its accomplishment; most of them perish in their attempts, either from the climate or in the tortures of the martyrdom to which they were speedily subjected; and all that the most ardent preachers of the true faith can do, and that remains to be done, is to sustain the comparatively few Christians who yet live under the Mussulman yoke, and prevent the Church from entirely disappearing in those immense regions which Mohammedanism subjugated.

It was then that the heroic effort, called the first crusade, was made by all Western Europe against the Saracens encamped in Palestine and Egypt. It was followed by several others, of which we cannot now speak. The primary object of the crusaders was undoubtedly to rescue the sepulchre of Christ from the hands of the Moslems; but there was a secondary one which, had the primary succeeded, would have resulted from its effects. This was to open again the heart of Asia to the zeal of Christian missionaries. The fanatical followers of Mohammed had occupied in force the only road through which Europeans could reach Persia, Hindoostan, and the countries beyond. The route by sea could not be thought of, when through the want of the mariner's compass vessels of the largest size were compelled to follow the shore, and a coasting trade was all that navigators could undertake to carry on.

In fact, there seemed to be an end to Catholic missions beyond the shores of Asia Minor, and yet it was just then that the Popes, acting in concert with the kings of France and the emperors of Germany, thought of sending through Northern Europe and Central Asia, to the very confines of Tartary, monks and priests. Ru-bruquis and Monte Corvino were the first agents of God to open China to religion, as Marco Polo was the agent merely of civilization to open it to commerce. Thus, in the most trying times, when the most zealous of men might well have despaired, the original design of converting the whole world to God through Christ was not abandoned; and the history of missions from the tenth century to the fifteenth was not left a blank.

But when the compass comes into the hands of Europeans, and the ocean can be traversed in safety, how soon the vessels of Portugal reach India, and those of Spain discover America. The Church at once begins her work again with a new courage, and the hope is suddenly awakened in many hearts of seeing the whole world at the feet of Christ. Who can read without the deepest emotion the narrative of the progress of Portuguese enterprise, under the direction of Prince Henry, all along the shores of Africa? It was not commerce alone which was the great end of those movements, for Portugal and her kings, and particularly Prince Henry, were then animated by a profound sense of religion. The cross was everywhere planted with great solemnity and heartfelt devotion all along the coast of this savage country, chiefly in Guinea and Congo; and the preliminary object seemed to be the Christianization of the whole continent. This, too, was evidently the case at first in India, until the immense wealth acquired by the first explorers tempted many of them to forget God and follow mammon. But nevertheless there were many men of God who never lost sight of the high motive which brought them to those distant shores.

Francis Xavier alone sufficed to spread a halo of glory over the missions of that period.

As to America, setting aside entirely the celebrated *conquistadores*, is there an epoch in the annals of the Church brighter and holier than that during which so many millions of Mexicans, Peruvians, and New Granadians were conquered to God, whose children have continued to this day to remain Christians? The heroic labors of many thousand missionaries, whose lives spent in their behalf were so truly apostolic, and whose success in the good cause was so wonderful, are even in this day scarcely known except to God. The details that have reached us, particularly from Mexico and Paraguay, comprise some of the most entrancing pages of human history that have ever been written; but with these exceptions the history of American missions is unknown.

All know how the bright hopes that at first were awakened have been sadly disappointed. Protestantism in Eastern Asia, the faults or rather crimes of political rulers in America, are certainly its two most potent causes; and there was a time, at the beginning of this century, when Catholic missions appeared to be on the verge of utter destruction. The Church, however, never thought of abandoning to their fate the nations that had not yet entered her pale, or of forsaking those that had received the beginnings of instruction at her knees. She soon began in earnest that work of reconstruction which, in order to have an exact idea of her situation outside of European countries, it is the purpose of this paper to portray. When the present extent of her sway in those extensive regions is compared with her humble beginnings at the dawn of this century, the heart of the Christian is at once filled with hope, and his mind cannot resist the conviction that the day is at hand when a great part of Asia and Africa will answer the call now so earnestly made upon them. But before describing the Church's foreign conquests in the present age, it is important to examine seriously the numerous differences which exist between her present mode of action and that of previous ages. The Church has always had the same object in her missions, namely, to spread the kingdom of Christ on earth, to civilize men, open to them the gates of salvation, and prepare them for heaven. But the means she employs change with the changes of times and nations, and it requires but a superficial glance to see how far her mode of action in the present age differs from what it invariably was in the beginning of modern missions, at the end of the fifteenth century. When this great fact is considered in all its details, the mind is struck at once with the many advantages resulting from what may be called the new policy in evangelizing infidel nations. The system was not certainly made up *a priori*, as the word policy would indicate. It

grew up from the force of actual circumstances, and must have been controlled by the Holy Spirit as everything else in the world, but particularly in the spiritual world. To some people it may appear at first sight that in several points of dissemblance between the present and the past the advantages are not all on the side of the first, and that many things in the old system, which have entirely or nearly disappeared in the new, seemed to the Church solid advantages for promoting the good of mankind. But if every detail is properly considered and weighed, there can be no doubt that there is a great deal more of hope to be derived from what appears to be the precarious state of the missions at the present moment than was the case when the powerful arm of great states seemed to uphold them. In these few words the first point of dissimilarity between the old and the new missions has been stated.

1. It is undoubtedly a fascinating spectacle to contemplate the sovereigns of Europe, as soon as their fleets had opened new avenues of commerce, having in mind the conversion to Christianity of barbarous or semi-civilized races, and leading by the hand heavenly religion with every mark of respect and honor, in order to enthrone her on distant shores, and give her the spiritual control of millions of new children begotten by her to Christ. The pages which relate those wonders invariably excite in the reader feelings of the most profound veneration. Who does not feel himself on the point of shedding tears when, perusing the adventures of the French Bettancourt in the Canary Islands, he beholds that good man suddenly leaving his pacific conquest, crossing the sea to the continent, in order to obtain from the Pope, through the king of Spain, the first missionaries that labored in lands surrounded entirely by the Western Ocean? Before he derives any commercial advantage from his discovery the inhabitants must enter into the family of Christian nations, and receive by baptism equality of rights in this world and the prospect of an eternal happiness in the next. Such were the sublime views of these early discoverers. The same thing happened on a much larger scale when the fleets of Prince Henry having reached Congo, on the coast of Africa, the Gospel was first preached to the negroes of a vast territory, and several of their princes were taken to Lisbon, instructed with care, baptized with solemnity, and afterwards were carried back to their subjects and enthroned with pomp as being henceforth Christian kings. Was not even Francis Xavier beholden to another king of Portugal for his wonderful mission to India and Japan? Those were days of a sublime union between Church and State, when both combined their efforts for the salvation of souls and the happiness of mankind. But this was not to continue long.

To endure for ages it would have required a long and constant

succession of princes, all of them animated by the purest feelings of religion, and all determined to place mere policy always in the background. But soon, alas! religion was almost entirely forgotten, and policy enthroned in her place to rule the destinies of the missions! Those very Guanches of the Canary Islands, so happy under the holy sway of Bettancourt, and of the first bishop and missionaries whom he himself brought there, have all long ago disappeared, and been replaced by a mongrel population of Europeans. The negroes of Congo, after several centuries of Portuguese misrule, are still almost as savage as they were when first visited by the fleet of Prince Henry. As to the conquests of the Church in Central and South America—among the greatest wonders the world has ever witnessed—they long ago reached their apogee, and seem now to be fast declining, and destined in the end to disappear.

The cause of all these disheartening movements was undoubtedly State control pushed to the extreme of a petty tyranny. In Spanish America, where so many great, holy, and zealous bishops have adorned the Church, how often has it not happened that their influence was reduced to naught by the viceroys, or governors of large kingdoms or of simple provinces? When at last nothing could be undertaken in Church affairs without the consent of the mother country, and everything in America—Indians, missionaries, religious orders, the hierarchy itself—depended upon the nod of Spanish or Portuguese ministers in Europe, the D'Arandas and Pombals of the epoch, religion had to hide her sweet face, and to shed bitter tears on account of the grovelling position and real bondage to which they had degraded her.

In Canada, even, how much could be said on this point. After having begun so well with her Champlains and her Montmagnis, it is known how many obstacles were placed in the way of doing good by some of their successors. It must, however, be said to their honor, that they never went so far as their Spanish congeners, and religion never had to blush, nor complain of being deprived totally of influence in the French colony, which, as Bancroft justly says, was not a colony, but a mission.

At the present time, if the Church is deprived of the help afforded her previously by Christian sovereigns, she is at least not attached to the car of State, and expected to act the part of explorer or spy for political purposes far less holy than her own. All her action remains exclusively under her control, and receiving no other aid than that of her own people, she is compelled to submit to no command given her by an arrogant power. Her missionaries can appear before infidel nations without the fear of being looked upon as political spies in disguise, and those they wish to convert can

see in them only the men they profess to be,—disinterested messengers of peace and virtue.

There can be no doubt that an immense obstacle stood in their way when they presented themselves to far-distant nations as the envoys, not only of an unknown Pope, but likewise, as was too often the case, of princes whose rapacity became known only too soon. It is said that the Dutch, then the rivals in commerce of the Portuguese in the far Orient, wishing to exclude them from the Japanese trade, had only to unfold a map of Hindoostan before the eyes of the Japanese officials, and show them the vast extent of the domain of Portugal in India, attributing it to missionaries and to their soldiers. The fact seems to be proved, but if it were not, the idea would have naturally sprung up at Yeddo and Nagasaki in the mind of such an acute people, as soon as they knew what had already happened in countries nearly contiguous to them. It is certain that the persecution against Christianity in Japan was continued to the bitter end, and until they thought they had destroyed the last worshipper of Jesus; and this persecution had its origin in the firm, though unfounded persuasion of the Japanese that it was necessary for their own national independence.

This might also have been one of the objects kept in view by the Chinese when they adhered so doggedly to their determination of excluding foreigners from their shores. Had it not been for these prejudices kept alive by what to them appeared facts in the case of other countries, it is extremely probable that at this moment a great part of Japan and China would be Catholic. The help on the one hand afforded to religion in those distant countries by several most pious kings and princes, was neutralized on the other by their interference with the Church's freedom of action, and the hindrances they caused to her missionary efforts. It is far preferable that the missionary should go, as he does at the present time, with a mere pittance for his individual support, but with his spiritual mission unconnected with any concerns of a baser nature.

Look, dear reader, at the impression he must now invariably make on all those who become acquainted with him sufficiently to know him thoroughly. He is sent by an august high priest, who cannot appoint so much as a corporal's guard to accompany and protect him. The one who gave him his mission has never been known to cover the sea with his fleets, and send large armies to raise his flag on foreign shores. Not only does not the Pope annoy distant nations by planting colonies in the midst of them; it has never been known that he has established counting-houses and industrial factories on any part of the earth's surface. The missionary to whom he has given his credentials, not only cannot become a political agent of any sort, but he is even positively forbid-

den to engage in any commercial speculation. He does not go to China and Japan to buy tea, or porcelain, or silk, or to sell opium and hardware. Never has any one seen, as is the case with many Protestant missionaries, a Catholic priest becoming the agent of a great European house. He seems, in fact, to have neither race nor native country, except so far as the few letters he writes to his friends may disclose the one or the other. If he ever returns to his place of birth, it is certain that he will never carry back with him coin of sufficient consequence to impoverish the smallest even of the South Sea coral islands.

The subject could be enlarged upon, but we must forbear from want of room. It is, however, absolutely impossible not to say at least a word concerning the means of living left at the disposal of the man of God who has forsaken friends and country to go and preach the Gospel of the Lord Jesus to people who were nothing to him by natural ties, and whom, had he so wished, he could have left in their ignorance of God without himself being the loser. As, however, the missionary priest is at the present time the apostle of the poorest people, it may be in China, Japan, or Tonquin—this new feature will be considered apart by and by—he cannot consent to be a burden to his flock; he cannot even, as St. Paul, work at a trade for his living; he must consequently receive from Europe, and the more wealthy Catholic communities of the world, what he absolutely requires for his sustenance. This is accomplished through the agency of the admirable Association for the Propagation of the Faith, an association so well known to the reader as to require no further comment. But this at least deserves mentioning, namely, that although the contributions of the members of this association amount every year to a respectable sum, as can be seen from its *comptes rendus*, still, as the total has to be divided among so many, and applied to so large a number of different objects, the word used a moment ago, pittance, expresses exactly what each individual missionary receives.

From these statements I leave it to any man of sense to decide if the new system of missions—taking all circumstances into consideration—is not preferable to the one in use two hundred years ago, and if it is not destined to bear fruit in greater quantity and of a more permanent nature.

2. A second feature of great importance requires a moment's attention. It is the near disruption of Mohammedanism, an event which, in its incipiency, has as yet scarcely begun to bear fruit, but which, in its maturity, is destined to have an immense influence in a near future on the propagation of Christianity. It has been seen that for more than five hundred years the Moslems opposed themselves as a barrier to the spread of Christianity, and it was only

when at last the progress of navigation enabled the Europeans to sail around the Mussulman empire, that the confines of Asia could be reached. But even when this happened, the vast countries occupied by the Arabs and the Turks remained altogether closed to Christian proselytism. It was a capital crime for any missionary to bring to Christ a single follower of Mohammed, and, independently of this, but a very few of those deluded fanatics would consent to listen to any advocate of truth. All that the messengers of God could do, was to keep up the spirit of the Christians still living in the midst of Mussulmans, to convert the schismatics, and bring back to a more strict discipline the children of Rome in those distant countries. It is indisputable that in all these respects the new situation is far preferable to the old one.

Mention has already been made of the disruption of Mohammedanism, and a word of proof must be given in support of it. There are writers at this day who pretend the contrary, and openly uphold the opinion that instead of breaking down, the religion of Mohammed is progressing rapidly in Asia and Africa. They foretell for it a future of success and prosperity such as it has seldom enjoyed. For them, evidently, the wish is father to the thought. These gentlemen would be highly pleased should Christianity disappear; and thus they feel a secret leaning towards anything opposed to it. But their opinion cannot be sustained in the face of so many incontrovertible facts. A few only of these can be mentioned here. There is the actual *disruption* of the Turkish empire, which must certainly disappear before long, whatever its well-wishers may hope. There is the universal decadence of Turks and Arabs to a lower plane, wherever they are in contact with Europeans. The Bey of Tunis has been tamed in his lair, that of Algiers has been dispossessed of his territories long ago, and the Emperor of Morocco thinks no more of invading Spain, or even of encroaching on the French in Algiers. Examine seriously the situation of the Mohammedans in Hindooostan, where so many of their princes are under the British yoke. It is there particularly, they say, that the Mussulman population increases rapidly. If it is true, it is owing to some abnormal cause which cannot last long. In Egypt, Palestine, Persia, and Central Asia the Turks are not as haughty and confident as they were two hundred years ago. It is already a long time since the Spaniards with the help of the Indians, in the Philippine Islands, curbed the Mohammedans of the East Indies in their desire to extend their conquests and invade the islands of the South Sea. Has it been reported lately that the attempt is likely to be repeated?

These few words must suffice. If, however, the term disruption is considered by some too strong, it cannot be denied, at any rate,

that everywhere except in the heart of Arabia, Christians can speak openly in the haunts of Turks and Arabs; and if any one of them wishes to embrace the religion of the Cross he can do so. Has it not been done a few years ago by a number of them in Damascus, that hot-bed of Turkish fanaticism?

Portray to yourself now what progress the religion of Christ is destined to make in the finest portion of the world, as soon as that incubus of Mohammedanism shall cease to hold it, and to paralyze at the same time civilization and virtue. Were not in ancient times the countries of Asia Minor, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Persia, and Central Asia, the richest, happiest, and best ordered of the world, even though fundamentally altered and perverted by idolatry? What blessings has the boasted monotheism of the Arabs and the Turks brought to them? Can they not revive when the true worship of the Triune God, which they embraced with so much ardor at the first preaching of the Gospel, is restored to them? It is said by some that the best interpretation of the prophecies of the Old Testament gives us the assurance that the true faith, after conquering the whole universe, at the latter days, will complete the circle and end by restoring Jesusalem to more than its former splendor. To do this the Christian religion is altogether competent; but Mohammedanism must first disappear before the messengers of God can achieve their triumph.

3. A third and very important difference between the old missions and the new consists in the facility afforded to religious women in our age to devote themselves to the active service of these arduous undertakings. Formerly it was considered as out of the question, as altogether foreign to the secluded habits of holy nuns, who were invariably confined to the walls of their convents. It was only in course of time, after a great number of pagans had been converted, and there were already Christian communities in those distant regions, that houses of women were established, in which, however, the strict rules of European conventional life were generally followed. Thus the Ursulines started for Quebec only when there was in the city a sufficiently large Christian population. And it is expressly mentioned in the *Relations des Jésuites*, that though the first nuns who arrived were allowed to visit the churches and the various establishments already in progress, yet immediately afterwards they were solemnly placed under the rules of holy inclosure.

It is certain that all Spanish and Portuguese America was converted without the help of religious women, although so far as the Indians were concerned there would not have been any more difficulty than there is at this time, and religious women would have been quite as useful then as now. But it was particularly in Asia

and Africa that their absence must have been severely felt. In many places, even outside of Mussulman territory, it is well-nigh impossible for a man, particularly a foreigner, to have any conversation with native females, inclosed as they are in their houses, which they seldom leave. How families could be converted under such circumstances as these remains a puzzle which the narratives of the missions do not sufficiently explain. But whenever this was not the case, and intercourse with all was allowed, the license of the native women was often so excessive that it became a real danger for the missionary. Some strange circumstances of the kind are related in a series of letters written from Ormuz, at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, by Father Gaspar, a Portuguese companion of St. Francis Xavier. They were translated and published in the *London Month*, for 1874, but we cannot rehearse them in this paper.

All these difficulties, thank God, are done away with by the establishment in our day of numerous congregations of women, who not being subject to the former rule of complete separation from the world, are allowed to do for their sex what the missionaries by themselves could scarcely accomplish. It is to St. Vincent de Paul that we owe this primarily. He was the first to break through the previous custom of strict inclosure for women, in writing the rules for his *Daughters of Charity*; and since his time, we think that not a single new congregation of nuns has been established which has not followed his example. To give a complete list of them would be too tedious, and well-nigh useless, as they all have the same character of simplicity, charity, self-sacrifice, and the most ardent love of God, of our Divine Saviour, and of his Holy Mother.

It was to be the privilege of our latter times to see what no other age of the Church has witnessed, namely, troops of delicate females crossing the sea in all directions, to help forward the spread of Christianity in the most barbarous lands. For they now are sent not only to the long-settled and civilized countries of China and Japan, but to the most forbidding places of America and Africa. The files of the weekly periodical, *Les Missions Catholiques*, quoted at the head of this paper, contain details of the highest interest, which cannot be passed over without at least a mere mention. In Trinidad, at the mouth of the Orinoco, there is a celebrated lepers' hospital, at a place called Cocorite, under the charge of Dominican Sisters. One of them thus describes her ward of twenty patients, which she would not "have exchanged, with their offensive ulcers and their faces more or less savage, for the brightest kingdom in the world." "My ward," she wrote, "is a little world in itself, worthy the brush of an artist; for many nations are represented in it—Chinese, Creoles, Hindoos, negroes, Africans, Portu-

gues, etc., all more or less deformed naturally or through disease. Some of them have no hands and no feet, others have distorted mouths or squinting eyes. I have two who are half crazy, and another entirely so. Of a couple of them who are in second childhood, one weeps all the time, the other sings from morning to night. . . . We have, as you see, variety enough to satisfy all tastes. The best is that nearly all, young or old, call me their little mamma; and I am proud of it, and hope to deserve it, as I intend to be a mother to them all." This Sister was evidently a Frenchwoman; she had a short time before landed at Trinidad from Lyons.

In Central Africa, on the Higher Nile, and in the barbarous country of Cordofan during the last few years, several houses of Sisters of St. Joseph have been founded, and many of them are at this moment engaged in reclaiming from barbarism the degraded Arabs and negroes described by Sir Samuel Baker in his *Ismailia*. Among them, one of the most prominent is Sister Emiliana Naubon, a native of Pau, in the south of France. After having been employed for thirty years in Syria and Cyprus, and having founded the female convents of Saida, Deir-el-kamar, and Beyrouth, she was sent to Khartoom by the way of the Red Sea, Souakin and Berber. Leaving Cairo with an Arabian Sister, on February 22d, 1875, she reached her destination the following 19th of April. She is there at the confluence of the two Niles.

From Cordofan we have the news, March 10th, 1875, that "one-half of the Sisters' house is completed. It is built of red bricks, and looks wonderful for the country. The college for negro boys has been enlarged, owing to the increasing number of inmates."

South of Cordofan, and between that country and the territory of the Shillooks, roam the wild tribes of the Noubas. Among them Sisters are found at a place called Dallem. They occupy there "a small house near a modest church built of straw."

Any one who has read the books of travels wherein those wild countries are described, cannot but wonder that women are found willing to go, and delighted to stay, in such God-forsaken and plague-stricken regions. Nothing in them can attract, and everything is most repulsive to sense. Nature is forbidding in her look, the climate fatal to human life, and man a compound of cruelty and baseness. But these degraded human beings have souls, and the grace of God will move some noble spirits to help to save them. It is heroic on the part of men to undertake it at any cost. How much more is it so for weak women? Yet more of them are found than can be sent, and the more repulsive the task, the greater is the number of those who apply for it.

The list of examples would be interminable, did we undertake to go through the pages of the periodical from which we quote. But

there is one instance that we cannot possibly pass over. It refers still to Africa, and carries us to the northeastern extremity of the continent, not very far south of Cape Guardafui. There is near the coast an island of moderate size, called Zanzibar, inhabited by a motley crowd of Arabs and negroes. Its ruler bears the name of Sultan, and the laws are merely his own sovereign will. All his subjects, in the island and on the continent for a good distance around, are Mohammedans, except perhaps some pagans among the negroes. The climate is detestable, the social condition of the people wretched, and the country to which it opens the way in the interior is even worse. It was scarcely known a few years ago; but since the attempts recently made to explore thoroughly Central Africa, many travellers have written about it. Mr. Stanley in particular has described it to Americans, having visited it twice, and started from it in his last expedition across the whole continent. What attraction could carry thither Catholic missionaries, no one can understand except those who are acquainted with the spirit of zeal fostered by the grace of God in the hearts of the apostles. They are there in consequence of it. When they first landed, finding themselves too confined on the island, they established themselves on the mainland opposite, near a village called Bagamoyo. This took place only a few years ago, and now the establishment strikes with wonder every European that sees it. Mr. Stanley, a man not much given to admiration for Protestant missionaries after having seen so many of them in different parts of the world, and observed their puny efforts, could not refrain in his narrative from speaking feelingly on the subject.

The object of the Catholic mission is very simple. Some one of those who started it observed that slavery was the great plague of Central Africa, and thought he could undermine it by using it as a tool for its own destruction. The missionaries' chief occupation, therefore, is to buy children and bring them up. You find them for sale everywhere, and a few francs is the price for one, male or female. How easy it is to fill houses with them! The object is not to devote them to a life of shame; fie on the idea! but to make of them children of God, and establish them afterwards in Christian villages which, it is hoped, will open the eyes and ears of the poor negroes of the neighborhood, and bring them to a knowledge of the true God. It is precisely what Archbishop Lavigerie is doing in Algeria for the posterity of the whilom Mauritaniens still living on the slopes of the Atlas Mountains, and turned into Mussulmans without knowing why. But for such a project numbers of children are required, and nurseries on a large scale are necessary. Nurseries require nurses, and on this account Sisters are wanted. They call them at Bagamoyo, *Filles de Marie*. People in this country

must not imagine that there are no other Sisterhoods than those which bless by their presence the United States. What a sweet nomenclature if it were written in full! and in each Sisterhood what a holy simplicity, devotedness, virtue, heroism! We know many of them, and wish we could know them all. With them as helpers, how can there be any doubt that the world will be regenerated? But something more must be said of those of Bagamoyo.

When they began to receive children, these were not all infants; there were youths among them; so that they have already built a village near their establishment, and filled it with about twenty families. An international hospital, besides, has been constructed for the numerous seamen who come in European ships. The Sisters cannot be idle, consequently. To give a more exact idea of their labors, and of those of the missionaries who direct them, a few words from a letter written from Paris, July 16th, 1875, are most opportune.

"The eve of Pentecost"—evidently of the year previous—"there was at Bagamoyo a ceremony in which forty grown-up persons were baptized. . . . . A few days after, two fine steel bells from Hamburg were blessed, and their sweet sound calls people to prayer in a place where, seven years ago, the roar and screams of wild beasts were the only sounds that could be heard. . . . . The day after the blessing of the bells, Bagamoyo witnessed the first communion of thirty children. The only thing which marred their happiness was the absence of their parents, who are probably all working under the whip of harsh masters in some far-off fields of Africa. On the same day, immediately after the first communion of the children, the sacrament of confirmation was conferred on sixty adult natives. When the afternoon came, the day was ended by a splendid procession of the Blessed Sacrament. Three altars had been prepared, one before the house of the missionaries, the second before that of the Sisters, the last in the Christian village lately founded. Imagine three hundred children walking in procession, sixty persons clad in white on account of the confirmation they had received in the morning, the roads sprinkled thick with blossoms which marked the route of the procession, the concourse of thousands of Mussulmans or pagans who were attracted by the novelty of the spectacle! All this in a barbarous country, on a spot where, a few years before, only lions and tigers roamed and fought each other!" These are the miracles accomplished in our day by a few zealous men directing a more numerous band of devoted women. This must suffice.

4. A feature of the new missions, more important, perhaps, than any of those which have been passed in review so far, is that the Catholic hierarchy is gradually extended to them, and the day is

not far distant when the whole globe will be encompassed by it, and divided into metropolitan districts and dioceses. The system has now been extended over nearly the whole of America, North and South, a considerable part of Australia and the adjacent islands, and some districts of Africa, north and south, besides all the Protestant countries in the north of Europe. All thoughtful men must recognize in this step a great advance on the former state of things. Dioceses, after all, are the only units which never disappear in the Catholic Church. Some of them may seem to be dropped, and are dropped occasionally as to the name, but it is only in order to be annexed to a neighboring one of greater importance. The fact of the Sees *in partibus infidelium* being still kept on the lists of Catholic bishoprics after centuries of discontinuance, furnishes a strong proof of the importance the Church attaches to her hierarchy.

When the discovery of a road to India, and of the continent of America suddenly enlarged the field of missions, a few bishoprics were erected in those distant countries. The Spanish monarchs showed some eagerness for such establishments in their dominions. The French before a recent epoch never had, in all their possessions beyond the sea, but one of them, that of Quebec. The territories to be conquered to Christ were so vast, and the requirements at that time considered indispensable to the erection of a bishop's see, were so great, that most of the time the Church was satisfied with missions intrusted to religious orders or congregations. The whole world knows how much Christianity is indebted to them for what they have done. But establishments made by them are subject to numerous causes of change, and even of abandonment. There is no doubt, consequently, that the new system has great advantages over the old one. Even in countries where a full hierarchy cannot as yet be thought of, the custom now prevails extensively of sending to them Vicars-Apostolic with the Episcopal character, as a step to the erection of permanent dioceses. And these vicariates, though embracing sometimes the wildest regions, are thus regarded as amenable to the strictest rules of the Church. Reflect for a moment on this fact, that the present Archbishop of Algiers has lately been made by the Holy See Vicar-Apostolic of the Sahara and Soudan. Who would have thought it possible fifty years ago? And who can say that the whole of Africa will never be thoroughly Christianized? Our own America is another great proof of this Christianizing movement, since the whole dreary territory formerly under the control of the Hudson Bay Company, as far north as the mouth of the Mackenzie River, is now, in its whole extent, confided to the spiritual care of Bishops or Vicars-Apostolic, all belonging to the noble band of the Canadian Oblates.

But the limits assigned to this paper prevent a greater development of this important subject.

5. A last striking difference between the old missions and the new is characteristic of this democratic age, and deserves a serious consideration. It is this: Formerly not only the missions were undertaken under the patronage of kings or great men, but in general the missionaries justly attached a paramount importance to including among their first converts in infidel countries some at least, if not a great number, of the most influential men among those nations. If the king himself listened to the message of peace, it was considered as nearly tantamount to the conversion of the whole people. Now it is not so. Is it a disadvantage, or the contrary?

Let us look at this a little more in detail. If one considers the vast and important countries of the far East, Hindoostan, China, Japan, Annam, and the largest islands of the East Indies, this feature of the modern missions is very significant. Those who labor in them meet everywhere with remarkable success among the humble and the poor; none at all among the rich and the great, with a few inconsiderable exceptions. Is it not so in all the countries which have been just enumerated? That the great do not feel any inclination to embrace Christianity is unfortunately undeniable, since most of them persecute it openly, and the remainder show a great inclination to do it. This is the case particularly in China, Japan, and Annam. That the people in general appear willing to receive the message of Christ is manifest from the large number that have done so, for instance, in the Annamite territory in spite of the atrocious persecutions which have raged there since the beginning of this century. There is no doubt that in China, too, crowds of people would embrace Christianity if it were not for the mandarins and the rabble. The last volumes of the *Missions Catholiques* are positive on the subject. In Hindoostan a like state of things has shown itself more strongly than ever during the last few years of famine that have devastated the country. All the Vicars-Apostolic and missionaries that labor in the parts of Hindoostan where hunger rages with the greatest fury, are unanimous in deplored their want of sufficient resources for feeding the dying populations, as they all cry loudly for baptism and for bread. The fact is that the Church in those immense countries is intent only, as usual, upon doing her work of charity and consolation; and this is a language that the people everywhere understand as the best argument in favor of truth.

It is impossible to enlarge on the subject, yet it would be much better understood could details in far greater number be given. The documents, however, are clear, and any person who peruses

them will be convinced. The important question which alone remains to be briefly discussed is this: Have the modern missions a fairer field than the old in attending to the humbler classes, who alone give a real hope of success? Or would it be better to see the influential ranks of society in these regions ready to receive the call, instead of remaining deaf and dumb as at present?

One thing is certain, that of the old missions only those of humble birth have remained faithful to the religion preached to them by former missionaries. Look at this a little more attentively, and you will be surprised at the result. To commence with Hindoo-stan, St. Francis Xavier began by preaching to the poor, and converted hundreds of thousands of them. His companions and successors followed in the same track with a corresponding success. Later on, Father De Nobili, remarking that the higher classes, the Brahmin caste particularly, had not yet given any sign of joining in the movement, became a Brahmin himself, and wrote a book which he called the *Ezour Veda*, so perfect as to language that it was thought to be the production of a learned Hindoo. Professing to be a Sanyissi, the highest degree of brahminical penitence, he attracted to himself the most noble, and austere, and learned of the nation. What has become of all those efforts for the conversion of the great? To-day Christianity has entirely disappeared among the high castes; but there are yet, as we will see presently, a million and a half of poor Christians. Look at China; it is known that Father Ricci and those who followed him have done for the conversion of courtiers and high mandarins all that could be done by zealous and learned men. Nothing remains to-day of their temporary success; but crowds of poor Chinese fill the numerous churches of the country. Not a single nobleman among the Japanese has transmitted to his posterity of this day the religion of Christ, which many of them professed before the persecutions began; but sixty thousand people of the lower orders were found a few years ago so deeply attached to their religion, after having remained two centuries without priests, that many of them have died since on desert islands for refusing to renounce it. In Annam the same spectacle again excites our admiration. At the end of the last century it was hoped that not only many high mandarins but the king himself might become Christians. The Bishop of Adran, sent by the Pope and Louis XVI., became a great man at court, and, at the death of the then living king, saved the legitimate heir, and was instrumental in placing him on the throne. This young hopeful heir was the celebrated Minh Mêh, who originated those bloody persecutions which well-nigh drowned Christianity in blood. The people, the lower orders of the nation, alone

remained faithful, furnished an immense number of martyrs, and form at this moment the entirety of the Annamite Christians.

These are striking examples, but a great deal more could be said. This much may be concluded, that the modern missions have at least lost nothing since they have been confined to the conversion of the poor. The great, the powerful, the so-called learned are in those semi-civilized countries the same godless people that we see in Europe. There are exceptions to the rule, God be thanked! but they are comparatively few, and the general rule is as stated.

Since those mighty patricians think that the world, that is to say, themselves, can do very well, and prosper, and enjoy the goods of this life without God and the practice of any religion, let them go on in their reckless career and persecute the Christians if they choose. This will not last long, for the signs of the times look ominous for the aristocracy; and if the higher classes of society have nothing to fear from the meek followers of the Saviour, they have a great deal to fear from God, and also at this moment from the devil himself, who is inspiring rather wicked thoughts in the minds of a numerous God-forsaken rabble.

Many features of the modern missions have thus been passed in review, and the spectacle has furnished many motives of consolation and hope. There is in fact but one aspect of them which is calculated to sadden the Christian heart. This is the fierce opposition of Protestantism, which is to-day universal over the entire field of missions. Mr. T. W. M. Marshall, in his celebrated book, has proved from non-Catholic authorities that the success of the Church far surpasses that of the adverse party. But it is nevertheless indisputable that Catholicity would progress far more in infidel countries than it does, if it were not for that sectarian opposition. Our remaining space does not allow us to examine this at length, and we prefer to devote our space to giving a short picture of the situation of the Church outside of European countries.

By our previous remarks, not only Europe, but America also, and Australia, are excluded from the inquiry, and consequently Asia, Africa, and the islands of the Pacific Ocean are the proper subjects of some statistical information, and of a few reflections.

In Asia, the whole western half, it must be confessed presents a desolate field, owing to the still strong possession of this vast territory by Mohammedanism. Thus in Persia there are very few Catholics; in Arabia, perhaps, none; in Asiatic Turkey there still are numerous Oriental churches and congregations connected with Rome, particularly among the Armenians and the Chaldeans. They keep up in the Catholic heart the hope that those nations may entirely return to the centre of unity, although for the last few

years the government of Constantinople has done its best to encourage schism among them. It has in particular expelled the Catholic Armenians and their pastors from the churches which exclusively belonged to the communion of Rome, in order to hand them over to the schismatic Kupelian. Lately, it is true, it has shown a somewhat better disposition by acknowledging as the head of the Armenian Catholics, Mgr. Hassoun, the prelate sent and commissioned by Rome, but entire justice has not, by any means, been done. This may continue as long as the rule of Mohammedanism endures, not longer. For want of space this part of the subject must be dismissed with these few words.

Turning to the eastern half of the continent, Hindoostan first attracts attention. The prospect there is of the most encouraging nature, in spite of many obstacles which still remain in the way. At the end of the last century the suppression of the Society of Jesus, the subsequent destruction of all religious orders in France during the first revolution, and the closing up of the great establishment *De propaganda fide* in Rome, appeared to have sealed the doom of the Indian missions, as well as of all the others. Towards 1820 there were very few priests remaining in the whole peninsula, and the flocks were diminishing every day. At last the reconstruction of the former orders and establishments arrested the downward tendency, and then progress was resumed. There has probably never been in India such activity and success among evangelical laborers on the side of Catholicity as there is at this moment. The whole country is, in fact, invaded and overrun by hundreds of zealous missionaries, which could not be the case even at the glorious time of St. Francis Xavier. The following are some of the details contained in the Madras Catholic Directory, the official publication of the hierarchy of Hindoostan :

At the last date, 1875, there were twenty-three Vicariates Apostolic, including those of Ceylon and the western half of the Cis-Gangetic peninsula. This means that this immense area was entirely divided into twenty-three ecclesiastical provinces, each of them having at its head a Bishop *in partibus infidelium* with the title of Vicar Apostolic. The very important Archdiocese of Goa was not comprised in these, and it must be kept in mind, apart from the twenty-three vicariates referred to. Some of them, it is true, did not contain many Catholics, Hyderabad numbering only 6645; Central Bengal, 1191; Malacca, 6160, etc. But there was Verapoly with 288,000; Madura, 145,000; Pondichery, 137,788, etc. The total for the vicariates amounted to 1,060,685. With the archdiocese of Goa, which, during the same year, 1875, contained 245,388 Catholics within its territory, and a total of 149,666 spread through the various vicariates, but not belonging to the jurisdic-

tion of the vicars apostolic, the total Catholic population of Hindooostan amounted to 1,455,739.

But this is for the year 1875 alone, and it is important to examine the figures given by the Madras Directory from 1864 to 1875, in order to ascertain if there has been progress, and to what extent. The calculating powers of the reader will not be taxed for this object. It has been done by the editor of the *Missions Catholiques*, who found that the average yearly increase amounted to 20,000. More yet, a great number of coolies leave Hindooostan every year to hire their labor in many distant countries, and as the Catholics are mostly poor, many of them belong to these shoals of emigrants. Thus Father St. Cyr, S.J., calculated in 1868 that 10,000 Christians belonging to the Madura Vicariate had emigrated to foreign parts during the famine of that epoch. This consideration, and several others of minor importance, prove that the average increase is considerably over 20,000. Hindooostan, it is true, contains 150,000,000 of inhabitants, and consequently the number of Catholics is still insignificant with regard to the total population. But as in cases of this kind the ratio of increase commonly follows a geometrical proportion, the moment seems to have arrived when Catholicity must begin to have some weight in the destinies of that country. The non-Catholic periodicals of India have already made the remark that the progress of the Church in that regard far outstrips that of all Protestant sects.

It were to be desired that we could be as explicit for China as we have just been for Hindooostan. The thing is not possible, for several reasons which must be briefly enumerated. Yet the conclusion of a much more gloomy account will on the whole be hopeful, and show real progress in spite of appalling difficulties. China, at this moment, seems to be in a revolutionary state, and the main feature of it is a fearful ebullition of rage on the part of the mob against foreigners, and also against Chinese Catholics, because of a supposed friendship towards Europeans on account of their religious teachers. Baron De Hubner remarked it during his short stay in the country, a few years ago, and did not hesitate to say, in his *Rambles Around the World*, that there would be nothing surprising if all the members of the European diplomatic body at Pekin were on some day or other murdered, although none of them showed the least apprehension of it. The massacres at Tien-tsin not long since prove the correctness of this opinion; and those of native Christians related in the seventh volume of the *Missions Catholiques*, cannot but excite horror in any one who peruses the narratives of the missionaries who witnessed those massacres and saw the heaps of the slain and the devastations of incendiaries.

This happened just after the great rebellion had been subdued;

and this scourge coming after the greater scourge still of the Taipings, seemed to intimate that the Chinese were indeed intent on destroying their country. The only fact which needs to be added to these few statements is that the Chinese authorities did not appreciate or feel the public loss, and instead of putting a stop to these barbarities, by their non-interference, rather gave open encouragement to the guilty. But what was the total result of this heartlessness on the part of the mandarins, and of this ferocity on the part of the rabble? Was the Christian religion at any time in danger of being totally destroyed in China, as it seemed to be in Japan at the end of the persecutions of the sixteenth century? We will soon be able to conclude the contrary, although it was undoubtedly a fearful ordeal. But that we may the better appreciate the work going on in China, we must present a few details regarding the extent of the Chinese Catholic missions.

Owing to the social confusion which now exists in China it is impossible to do for it what was just done for Hindoostan. No statistics are possible as regards many places. Another way of proceeding must be adopted. First, it is a well known fact that for many years already a number of religious orders and congregations have labored zealously for the conversion of the lower order of the Chinese, and have gathered around themselves large congregations of Christians, and established successively new centres of action with more or less prospect of success. These orders and congregations are mostly the Dominicans, the Jesuits, the Lazarists, the Franciscans, and the gentlemen of the Seminary for Foreign Missions from Paris. Vicars-Apostolic have divided the country as in Hindoostan, although perhaps not so thoroughly and completely. Secondly, wherever there has been little disturbance, as at Shanghai and Zi-ka-vei, the success has been surprising. All Europeans who have visited these establishments and estimated the good effected by them among the people, have expressed their admiration. In the third place, an attempt must be made to discover if the fury of the great rebellion and the subsequent uprising of the mob, have been able not only to destroy entirely what existed, but even to stop all possible progress.

This is what I read in a private correspondence from Zi-ka-vei, of Father Th. Robet, S.J., . . . missionary in Kiang-nan, July, 1875. The province of Kiang-nan, it must be remembered, was one of those most affected in all China, first by the rebellion, and afterwards by the hostility of the Mandarins. Still, this is the very clear statement of Father Robet: "It was said twenty years ago that this mission, of Kiang-nan, numbered as many as 100,000 Christians. I have the proofs that it was not more than 76,152 in 1854, when the number was the highest. It was directly after that the rebels

invaded the province of Kiang-nan. . . . They say that 10,000 Christians were killed by them from 1855 to 1864. . . . I am sure it must be true. . . . After the expulsion of the rebels, of every twenty inhabitants only *one* remained. . . . Yet in 1870 there were still in the mission 48,722 paschal communions and 137,114 communions during the year. In the same year there were in operation 250 schools for boys, in which 2370 Christian youths received instruction with 1169 pagan boys. Of girls there were 106 schools with 1473 Christian scholars and 26 pagan. . . . This year, 1875, the number of Christians in the mission must be very near *ninety thousand*, much more than ever before!

These figures are eloquent, and prove that the fearful disasters of the great Chinese rebellion, and of the mob rule which followed, could not stop the progress of Catholicity in China. Meanwhile other details given in letters written about the same time, show that Protestant propagandism entirely ceased, because the ministers and schoolmasters feared too much for their persons and families to remain in a country subjected to such social convulsions. Fourthly and lastly, this is, after all, but the fulfilment again of the great axiom of Tertullian, *Sanguis martyrum, semen Christianorum.*

Could we go through the scenes enacted at the same time in Annam, that is, Tonquin and Cochin China, it would be but the repetition of similar horrors and similar results. We must pass on to Africa, since nothing can be said as yet of Japan, where missionaries are just beginning their operations with the initial number of sixty thousand people, the offspring of former martyrs.

In Africa very little could be undertaken for the Christianization of the inhabitants until lately. Not only did the climate soon destroy the few apostles who presented themselves for this arduous mission, but, owing to the Mohammedanism of a great number of the African nations and tribes, and to the degraded fetichism of the remainder, the disheartened missionaries found scarcely any one willing to listen to them. This continent remained, therefore, a wilderness in a religious and moral point of view. The efforts made formerly by the Portuguese and French throughout the whole of the southwestern coast, had dwindled away to almost nothing; and in the north, even in Egypt, the Cross appeared only over a few Franciscan convents. It looked as if Africa was considered out of the pale of redemption. Nay, in Algiers, where certainly it might seem there was more reason for hope than anywhere else, the French government under Louis Philippe sternly refused to allow Christianity to be preached, under the foolish and mistaken idea that proselytism would be in the way of colonization.

At this moment the change is complete. It has been found that

the injurious effect of the climate on Europeans can, in a great degree, be warded off by hygienic precautions; and many of the natives in the interior of the country are far from showing any opposition to the Christian ministry when their prejudices are kindly dealt with, and care, too, is taken not to oppose directly what is radically ingrained in their character. Consequently numerous congregations of missionaries are devoting themselves to that hitherto unpromising field, and a gigantic effort is being made on all sides at once. A French writer admirably expresses it in a notice, *Sur les peuples Kabyles de l'Atlas*: "The hour of regeneration has at last struck for Africa. In the darkness of more than a thousand years' duration in which she has so far remained plunged, she seemed to be altogether outside of the sphere of religious progress. But at this day, on all her shores, apostles sent by Rome daily arrive, with no other means of support than the alms of their brethren. They suddenly appear everywhere at once, north, south, east, and west. The whole continent is, as it were, surrounded by a circle of faith and charity, from every point in the entire circumference of which movements are directed toward the centre. The missionaries, in fact, let them start from Algiers or from the Cape of Good Hope, from Guinea or Egypt, all of them turn their backs to the coast, and, armed only with the Cross, march intrepidly toward the unknown interior."

The present Archbishop of Algiers has powerfully organized the noble band which has the Atlas Mountains for its starting-point. He has founded for this purpose a congregation of his own, with the approbation of the Holy See. It is simply called *La Société des Missionnaires d'Afrique*. They are sent, three together, to any desirable point. Their mode of action consists in adapting themselves entirely to the Kabyle or Arab life; language, costume, habits, everything of a serious, or a trifling nature. The peculiar ministry by which they begin their apostleship consists of two things only, namely, to tend the sick and bring up the children. It would be fatal to preach the Christian dogmas at first. These are gradually inculcated when they have fully acquired the confidence of the natives. In 1875—we could not obtain more recent information—they possessed already nineteen establishments under the charge of the Fathers, Brothers, and Sisters of this congregation. Ten of these establishments were located among purely infidel tribes, either in the Great Kabylia, or in the Sahara itself.

A word has been said of the efforts made on the eastern side of the continent, from Egypt and Zanzibar. A few reflections of importance are only required here. The object of the Zanzibar and Bagamoyo mission is the evangelization of the eastern coast of Africa and of the interior, as far as may be possible toward the great

lakes. Its success so far surpasses the most sanguine anticipations, and the missionaries do not meet in that part of the country the difficulty existing in the west with regard to an open preaching of the Gospel. They tend, indeed, the sick, and bring up children as do the missionaries of Algiers; but they find, likewise, many of their converts among the adult population of the neighborhood. We have seen, in one of their great ceremonies, sixty native grown people walking in procession, after having been confirmed in the morning.

The mission, whose centre is at Khartoom, at the junction of the two Niles, seems also to meet with great success in the actual conversion of the negroes of every sex and age, although their first object is hospital work and the redemption of slaves. In several letters written from that centre, mention is made of the baptism of adult people, but the locality they came from is not mentioned. It would be important to know if some of the Noubas are already Christians. The missionaries, before going to live among them, entertained great hopes, as they were sure this tribe was originally composed of a certain number of Nubians who abandoned the banks of the Nile at the coming of the Moslems; and it is known that the Nubians fought during several centuries for the religion of Christ before bowing down to Mohammedanism.

The missions of Senegambia and of Guinea, chiefly the first, give proofs now of great success among the blacks of Southwestern Africa; but probably they will not reach the banks of the Niger in advance of the apostles of Algeria, some of whom have already been sent to Timbuctoo, through the great central desert.

Finally, from Cape Colony less perhaps is to be expected than from any other centre. The Catholic missionaries are yet few in number, and they will meet with fierce opposition from all the Protestant sects which swarm along that coast. But the great Madagascar Island, which belongs to Africa, and is very near the southeastern end of it, now offers a very remarkable spectacle, one that sooner or later must have great consequences for the spiritual welfare of that part of the world. Owing to the complete liberty granted for preaching the Gospel there are now in this large island hundreds of thousands of Christians, Protestants and Catholics. A singular division is taking place among them, and it is curious to know what is to be the result of it. The higher classes among the Hovas, the dominant race in Madagascar, adopt Protestantism on account of the superior wealth of its preachers. The humbler classes, as they are called, rush to the standard of Catholicity, although a certain number of the nobility embrace it likewise. There is no room for fear as to the result. The masses must have by and by the best of it, both because they are more numerous, and

because their motives are of a higher order than those of the adverse camp. When people embrace Christianity because those who preach it are well off it may be maintained that they do not know anything of its spirit. Only those who are moved to make profession of it because of the meekness, lowliness, and self-sacrifice manifested by its preachers, will love it ardently, and propagate it efficaciously.

Finally, the missionary field spread over the vast Pacific Ocean, and the innumerable islands with which it is dotted, requires a concluding word. The Australian Continent has been excluded from these considerations on account of its being destined to become altogether European, and because there are in it scarcely any native tribes to convert. But the entire extent of Oceanica is at this moment fast receiving the good tidings of the Gospel of Christ; and though the Protestant sects at the beginning made some headway, on account of their being the first occupiers of the field, the children of the true Church now increase rapidly in number all over the unoccupied lands, and even wherever sectarianism claimed at first the predominance. In many small coral spots where there is room only for a single village, a neat little church, often built of coral stones, raises its spire to heaven, and receives within its doors the simple-hearted population who come to pray and worship God. The Marist Fathers, or those of Picpus, have charge of many of them; and with religion civilization is introduced such as will surely benefit this poor people. In all those happy localities the native race is preserved pure, and rapidly increases in number. Anywhere else, when many Europeans have settled, vice reigns supreme, and the ill-fated Malaisians disappear rapidly. On the whole, it may be asserted, that Oceanica will either become a pacific conquest of Catholicity or will be inhabited in future ages by a mongrel and degraded set of people.

This hasty and very incomplete view of the modern missions cannot be called a sketch on account of its meagreness; it is only a very faint outline of the reality. Yet it will give to intelligent readers an idea of the Church's wonderful and real power. At the very moment that in European countries she is thwarted and opposed in every possible manner by those who rule the world, she takes quiet possession of a territory ten times as large as Europe. Protestant Germany and infidel Switzerland may imagine that they are at the point of crushing her in their domains; schismatic Russia may fondly hope to see her disappear from Poland; the rest of Europe, including all the former Catholic powers, may think that "modern thought" is sure to win against her. It has been proved in former papers that the thing is not so certain as many people are inclined to anticipate. But, suppose these unholy desires were

more likely to be realized than they are, look at the vast territories which are now offering a refuge to the persecuted Bride of Christ, and you will acknowledge that she is not yet a desolate outcast deprived of friends and home. Her home is wherever she plants the Cross and sees worshippers kneeling around it. Her friends are men and women with more heroism in their souls than all her adversaries can ever exhibit. Is it Count Bismarck, with all his immense power over all the European Lodges, who could find as many and as unselfish abettors of his plans, as the Church draws together every day of devoted servants and ardent admirers? Their devotedness and affection are put constantly to a test which no tool of the greatest statesman in the world could ever consent to undergo. Inquire a moment if the greatest amount of money and honors, or the most ardent zeal of a partisan conspirator could enable any one to endure the long life of hardship and obscure self-sacrifice which the Catholic missionary willingly embraces for the sake of proving his burning love of Christ and His Church. Then inquire further how many thousand men and women go to compose that army of true soldiers, who fight and die in so large a portion of Asia and Africa for the honor of God and the salvation of their fellow-beings. Having done this it will be easy for you to conclude on which side there is real hope of success. The tool of politicians, the fanatical adept of Freemasonry or modern enlightenment, may for the sake of a powerful self-interest, nerve himself to what he calls heroism in his cause, and expose perhaps his person to a speedy end and his future to the ruin of all his hopes. It is a chance he takes. But he never could devote himself to the life-long ordeal of an African climate, or to a secluded existence of many years on a spot a few miles square in the midst of the Pacific Ocean. For this the love of God is required, and in consequence of that love a more than filial obedience to the Mother Church.

The spectacle of it, when it is taken in its complexity, and embraces the whole field of the missions, is promotive of the most ardent admiration, and truly awe-inspiring. Can there be found any other power in the world able to form and realize such a project as this? Suppose all the treasures of the European nations were put together, suppose a promise were made to men of good will that each one should have a liberal share of those treasures, provided they would do for the realization of a particular plan what the grand army of Catholicity in foreign parts does year after year, day after day, for the spread of religion in infidel countries. It is likely that at the first call there would be an affirmative response from many people who judge of terrestrial happiness only by the amount of money each one is able to procure and possess.

But it will easily be foreseen that the enthusiasm visible at the first moment would not last long, and the ardor of the adventurers would soon cool down at the prospect of the dreary life imposed upon them. But the ardor of the Catholic missionary, although never stimulated by a full purse and the means of luxurious living, continues unabated until death; whether it comes at his first landing on a plague-stricken coast, or terminates a long life of privation and hardship in an obscure spot.

Any one who appreciates these considerations cannot but recognize in the Catholic Church a vigor superior to that of any other power. As to Catholics themselves, they will feel, all the more profoundly, the divine character of the Mother who gave them birth, and fed them with her milk.

Thus, in concluding this last paper on the "Actual Situation of the Church," the thought naturally reverts to the numerous children she has found on, or brought to, these hitherto happy shores. More than anywhere else, perhaps, it is impossible on this continent of North America to be a sincere adherent of Catholicity and not to feel the deepest devotion to it. It may be maintained that the destinies of the nation are involved in its prosperity, or the reverse. But independently of this, the future happiness of all Catholic families entirely depends on the continued prosperity of our holy religion, and on the sincere attachment of all of us to it. Since the beginning of this century we have been blessed, undoubtedly, more than any other civilized people, by an extraordinary development of our highest spiritual interests. If, in our previous researches, it has been found that in many places the Church's influence has dwindled away, it has been just the reverse in this country. At the end of the Revolutionary War it may be said that Catholicity took its first free breath of air on a free continent, but from how few lungs and throats! How different is the prospect at this moment! If there are things of which we, as Catholics, may still complain, they are few indeed, and trifling, compared with what exist in European countries.

But in order that this state of prosperity may continue and increase, it is all-important that our devotedness to our holy religion shall know no other limits than those of what is possible or practicable. If this were entirely the case, is there anything in the world that we could not accomplish? And the claims of the Catholic Church to such a devotedness on our part, are irresistible in view of the various points established in the previous pages. When, particularly, one considers the brutal attacks from so many sides against what must be to us dearer than our own lives, it is impossible not to feel inclined to resent them and resist them, with all

possible energy. That there is on earth a universal conspiracy against Christianity itself, but chiefly against Catholic Christianity, cannot remain doubtful to any one who gives the slightest attention to the various subjects discussed in these papers. Yet the matter could scarcely be sufficiently developed, from want of space, comparatively with its importance. To the extent that it has been, however, it deserves to be practically acted upon, and the best practical action in the premises consists on our part in a firm determination to see the Church's rights vindicated as far as may be in our power. If done with energy, but with prudence and moderation, in this country, it cannot fail of success, because all right-minded men, even outside of the Church, will listen at last to the voice of justice; and if wrong has occasionally been perpetrated in this country, it has been, to our knowledge, often redressed; and in our sincere opinion there is always hope of better days, even in the most gloomy times.

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## THE METAPHYSICS OF INSANITY.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH.

### I.

**T**HREE is a wonderful sympathy between the human body and the human mind, so close, indeed, that the vicissitudes of either seldom fail to be accompanied by corresponding changes in the other. That scientific men, therefore, whose habit of thought is to rest upon only physical evidences should, in the absence of proper metaphysical refinings, learn to regard the two things as one, is naturally to be expected; and the growing prevalence, here of opinion, there of suspicion, that after all mind may be only matter excites in us less of wonder than of sorrow. Veneration for the traditional teaching of Christianity grows rapidly less in the presence of a presumptuous modern school of science which, ignoring entirely the emotional and moral parts of human nature, claims a primacy by virtue of its coldness and of a glittering false assumption that it alone is raised upon purely rational evidence, that it alone contains nothing but what is intellectually proven to be true. Vast erudition, however, and accurate physical research, cannot compass all knowledge, and even when most audacious and most cold, are compatible with not a little ignorance. In view of the effects produced by this bold assumption, never was the time more

opportune for orthodoxy to pronounce that it pre-eminently contains nothing but what is intellectually proven to be true; and that itself, more firmly than any conjectural science, stands only in last analysis upon purely rational evidence. Let the contest be accepted as one, not of prejudice or habit of thought, but of reason, and the wider the field of facts and of thought overlooked by reason the more decisive shall be the war now waging for the truth.

It is observable that intelligence develops gradually from infancy to manhood apace with the development of brain, and that bodily disease and pain unsettle it; that insensibility, moreover, blots it out effectually. Here is a striking concomitancy that many are at a loss to explain upon other than materialistic principles, and their skepticism unfortunately is sometimes confirmed by others' ill-conducted efforts in the righteous cause. There are, indeed, extremists in what may be called *spiritualism*, who maintain that the entire mind is a separate immaterial existence that merely occupies the body as a material tenement and instrument, just as a pilot inhabits, and is master of, his ship. The mystery of sensation is by such inexplicable, and other phenomena that must depend upon a mutual intercourse, not of two separate natures, but of two distinct entities compounded in only one human nature. The most obvious error, however, of these extremists is that *mind* is spirit, and not the aggregate of all the human mental faculties, organic and inorganic. The greatest difficulty in their way, and one that they utterly fail to explain upon sound principles to their adversaries, is insanity; for here the very immaterial essence appears to them diseased, and intellectuation itself a failure. An inability to explain the fact and the phases of insanity in accordance with our doctrine of the spirituality of man would, if it existed, be a reproach to us, and the fair and proper explanation of them that can be made should therefore be wrought out and disseminated. Its general understanding, moreover, would contribute greatly to the common and temporal welfare of humanity.

There are few subjects of deeper interest to all classes of men than mental disease, for no age, sex, or condition is exempt from it. To all of us every poor victim of insanity is at once an object of attention and curiosity, if not always of sympathy, for in him each man sees a distorted image of himself, recognizing generally certain likenesses to parts of his own sound mental constitution, whilst marvelling at obvious differences from himself that he cannot distinctly define or understand. This is not strange, for few of us know in what precisely our mental integrity consists, and we cannot therefore all know precisely in what consists mental deficiency. There is such a thing as a deficiency in knowledge which is not due to deficiency of mind, and which may well be without any im-

perfection of faculties. This is only negative, and comes from want of experience, as in the child, whilst imperfection of faculties is a departure from rule, and is disease. Even a young infant will mark insanity, will contrast the normal operations of its own mind with the utterances of an idiot; and something abnormal, vaguely unnatural, about these, occasions in it astonishment and fear. In observing nature it has observed that we think according to rules, has learned the plain rules of thought, and now recognizes a departure from them. There is perceived no cessation of thinking, only something striking to which it is not accustomed. An absence of thought would not startle it, for sleep is too familiar; but an unnatural thinking, whether in sleep or waking, arouses distrust and dread. To scientific scrutiny, however, it is seldom that an undercurrent of normal, natural, and valid work is not visible even in the most pronounced insanity, when the result of insane thinking, taken as a product, is a complete abortion; and the nature of this current is intelligible, but only to a mind divested of the dragging weight of its native materialistic belongings. To any other all that there is of insanity seems to be unintelligible, nothing of the disease being known, only its effects. Generally its words appear as disjointed signs of unconnected thought which, arising out of emotions and imaginings not naturally and commonly associated, produce abrupt changes, and even conflicts, of emotions in the listener. Hence the urchin and unreflecting man are provoked to laughter, whilst the serious are saddened at the fruitless efforts of a rational creature to effect fully rational results.

Whatever can throw light upon this subject so familiar to us all should be eagerly welcomed as of deep interest to all communities, for there are few amongst us who are neither parent, child, relative, nor friend, to some one of disordered mind; and no philanthropist, statesman, jurist, physician, philosopher, or theologian can of right withhold from it his earnest study. We can recognize the disease only by its effects, which are mostly painful, or lead to painful consequences; and it is these in the individual that mainly interest the philanthropist. The well-being of the nation, present and future, and the intellectual character of the people relatively to art, science, industry, wealth, and power, are the statesman's care; and whatever impedes or threatens the highest and best development of these he must intelligently study with a view to its correction or improvement. The jurist's interest in mental disease is in the narrower but most important sphere of the administration of justice; but it behooves him to inform himself diligently as to the nature, operation, interplay and diseases, of the human faculties, according to his knowledge of which he must measure, in behalf of justice, mental competency, testimony, and moral imputability. At

present it is the physician only who is appealed to as an expert when mental integrity is questioned, and whose judgment, supposed to be based on science, sways both bench and jury, disposing of the rights, properties, and even personal liberties, of men. To him also are the insane handed over as patients, in the persuasion that he is the proper and most competent restorer from all infirmities of both body and mind. In society as constituted this is all as it should be, but the physician is not all that he should be unless a sufficient and sound metaphysical science be added to enlighten his pathological science and his experience. This no physical analysis or physiological conjecture can supply, and the dearest natural rights of a man, those that are born of his very nature, should never become subject to the narrow theories of any day or of any school. It is the metaphysical philosopher, with other perceptions than those of sight and touch, finding in his own interior his principal subject-matter, who, in studying the obvious human faculties one by one strikes the right path that leads to light; and only the severest analysis, proved and reprobated, of the entire system of these as actually made manifest can determine their true nature and the laws of their operations. For this no instruments or appliances are required, no inductions from other facts, no critical physiological learning, only a fair physical knowledge to direct a severe metaphysical inquiry and to confirm its results. To the theologian the highest and broadest view of insanity belongs, because it is his to determine degrees of conscientious responsibility, and he must regard the subject from every side, being the recognized champion of all truth, the advocate of all good, whether to the one, the many, the state, or to all mankind, and whether it be for time or for eternity.

To properly comprehend the subject of insanity we must take the term in its widest sense, and must consider as insane whatever mind is *insanus*, not sound. According to this any man is insane who, so far as his mind is concerned, is not wholly, in every respect, *sui compos*, possessed of himself. We must bring under the term many infirmities both transient and permanent, chief amongst which are dreams, forgetfulness, false imaginings, confusions, dotage, imbecility, mania, monomania; and to produce which, when induced, contribute mainly, excessive use of stimulants or sedatives, poisons, fevers, exhaustions, as also fears, hopes, joys, sorrows, or any other passion excessively indulged. In every case there is too little or too much continuity of thought, some excess or deficiency of continuity as measured by a normal average, by the standard of nature, in which properly ordered reflection cannot fail to discern designing wisdom; or there is confusion, which is reducible to excess or deficiency; and there is never a complete circumspection united with

a rational entire possession of one's mental self. But what can account for unnatural excess and deficiency in continuity of thought, and detract from the integrity of self-possession? Here is the state of the question proposed, and an exhaustive reply to the inquiry put would, if made, be a full explanation of insanity.

It is a most common thing to hear of *diseased intellect*; but this expression may be lightly used, for there are few who precisely understand the nature of the human intellect, and most people in speaking of it would be apt to speak according to crude conceptions. What they commonly mean by the term is not intellect, but *mind*, which is the complex of all the mental constituents, the intellect being only one of several; and as one of the aims of this article must be to establish the fact that our purely intellectual powers are not subject to disease, a resolution of the entire mind becomes necessary. This will involve a brief explanation of all the faculties and of the part which each takes in that complex process which we call thinking, but which, in its highest and most common form, constituting all men whatever to be rational beings, would be more accurately expressed as *reasoning*. Only in this manner can we come to know the infirmity to which the frequently worthless results of true rational procedure are due.

All our sensations are primarily only simple facts to us, through a certain primary power of perception that we possess. Whatever is external to us can present itself only by some sensation, and by external is meant whatever is in any degree foreign to the sensitive, or more accurately speaking, sensitizing, principle; no part of even our own bodies being perceived and known except through sensibility. The faculty of having sensations is termed *external sensibility*, and it is the medium designed and employed for placing us in knowing contact with objects of the material universe, no matter how near or how distant. It is by no means infallible, for it is an organic means comprising the nerves as instrumental parts; and these are subject to changes and injuries that may modify impressions, causing presentations to us that mislead the judgment, whose habit is to act upon presentations of normal nerves. When sensations pass the bounds of primitive fact and become to us something more, it is after the rapid reflex action of the intellect upon them, subliming them as abstractions, universals, ideas, which are in no way facts of sensibility, but intellectual forms worked by intellectual process, having sensible fact as only their origin and object. A distorted sensibility could not constitute mental insanity as we mean it even when misleading a simple judgment, for in fact we frequently observe in the suffering irregular sensations, calculated to confuse or deceive, corrected by intelligent rational deduc-

tion, when a knowledge of all the circumstances has furnished premises unknown to primary judgment.

Besides the external sensibility just described, which alone places us in contact with whatever is not the perceiving subject, there is another sensibility which places us in perceiving contact with the perceiving subject itself and nothing else. Thus is the entire sensitive faculty complete. This *internal sensibility* by which we feel the presence of our ideas, our volitions, our judgments, our reasonings, our memories, as various modifications of the perceiving subject, does not feel by *sensation*, which is too gross and material a medium for the purpose, but by a species of sentiment too fine for common apprehension. So delicate is it, indeed, that notwithstanding its intensity the masters of great schools of philosophy have had endless contentions as to its nature, and their followers are to-day yet mystified by this most obvious fact which they all perceive but cannot satisfactorily explain. We term this faculty *consciousness*, and if it is not a purely spiritual sensibility, supplementing external sensibility in our entire nature, by which we have sentiments, not sensations, of spiritual modifications, thus *realizing* them in our knowledge, it is inexplicable. Physiology, however, has recently taken the explanation in hand, and is making deductions by means of the only premises in its possession. Unfortunately these premises are nothing but inductive conjectures and assumptions made to fit them, yet many of the leading minds of this day, who think in English, will soberly inform us that "unconscious cerebration" explains the fact of consciousness. As to its nature all explanation is withheld by them. No matter how metaphysicians may differ as to the nature of this faculty, they agree that it is not subject to disease, that its objects are *internal* facts only, and that it cannot mislead even a primary judgment. No one is ever conscious of what is not; nor does any one ever fail to be conscious of a change or condition that can be at any time an object of consciousness. The facts of his internal state, such as they are, whether normal or not, are herein manifested as facts pure and simple, and are objects for intellectual seizure and elaboration like any other fact made manifest by any sensibility. The subject of this faculty is the inmost proprietor of all that belongs to us, our *self*, which continues *one* from youth to age, through all vicissitudes, the only thing unchangeable about our complex being. It is that mysterious *unity*, indivisible, in whose behalf our body strives and wearies, which is termed by the philosophic world the *Ego* of each one of us, which any consistent science must recognize as a substantial principle, not a mere mode, and which sound metaphysics presents to us as the rational human soul. Its conscious faculty informs it without organic instrument; is neverfailing, is

without degrees of strength, without pleasure or pain; and is an infallible informer even to those who contest its nature or who affect to ignore its existence. There is nothing erratic about it, and the explanation of mental insanity must be sought for outside the entire duplex sensitive faculty.

The next faculty operating in natural chronological order is the Intellect, and this it is that is commonly accused of derangement. This faculty of the mind is little understood, is difficult to understand, and therefore arises a necessity for explaining it somewhat more at length. Care, however, will be exercised to not overstep the bounds proper for the parts of an article intended to present only an outline. The analysis to be here made of the nature of the intellect will determine its specific operations, and these will be found at all times valid and invariable, notwithstanding the fact that their completed products are frequently mere mockeries of intelligence. There is no contradiction in this, for who does not know that the most skilful miller, with perfect machinery, cannot produce meal from husks? And the human intellect, like the miller, requires for sound product sound material properly prepared and presented. The elements must be suitable in themselves, and suitably grouped with other elements, in proper quantity and condition, before a valid and valuable product can be obtained.

The specific functions of the intellect are to decompose our complex sensible facts, whether such impressions belong to the external or internal constituent of our sensitive faculty, to detach parts and universalize them, and subsequently to combine these in complex *ideal* forms. It is in a complex way that objects present themselves, for one object may be red, round, heavy, hard, and rough at the same time, and we have five external senses to apprehend very considerable complexity. This is a synthesis made up by nature, which we cannot objectively dissolve without destroying the object, but which we can subjectively dissolve by the analyzing power of the intellect. The analytic faculty is essential to any understanding, although this consists in all cases in combination. It is a prerequisite. For if we had nothing to combine but *entire* sensible apprehensions or their reproduced images, one overlapping another, there could result nothing but confusion and shapeless insanity. The combinative power of the intellect is then not alone sufficient, for all natural syntheses must be first disintegrated for its selection; hence the rigorous necessity for the supplementary power of decomposition. We find, accordingly, the human intellect to be complex, and to consist of the simple faculties of *analysis* and *synthesis*. Here is a beautiful arrangement whose entire excellence and sufficiency are not at first seen, in which is found man's great exaltation, by which he becomes possessed of ideas and the

ability to unite them in knowledge, and lives that superior life of intelligence, freedom and morality from which all other earthly beings are excluded.

The term *idea* has just been used, and upon this it is important to dwell at some little length. There is nothing with which we are more familiar than with ideas, and yet how very few have even a fair understanding of their nature! The word is sown broadcast amongst the writings of physiological psychologists, but it never receives at their hands a definition. They do not comprehend it. To say that it is "sensation transformed," is not to define, is not to give clearness, but to add and confirm obscurity. For the kind of transformation is not explained, nor the nature of its result. Such language only serves as a refuge for ignorance, and becomes a sepulchre for truth. If you search the indexes of their books you will find generally the primitive term *idea*, whose definition is avoided in the text, whilst the treatise is turned aside to such derivatives as *ideation*, *excitement of ideas*, *succession of ideas*, etc., which make a great display around the central object without touching it. The explanation of this is simple, for no materialistic thinker can properly comprehend the term. A mind whose favorite and habitual channel of thought lies amongst the sensible qualities of bodies would have to lift itself out, for the very thing that characterizes it, its materialism, is a positive impediment that must be removed, and matter with its belongings lost sight of for the moment, before the clear conception of *idea* can be had. The activity of the spiritual part of thought is too rapid to be easily followed, too subtle to be discerned without training; and the objects of ideas, sentiments and images which are their mere occasion and origin, are mistaken for the ideas themselves. To rectify this error, and to reach a proper comprehension of but a small part of sublime human reason, of the true nature of its smallest element, is to open up a new region of thought, is to cast a light upon the immaterial, and must divest any mind of the obstructive weight of its original materialism.

It should not be supposed that we are wandering away from the subject of insanity; for to comprehend this we must learn the true nature of ideas, and ascertain if insanity can possibly consist in wrong, or wrongly formed, ideas. To touch at once the heart of the subject, it suffices to say that any idea, in the proper and scientific sense of the word, is either an intellectual abstraction or a synthesis of such abstractions. It is not an image of sensible form, or of sensible form transformed to any other. By our analytic power a part of a sensible group of qualities is detached from natural fellowship, when it remains no longer particular, that is, a member of any actually existing group whatever. It is raised and

held aloft by the spiritual intellect as a sublimation without actual material belongings or associations, which is what we mean by abstraction and *generalization*. We acquire thus an element proper for a combination without confusion, and may unite several such in a clear complex idea. All the parts of a sensible group may thus be detached, idealized, then synthesized in one combination whose sum is not the original sensible object, but the complex idea which we form of it, the several simpler ideas united in one. It is thus clear that every common noun, and every verb that we utter in speech, is a generalization, and that words are signs, not of things, but of the ideas that we form about things. The actual bodies of nature with which we are familiar are more complex and obscure than we perceive them to be, and our ideas are not adequate to completely express them; we therefore must think and talk of them, not according to what they really are, but according to the ideas of them that we are able to form. In our reflections upon experiences we doubtless, in the beginning, act upon our sentiments, which we gradually learn to refer to objects that occasion them, and we thus form our primitive notions of things that we afterwards, with improved knowledge, modify. Since, then, we never *think things*, but always think our own ideas, good or bad, these must vary in different individuals, and are better or poorer elements of thought according to the means employed in their acquisition. When, for instance, we examine a block of wood, we get its color, shape, hardness, weight, porosity, etc., by sensation, these being only sensible qualities, not the substance of the thing itself; and they express merely certain *relations* which its special molecular disposition bears to us by means of air, ether and nerves as intermediate vehicles of modifying force. We see its surface, and are apt to think that we know its interior; but cut it as often as we will we see only greater or less surfaces, one after another, even with instruments of greatest magnifying power. Any complex idea of the block, if thus made up, would be but poor, yet this is the common idea of the unlearned of such an object, and it is conceived by them to consist in a plurality of images that are reproductions in the mind of as many preceding sensations. It is unquestionable that the insane, like other people, thus form their primary elements of thought, and that such are valid of their kind like those of other people; only all are meagre. There are men of learning, too, with ideas more complete than those of common men, yet who are insane. The chemist delves below mere visible surfaces, and discovers invisible constituents, yet many a crack-brained chemist is an expert in chemical analysis, with perfectly sound primary and composite ideas. It is not rare that a man is seen to scientifically and most rationally pursue a train of thought with

conceptions true and exalted, who is, notwithstanding, in some way unpossessed of himself, and fit only to be taken care of by common people. *Omne receptum secundum recipientis naturam* is, in its universality, a true and profound maxim of metaphysics; and normal reception of impressions intellectually is an evidence of valid intellectuation in the receiver.

Since we are now clearing "ideation" of insanity it may be well to proceed one step further for a still more accurate conception of the ideative process according to orthodox science. It has been observed that primary intellectual analysis is the detaching by the intellect of a part of a sensible group. Now it must be plain that no such part can be intellectually separated as the same thing precisely that it is in nature. In other words, it cannot be removed from natural objects to the intellect. This would be a process according to materialistic conceptions of things. Now no material process can resemble, or be analogous to, that process by which the intellect transforms sensible parts of things into ideas, nor can any material thing hold that relation to another that an object has to its idea; nor can we elaborate any conception from our knowledge of material activities, no matter how refined, that can adequately apply to the abstracting and universalizing powers of the human spirit in intellectuation. Nevertheless some kind of a physical illustration, enlightening only from afar, may not be without some value. The atmosphere, for instance, has certain capacities, one of which is for moisture. When a water surface is presented to it an abstraction from the water takes place by a transformation into vapor. *The reception is according to the nature of the recipient.* Vapor is elaborated and raised by the air, which takes possession of it as an attenuated and apparently limitless form that suits its nature; and what is transformed is no longer particular water, not a part and parcel of that liquid mass below whose density might drown or whose weight might turn a mill-wheel. Although no true analogy is here to the intellectual process, yet the fact is brought to mind that a capacity may abstract, and, in the act of abstracting, so change the abstracted thing as to make it peculiarly its own. That there is no analogy is because the spirit adds nothing to its substance from anything else, but in forming its idea merely, in an inscrutable way, modifies itself. It is not then scientifically true that an idea is a real part extracted in any case from a real whole perception; nor does its objectiveness consist in its partaking of the nature of a perceived object. It is the working by the spirit of a condition of its own modes of being consequent upon a sensitive experience; and it is objective because a sensitive impression does, in being its occasion, be therein its origin. It is not now strange that physiological psychology avoids the definition of idea.

It was observed that language, properly so called and not mere utterances of sound, is made up of signs of ideas, and can be employed only by beings possessing intelligence. It is conventional and subject to change. The natural utterances and other signs made by brutes express not ideas but entire concrete conditions, and thus a moan drawn from a man or brute is not the expression of pain in the abstract, not generic pain, which would be an idea, but the actual ache or smart experienced at the time. So far then as ideas are concerned we seldom see in any human being an absence of the products of analysis and synthesis, and of words that are their proper signs. There is no doubt that all form their ideas in a normal way from such material, normal or abnormal, as their sensibilities present; and the ideas of either sane or insane may be shallow or profound in their accuracy and complexity, or sensible, or sublimely abstract. Some doubt may linger as to the valid formation of some complex ideas whose value depends upon correct observation. It will be at once conceded, however, that such require, in addition to observation, correct judgment and reasoning and valid rational products as antecedent to their correct formation. It is the conclusions of reasoning, concrete products, that are the elements of such ideas; and conclusions may be right or wrong, constituting complex ideas right or wrong, in any man whatever. The error is not in formation but in the constituents prepared.

All the subsequent acts of the intellect are of its synthetic part, and these are *judging* and *reasoning*. When these are examined the whole science of logic will have been briefly exposed, and all minds determined as subjects of logical laws, that is, to be logical, rational. There are fixed laws that uniformly govern the intellect in these operations in every man, and there will be found no disease affecting the operations of these laws, wherefore the conclusion will be that there is no insane human intellect according to the proper and scientific meaning of the term, no man whatever who is not a rational creature.

The demonstration appears satisfactory that there is no such thing as malformation of primitive ideas, or of any idea whose elements are not antecedent products of rational process. All truly correspond to their objects, such as they are. The *modus operandi* of the intellect does not vary, and its first fruits are valid and normal. The second intellectual process is the uniting of these in composition as subject and predicate after the perception of some evidence that they truly belong together. This is the formation of a *judgment*, which by reason of the evidence becomes irresistible. It does not belong to the will to command or prevent it, and intellectual activity never fails to be moved by an evidence perceived. There are, of course, many errors of judgment in both sane and

insane; but the formative process, as in ideas, is according to fixed laws. The source of error must, therefore, be looked for outside of this process, generally in the evidence, whose genuineness and sufficiency are often only apparent and not real, and which is not unfrequently put forward by ourselves upon ourselves in attempts at self-deception. It is in this way as well as by neglect that we are constantly morally guilty of our intellectual errors. There are no *purely primary* judgments, practical or theoretical, that are intellectually or morally wrong after true evidence, for such are composed of the simpler ideas mostly but not entirely derived immediately from sensible facts, and they are united before temptation can intervene to bias them. Until the uprising of self-interest to interfere, our judgments are honest and true, true as far as they can be with inadequate ideas; and they are wrong only when the evidence that prompts them is not true. Thus may one man disguised in the clothes of another be seen to commit a crime, and apparently good evidence leads to a false judgment. Self, however, is the prolific origin of such errors, and so indulgent are we to its faults that we try secretly to hide them from even our own eyes, mostly with success; and where success is not perfect we make a second effort to hide the imperfection. Repeated efforts of this kind, from which we but half turn away, are crowned in the end, and we soon forget what successful hypocrites we have been. Thus we often imagine that we are blessed with an error that pleases us when we are in reality only cursed by it. Our numerous passions, the complexities of our desires, the tenacity of their grasp and the pleasant gentleness of its touch, explain an infinity of temptations followed by wilful successes in blindness, all of which are nothing less than guilty acts of self-deception. Even the best half of the world is thus lured and self-deceived into moral rottenness. If our primary practical judgments are honest our later ones are more and more suspicious; and if our primary theoretical ones are true, those to succeed them are liable to evidences that are only apparent or insufficient. Habit of mind explains much error, for doubt habitually indulged becomes positive unbelief, as wish habitually indulged becomes the parent of a settled persuasion. We frequently behold the maniac, a prey to frenzied feelings and self-deception, a victim to some habit of mind, raving under a torrent of mental judgments primary and deduced, true and false, intricately mingled; the result as a whole being utter worthless confusion, yet the formative process of each regular, and an evidence real or apparent prompting separately each one. Amongst such judgments, most of which are forgotten as soon as made, though some dissolve slowly and some persist as causes of aggravated unrest, are interjected words of meaning combined in phrases

without meaning, for they are but signs of ideas that are not relevant. Here is no formation of judgment, only disconnected gibbering, whose emptiness proves the absence of any perception of relations; the mind being thus void of all evidence, without which there can be no act of judgment.

Thus far we have, in examining intellectuation, found in it no irregular process, only products of regular process that may be imperfect, worthless, or even positive errors. Our last and highest intellectual act is also synthetic, and consists simply in *deduction*. Logicians unite in terming it *reasoning*, and every being capable of deducing must be a rational being. This process does not deal with ideas singly, these being only remote and primary elements, but with completely formed judgments, in which ideas are found already combined. When two judgments are simultaneously compared in the mind, and found to have a meaning unitedly which neither can singly have, their entirety is resolved into a third, which is seen to be in one view equivalent to that which the others unitedly mean. This equivalence is an identity, and is called the *formal identity of reason*. The third judgment is a conclusion, and every conclusion of a syllogism is then a short expression of the entire formal meaning of the premises. There is a sifting down of all the ideas and meanings contained in the separate parts of the premises to one single meaning contained in their totality. When the human reasoning process is scanned, not by mere logical accuracy, but by metaphysical insight, there appears in it a resolution and combination of thought that has no analogy to any possible resolution and combination of matter or material results; for the most complex conclusion is a simple unity with a plurality of elements, whilst with matter several parts cannot form a simple objective unity, nor can any whole be less compound than the aggregate of its elements. A synthetic unity of thought is familiar to us all, whilst a synthetic unity of matter is contradictory. That the insane reason is frequently most evident, the regularity and validity of the process being perfectly visible to the trained mind, even when the conclusions, though true illations, are concretely worthless falsities. The explanation of this appears to be that there is a false judgment in the premises, or a confusion of ideas whereby several meanings attach to one, or an obscurity that may violate the syllogistic rules by multiplying meanings indefinitely. Insanity, therefore, if it were simple and uniform, could not be due to want of reasoning faculty, or to want of synthetic capacity to form judgments and complex ideas, or to want of analytic capacity whereby all intellectual elements have their origin. It cannot be due to any abnormal formative process of the intellect, since we have discerned these to be regular in all persons, sane or insane, in

whom can be discerned any intellectuation whatever. The laws that govern judgment and reason are the known and fixed laws of logic, but we would ourselves be illogical to conclude that an insane mind, or a common ignorant mind, is not subject to those laws simply because it reasons a falsity and produces error as its practical result. Powers are exercised upon materials, all natural powers according to fixed laws from which there is no departure, but we frequently see unnatural products, vegetable, animal and intellectual monstrosities, which are due to presentations of material not contemplated in the design of nature. These come by accidental causes, or, if designed, they belong to a subtler design that escapes our scrutiny, or to a larger design that we fail to grasp. What appear to be only disorders and departures to us, with our limited view, may not be such in the grand total of design, and like the erratic motions of fixed stars, they may be part of an extended order that is simply beyond our vision. There let us leave them, for this train of thought is foreign to the present investigation, no matter how tempting the philosophic speculation seems. Suffice it to us that the intellect is demonstrated to be a faculty not in any way subject to disease, that its erroneous products owe their character to some other faculty with which it interplays, whose association with it is constant, intimate, and inseparable. The next question that naturally arises is : Does the intellect move spontaneously or by direction ; and can insanity be due to a halting force, whether spontaneous or directing ?

Many of our bodily motions are directed by the will, whilst others are involuntary. With regard to the former we may act or not as we choose, and we may choose to act or not according to an internal liberty that we incessantly exercise. The will, therefore, may be viewed under two aspects, as a principle of bodily action, and as a free principle of election. It does not immediately contract the body's muscles, but this strong motion is excited by a subtle and invisible molecular motion of the motor chords in another sphere ; and who can say how often this reduction of material movement takes place from sphere to sphere, or how infinitesimal the first may be that is the immediate effect of the prime originator ? The finger of a child cannot uplift the seated rocks, but once a baby finger touched an ivory key that closed a galvanic circuit, a movement sped along the wire, a spark was struck, a fuse ignited, and an explosion of many tons of powder wrenched the huge rocks of Hell Gate from the earth's foundation, hurling them through the incumbent water high into the air. The material potencies let loose by the initial finger were many, and the result tremendous, bearing no proportion to the beginning. But was the finger truly initial ? Or was not its pressure a mere way-station along the line of forces,

and its violence far too great to bear any proportion to the true beginning? An intercourse between the material and an immaterial is not difficult to acknowledge to an honest mind. The physiological psychologist, to be logical, must claim that there is no initial principle, that there is no internal beginning, but that each internal activity is a *result* of a chain of changes propagated from external impression. He must destroy utterly the principle of liberty, and lay every deed, however small, however great, however mean, however noble, to the door of rigid fatality. To vindicate human freedom of election would here be out of place. It must be received upon conscious testimony which is even more direct than the testimony of reason, and must therefore be held as entirely unassailable by any evidence whatever. Our scope contemplates but an explanation of the phenomena of insanity upon the supposition of free will. It must be conceded that the will is a source of many intellectual errors, a guilty source, but it does not thereby constitute insanity. Indeed, the erratic doings of the pitiable feeble-minded, or of the more pitiable maniac, are deemed by all to be less and less insane, more and more morally imputable, in direct proportion as they are deliberate, accordingly as freedom of will is more and more discernible in their direction. This freedom in man is due to his intelligence, but here a nice distinction must be made. It is not simply because he possesses the faculty of intellect that the choice of his will is free, but because he practically exercises that intellect upon normal materials with valid rational results.

It is only in so far as the products of his reason are true, formally and materially, that a man is really master of himself, and morally responsible for his acts. The fetters of his practical intelligence extend to his freedom, and both are vigorous together, or feeble together, down to complete inanition. As a principle of action the will is often perfect in the raving maniac, even when least free, and no disease of it constitutes the mania. At the same time all freedom is extinct for want of appropriate truthful reasonings, even whilst the use of words and phrases evidences an exercise of the simpler functions of the intellect with little or no coherence. Insanity, therefore, does not attach to the will as a disease of it, no matter how greatly actual volition may be excited or swayed by insane reasoning. Such excitements are caused by passions aroused by false reasonings, and any will whatever would follow a dominant passion of the moment, but for the rein that practical intelligence draws upon it.

The faculties of the complex mind have been nearly all enumerated, and insanities discerned in their effects, but their seat not yet discovered. This has been, nevertheless, more than once foreshadowed, and whenever the idea of *coherence* or *association* has

appeared, it has seemed to contain some promise to be fulfilled. There is a grouping of ideas which, in connection with the exercise of the faculties mentioned, would make up our mental integrity, as there is another grouping of ideas with which mental integrity is impossible. The first has the coherence of natural and regular association; the latter, in proportion as it is deficient in this, produces more or less insane rational results, that is, some degree of mental confusion. Suppose two maps to be placed before you. They are miniature pictures of America and Europe. Every town, coast, river and mountain range is in proper place, associated according to nature, and each map is proof of skill and intelligence. To-morrow both are different, parts of each having been removed and interchanged, even the Polar seas brought down from their natural positions, and, with the poles embraced, inserted amongst the lower latitudes. You will recognize evidences of intelligence in the general make-up of each map, of erratic intelligence; and you will reject each as a false, valueless and deceitful whole, suggesting to you, by some similarity perceived, the idea of insanity. The elements are separately sound; the product of their combination absolutely unsound. There is a false association of parts as measured by nature, an absence of some that should be present, and a presence of some that should be absent; and each map, by reason of too much association or too little, either of which, being a departure from a natural one, is confusion, turns out to be a failure as a whole. All the parts of the entire world may be madly mixed, that is, irrelevantly, or they may be nearly obliterated, like the mind in imbecility, and we thus have analogues of the two extremes of insanity. But how is it that the mind makes confusions of ideas that ought to be naturally and intelligently associated? And what faculty have we that is, like sensibility, organic, subject therefore to disease and decay, whose disease would work departures from natural rules to which we are accustomed, disrupting thereby nature in our perceptions, and throwing its elements into confusion? A moderate degree of concentration and thought would seem now sufficient for this solution, which is most interesting and satisfactory.

In a few pages the elementary parts that constitute the human mind have been detailed and briefly explained as to their nature and functions, and they would seem to form a complete system whereby all human knowledge is formed; yet it has been seen that the understanding of them does not enable us to account for insanity. It may be well to here take a parting glance at them for their better recollection. In the passive conditions of sensibility, external and internal, the human compound and the human spirit are respectively recipient of impressions made, which impressions

the intellect, by its duplex activity, elaborates, first into primary elements of knowledge, then subsequently into knowledge complete. Appetites lure our activities, bodily and mental, towards their gratification; passions drive them; but a superior intellectual desire, or free-will, directs gently the subtler motions into co-operation with it, and can govern with a master hand the most unruly and stubborn resistances. This is the system thus far explained, but it is not complete. With it, if a man were the tenant of a momentary life, brief as one of his sensations, he might reach one flash of knowledge which would immediately expire and be lost forever; but he lives and thinks for many years a connected intellectual life, which he could not do if every thought and idea were ephemeral, and every sensation were to immediately die without resurrection. In such a supposition he would experience an infinity of separate lives, not lead one human life as we know it to be; and the various intellectual fruits born at different periods could not unite in one lasting structure of knowledge. Another faculty is then essential for a complete working system, so absolutely essential that all the others would be useless without it, the ablest intellect enduring without enduring results. But for this faculty there could not be even insanity according to our conception of this word, purely because we would not retain possession of intellectual products of any kind, sound or unsound. We would be simply without mind, imbecile.

If mental soundness is inconsistent with sentiments and sensations that are only transitory, as has been explained, some kind of permanency of these we must possess; yet if they were all to remain ever present we would be overwhelmed by them, lost in their number, strength and confusion. We must suppose then more than one kind of permanency, and that besides a continuous permanency there is one by revival or repetition of sensations; yet as each sensation is due to cause, we are still at fault, because we could not repeat them without repeating their causes. A certain strong resemblance to them might, however, seem sufficient, for which causes of sensation are not required, and whose advent must be under control of the will, that we may freely think. Now such resemblances are what we find that we actually have, and the Author of nature has not left our mental constitution incomplete. The mind is continually filled with images or resemblances of things seen, heard, smelled, tasted and felt, that is, with phantasmal sensations which we can call up at pleasure, and which are really the material that comes directly within the intellect's elaborating grasp. These are commonly termed *phantasms of the imagination*, and they never cease to recur day by day, to be thought upon or brooded over through the long years of a protracted life. It is then the reproductive faculty of imagination that makes our life one instead

of many, and that enables us to close up the ranks of our many feelings and experiences for one simultaneous and comparative view when we are thinking. A twin sister to sensibility, but of a finer and more ethereal mould, it also is organic. Or rather it may be styled with greater, or even perfect, accuracy, sensibility's other self. Like its original it is the subject of disease and decay, and frequently of confusions that thwart the intellect's activity, rendering its resulting products unnatural and shapeless abortions. This faculty is the seat of insanities. Its laws correspond to laws that govern matter, but that govern it in an organ the most exquisite that exists or that can be conceived. A knowledge of these corresponding laws, both psychological and physical, is necessary to an understanding of their interruptions, which explain insanities. The principal of these, the psychological law of *association of ideas*, appears now in order for investigation, and this is the field where at last our *direct* work is to be done.

## II.

The organ of imagination, as of sensibility, is the sensorium, and it matters not to our conclusions whether this be a portion of the brain, the whole brain, or the brain and nervous system. On these points physiologists differ, and we may properly leave to them the exact determination of sensorial limits, and of physical laws that govern the sensorium, reserving to metaphysics the determination of psychological laws that govern the faculty of which it is the organ. When the physiologist remains within his sphere his evidence, in determining physiological laws, is sensible observation and deductions therefrom. This is proper. But when he assumes to explain psychological phenomena upon physiological principles, turning *object* into *subject*, his evidence is observation in one sphere and inductions in another, whereupon the conclusions are illogical, not being legitimate deductions, but only conjectures. We all agree that in sensation there is a sensorial commotion, a nervous thrill started at the point of reference, and ending we know not where. Amongst the molecules of the conducting chord action and reaction we know to be equal, and if we had, in ourselves and our entire environment, matter only to deal with we could fix no end to the motion; we would have to say that its transit through the nerves is but a span of a continuity, a measurable link of an endless chain. There is, however, a term to it, an absorption of it, but according to a mysterious law that differs essentially from all laws of matter, and which manifests its existence in the reaction of the sensation felt. In this peculiar reaction is perceived an association with the material body of something else that is different in nature and more exalted in function. This we recognize as *spirit*, and it

is clear that those who ignore it must accept a deeper mystery than we, with a much larger share of the unintelligible as their portion. The metaphysical evidence employed in properly determining psychological laws is not sensible or inductive, it is direct internal observation and deductions therefrom. There is no inducing from one sphere to another, and no violation of the canons of logic.

From the fact that there is a correspondence of some psychological with some physical laws it cannot be inferred that they are identical, only that they are in uniform relation. The two spheres should be kept logically apart in the present state of science, and relationship, the only link that we know between them, preserved as a proper object of true science. In accordance with this, when the eye views a number of objects with differing forms and colors, we must suppose that there is in the sensorium a diversity of infinitesimal movement for each object, and for each minute part of each. At the same time we may be affected, through other external organs, by some specific odor and taste, some specific sounds which the ear separates, and a variety of specific sensations of touch and feeling which the nerves corresponding to these two perceptions distinguish. There is thus produced in the sensorium a complex simultaneous commotion of an unknown nature and extent, which must be nevertheless according to order, according to several related orders, indeed, since each affection is distinguished from the others, and involves an arrangement of its own. Here is a beautiful and wondrous movement, whose delicate complexity and perfection almost defy belief, which immediately gives place to an indefinite and rapid series of others as perfect and complex; and if complete sanity of mind must depend upon one accurate repetition of the whole of it, with others into which it gradually merged, until it was all, piece by piece, dissipated, corresponding psychological states keeping pace with the changes, we would have to marvel, not that some men are insane, but that any one man should ever be completely sane. The order of motion and arrangement is not only according to each sensation singly perceived, but, as was observed, there is a broader order that embraces all the separate arrangements in one group. This group is an association, possessing as it were its own autonomy, and is subject to recall in its integrity after departure. The psychological correspondence is an association of ideas, and it is such associations, just as they occur in natural life, that habitually and continually recur as the objects of our thoughts. It is thus the past that we think of; and we reflect upon the present only when it is past; and we make the future in our minds by a forward projection of the past. It is therefore easily understood that if the past recur imperfectly in associations that do not follow actual natural experiences, the objects of intellectual

activity must be imperfect and misleading. When these associations are unnatural they are broken, mixed with parts of others, shorn of sufficient dimensions, or exaggerated; but the intellect must take them as they come and elaborate them accordingly. We may thus have true or false products of the entire mind, be perfectly sane, or be insane in any degree proportionate to the measure of departure from true natural association. Some parts of any original association in actual life are almost invariably parts of succeeding ones, and the same must be said of parts of these; there is then a chain of associations all of which are related to each other, and an extended experience recurs in an extended association of minor associations, when ideas remain in the intellect to be simultaneously compared after the successive material arrangements to which they were successively related are gone. The departures from natural association may thus be many in a very comprehensive thought, or a consecutive reasoning, false associations of ideas be extensively interwoven, when some kind of insanity would be the external manifestation of this internal condition.

We do not know by observation any physical law that governs association of sensorial motions, but we do know by observation a psychological law that governs the association of ideas, and it may be thus expressed: *When part of a past perception returns the whole returns.* The first perception is one of associated representations, after which follows an association of corresponding ideas; and as the reproduction of forms in the imagination corresponds to a reproduction of sensorial arrangements, we rationally conclude that association of ideas corresponds, and is due, to associated molecular movement. It is the fact of a complete return in every instance that maintains our minds according to nature, makes us natural and complete; and this is mental health. The contrary causes us to appear in some way unnatural and incomplete mentally, and we are set down as wrong in our minds in some degree. With perfect conformity to nature, and sufficiently large circumspection of such conformities, there is not only complete sanity, but that sound practical common sense which is perfect self-possession. Without this circumspection there is a narrow mind, which may be more narrow in proportion, until its subject appears to be little able to provide for himself; and he may be a rare genius, yet without that sufficient degree of self-possession which makes the man of sound intelligence. This is due, not to imperfect single associations of ideas, but to an insufficing major association whose immediate elements are the minor in a naturally consecutive series. Each minor order may be perfect, with the major order imperfect owing to something incomplete in cerebral association.

The want of sufficient and normal major association may account

for that large number of men who are commonly described as "crack-brained" but not insane; and does not constitute the same class of diseases of mind that want of minor normal association does. In the latter class there is more perceptible discord generally. If, for instance, a person talking, either in rambling or concentrated thought, should intertwine in his imagination the parts of two distinct associations, one of the land and one of the sea, the law that governs the faculty would be shown to be not normally operative; the return of a part not inducing the return of its whole, but something spurious withal, and the discord would be so great that the insanity would be apparent even to a child. A very slight mingling of this kind might be at first sight discernible only to a keen expert. If confusion, however, as is more commonly the case, occur amongst associations more kindred than those just mentioned, and especially as to parts not always essential to final results, insanity may be discovered only after frequent repetitions, or even a familiar acquaintance. The rule for its discovery must nevertheless be the same, *an absence of complete nature in all associations of ideas.* By this is not meant a complete absence of nature, but the absence of something that is a part of nature complete. A most important consideration should here be made and remembered, as its bearing upon the whole subject it is difficult to overestimate. Human desires and passions, physical conditions that modify them, temperaments excitable or sluggish, susceptibilities, habits of body and mind, and indescribable idiosyncrasies, all influence the imagination and affect thereby continuity of thought. They may concert, by concentration or dissipation, to rivet continuity or to break it in fragments, to crystallize associations too long or to dissolve them too soon, and must all be taken into account in practical judgment by a close student of natural mind, in order to determine what groups of ideas are likely to be natural in a given case and what are not. The rule given is not, however, to be departed from: *complete natural association*; but a nice discrimination is required to determine precisely what is nature in every case. Some cases are peculiar, and there are men who have mental infirmities yet who are not all infirm; possessing sometimes, slumbering in mere potency, dominant feelings that on occasion will awake and convulse the sensorium, or that will gently deflect from natural co-ordination some motion essential to coherent understanding. This is what is called a "clouding of the intellect," and it is rightly judged that there is, in the heat of some passions, a clouding of the mind that does not completely obscure it; that diminishes responsibility by obstructing true rational results, making them difficult, and that sometimes, by invalidating them, destroys responsibility entirely. The victims of this kind of disorder are not deemed

insane, but to be subject to fits of insanity, and they are generally soundly reasoning beings until their cerebral associations are confused. Permanent passionate insanity is often induced by passionate unrest, when exhaustion of brain impedes fluent association. Sometimes the obstruction goes so far as to produce mental imbecility, when the imagination is incapable of reproducing amongst its images any association at all.

Several difficulties might here present themselves to an easy acceptance of all that has been said, for the subject is difficult and demands the closest study. A reconstruction of some common conceptions is also involved, which is not readily made. It may be asked if memory rather than imagination is not mostly in fault when a complete repetition of past perceptions fails. And it may be urged that imagination does not strictly follow nature, but creates some products for itself. Who, for instance, has ever seen a centaur or a satyr, or any of those beautiful creations of things that do not exist, amongst which we wander in our reveries? In strange cities we pass by rows of houses the surfaces of whose front walls we see, but whose interiors we create in our imagination. When we think of Jeddo or Pekin we construct for ourselves streets, gardens and houses, whose plans and architecture would be absolutely foreign to Mongolian ideas; and as there are no originals that conform to such images, the latter must be our pure creations. These difficulties it is important to explain away.

It is true that nothing is remembered that is not a repetition, and equally true that many sensations are repeated that are not remembered. Where, then, are they repeated, if not in that faculty which is a pure and faithful shadow of sensibility? Imagination is much richer than memory, occupied constantly with repetitions that are not recognized, in which case they seem to be, not images or representations, but originals. Most of our sensations do not at the time draw attention, and consequently when they reappear in the fancy they look like strangers; but when they have so strongly impressed us in the beginning as to prolong in duplicated motions our attention, they reappear in duplicated motions, as a phantasm and its true double, when there is recognition, which alone is memory. This is our organic memory, which we share with perhaps all animals, and it is a faculty simply auxiliary to imagination. We have, besides this, an intellective memory, not organic, whereby we remember our volitions and intelligences, but we remember these only through the medium of the spirit's conscious states, grouped associations also, but of internal sentiments of the spirit. The examination of this subject, however, is too deeply metaphysical for the present purpose, and not necessary; but thoroughly carried out it would develop beautifully the existence of a spirit in man.

This memory, and a spiritual reproductive capacity called more properly conception than imagination, are too obscure to be generally taken into account in determining condition of mind; and it would be vain to scrutinize them for that purpose, for they do not contain any of the elements of insanity. The first conclusion must be that every failure of the imagination to reproduce involves a failure of memory to recognize, but that a failure of memory does not necessarily suppose a failure of imagination. A condition short of forgetfulness may then suffice for mental confusion.

As to the second difficulty, it is only a vulgar error. The imagination is not creative. It revives entire groups of perceptions, each being made up of parts, any of which can, by the synthetic power of the intellect, be separated and recombined in new composition; and so closely are these two faculties associated in mutual intercourse, that the new mental composition to which nothing in nature corresponds, but whose every element is taken from natural groupings, appears at first view to be a purely original picture in the mind. What is commonly thought to be a new creation of one simple faculty is only a new structure of old materials, an offspring of that union of two faculties termed imaginative-synthesis. Herein is the source of highest and lowest art, of all the fine arts and poetry on the one side, and of hideous monstrosities on the other.

According to the theory that has been set forth insanities are reducible to two principal divisions, each of which is a graduated departure from normal thought. Associations may be either incomplete or mixed, that is, deficient or overlapping each other, when we have different degrees of imbecility, or different degrees of confusion. There is an insufficiency of associated ideas for intelligence, or our reproduced natural experiences, consequently their ideas, are falsely related in the mind. These are the two principal divisions, of which the second, confusion, is the most common, although they may be sometimes united in the same subject. Under this second the mind may be either too rambling or too concentrated, according to the number and strength of the dominant emotions. Intensity in a variety of feelings will lead the mind to ramble, whilst intensity in one will contract it to monomania. These latter two dispositions we observe to be excessive in many sane people, and it must therefore be the degree of excess that we characterize as insane. This occurs at that point where our reasoning fails, through defect of major association, to suggest and recall other reasonings in the same line, when the subject is governed by whatever happens to be the reasoning of the moment. Thus an insane man, impressed by the habit of thought due to early education, reasons assassination to be at all times a crime, and

abstains from it, whilst at another time, forgetful of this, he pursues a different train of thought, and practically reaches the opposite conclusion. Through mal-association one conclusion does not suggest the other; the man is therefore not completely possessed of his entire self, and he is a danger in society. At one moment he is harmless and more responsible for his determinations, whilst at others he is a perfectly irresponsible victim of disease.

The most common form of insanity is observed in a disposition to ramble, but being due to abnormal association, its cause in some way underlies all other forms, even its opposite, concentration. The mere rambler is comparatively innocent, for generally there is not a sufficiency of passion, or of dominant passion, to intensify him. His imagination runs away with him, and the will is too feeble to govern it. A feature of the law of association of ideas is most apparent in him, viz., *when a part of a past perception returns the whole returns.* It is, however, not precisely the whole that returns to him; there is something lacking sufficient to denaturalize him, and this something lacking is his insanity. Sometimes there is nothing lacking in his minor associations, but insufficient motive and will to command a sufficiency of association of all kinds for complete practical intelligence. The physical laws that govern associated motions of the sensorium, left to themselves, would doubtlessly continue to reproduce associations indefinitely, since some part of each would introduce a new one to which also it belongs, and this process would have no limit. At least this is what we must infer from the corresponding psychological law, for associations of ideas follow this rule. The law, then, that continually fills the fancy with successions of associated images, is a law governing matter, and it operates spontaneously, independently of the power of volition. That the law of association of ideas should act spontaneously would therefore be naturally expected, and this is actually the case. A part of one group of ideas is a part of another, or suggests by similarity or its opposite some part of another group, when one entire association gives place to a new one, and this is repeated indefinitely. We have thus involuntary distractions of thought, wander in absence of mind, are immersed in reveries that are pleasures of the imagination; or we may ramble with the greater incoherence of an idiot. We have, however, a certain command of the law, when we choose to direct it, as we have of the semi-voluntary muscles of breathing; but when undirected by the will it does not cease to operate, and runs off with our thoughts waywardly. When these operations are controlled by right reason, that is, reason deducing from prior correct conclusions as premises for the later reasoning, and this is continued, we are natural and self-possessed, even if we happen to be more or less "flighty" or

light-minded. But when the will is deficient in inclination and motive, or there are groupings that are not natural and true reproductions, these operations become wandering and erratic; there is a constant evolution of false rational products, and the result is some kind of rambling insanity. An extreme of this disease is *idioey*, but this must not be confused with *imbecility*, which is a pure weakness, and which arises from torpor of associative faculty rather than confusion. Almost every child is a rambler, but he is natural; when, however, a mature and experienced man becomes as a child he is not natural, and therefore not a completely sane man. Second childhood comes on with a recession of those passions and higher emotions that are unknown to real childhood, of the deep movements that thrill and convulse the sensorium, whilst petty feelings and sentiments, such only as childhood knew, agitate but its surface. Childhood substantially returns. The passage from this condition into *doteage* is simply by deepening without change of character, continuity of thought breaking oftener; and the mental drivelling of extreme old age is the utter disassociation of sensible phantasms and sensible ideas. Complete insensibility, which may not be unconsciousness, is their extinction.

The opposite of rambling thought is continued sameness, and the extreme of this is *monomania*. It was said that in all insanity there is always too much continuity of thought or too little. The rambling fool has too little, and there is not sufficient of him associated and concentrated to form an object of deep pity. He is simply to be cared for, lest through pain or distress he become intensified, and so command our sympathy. The monomaniac has too much, and is dispossessed of the greater part of himself through inattention to it. One aim, or one idea, or one persuasion, masters him. He is not born with his monomania, but acquires it by constant driving through the same ruts of thought, which become too deeply worn. Associated motions acquire a facility by frequent repetition, and eternally reproduce themselves. Other associations become fewer and fewer, their parts entangled more and more with those of the dominant association, until any one of them invariably reproduces it. The man thus becomes closed to perfect freedom, and is insane. Monomania is the effect of some dominant desire raised to passion, which reason has not rightly controlled, and which has ended by controlling and shaping the products of reason.

Constant repetition, however, often produces another effect than habit and facility. There is not only wear, but tear, of tissue in the human sensorium; and partial disorganization resulting in partial or entire paralysis, so far as its relations to psychological phenomena are concerned, follows excessive wear. Herein lies a danger to

the mind from any inordinate pursuit, or the inordinate indulgence of any one passion, whether simple, like fear, anger and love, or complex, like anxiety, ambition and revenge. The imagination is put upon a strain in one direction by continuous study, the harmony of its motions jeopardized, and imbecility threatened instead.

The insanity arising from too little continuity of thought is different from that arising from excessive continuity; and these two diversities may be properly termed the *qualities* of the disease. There are also too little activity and too great activity of mind, and these may be properly said to express the disease's *quantity*. It must not be supposed from this that sanity lies at the bottom, too little continuity or activity being disease, and too much of these being worse disease. Sanity lies between the extremes of quality, a departure in either direction leading towards disease; the greatness of the disease measured by the degree of quantity. More or less confusion is consequent upon any notable degree of either quality, and has place by reason of a suspension of that law of association which requires a return of all the ideas upon the return of one. This suspension follows a suspension of an organic law, and it is characteristic of all laws that govern organism that constitutional changes in it modify them, and that radical changes work an entire substitution. If the sensorium be so far untuned from normal molecular activity that a group of motions fails of complete reappearance, the voids being filled by stragglers from other groups, the corresponding psychological condition would be an association of ideas so different from true nature and what it ought to be, that a combination of such unnatural associations in complex thought must lead to the evolution of unnatural and false mental products.

Character and degree of insanity are often observed as exaggerations of personal peculiarity. One man is brutish, his receptive faculty in sensation being blunt, when there is a corresponding torpor of imaginative reproduction. When this torpor is extreme, the man, like one dead-drunk or drugged with opium, is imbecile. Another is highly sensitive, all sensations being indexed at the exterior by the play of muscles upon his face and body. When, in their absence, he is beset by their images, the internal imaginings are seen to be vivid by the same strong indications that again externally appear. Excessive indicating characterizes the maniac, whose mental condition is the opposite of imbecility. A mild form of each condition is consistent with what is commonly conceded to be sanity, when the subject is termed either a dullard or hare-brained. The rule of phantasms is that they are feebler than originals, but cerebral movements are sometimes repeated in all their primary

force, when fancy is as vivid as reality; and the pictures of frenzy and delirium-tremens have all the high relief of sensations. It is safe to say that frenzy is not always deprived of normal associations of natural groupings of ideas and of true rational products, in which case there is no release from moral responsibility. This introduces us to a most important consideration, the degree of moral responsibility that may attach to the unsound in mind. No general rule can here be made to determine, and in each instance a practical question arises to be singly settled; for symptoms vary indefinitely, although one broad principle must test every case. The practical question must be this: Does the established general principle *hic et nunc* apply? The reply to this will involve nice discriminating power, experience by observation, and a knowledge of the nature and degrees of insanity as herein set forth. But the broad principle must be given, and to reach it requires some little reasoning. The rule amongst mankind is that men are sane, and those not sane are exceptions to the rule. Every one, then, should be deemed responsible and held accountable until there is evidence sufficient to create a rational doubt. What suffices, however, to make a doubt fully rational in one man cannot so suffice in all, and what is a fully rational procedure in a man of common intelligence may be an unworthy train of thought in a man of science or one of cultivated mind. It seems to be sufficiently clear that, in every case of insanity proper, there is a want of true value in many concrete products of reason, but not in all of them, and that this is due to some departure from entire mental nature as we know it. There is some inability which is greater or less in proportion as it fails from the standard of common nature. When a clear case of insanity is discerned, the comparison is with that ordinary nature common to us all; but there are obscure cases whose discernment requires a knowledge of nature as modified by some special culture or habit of thought, and which is by no means rare. Each time we are led to an examination by observing some false products of reason that we would not expect under the circumstances, for common nature is a most familiar portrait ever before our active minds, and any variation from it we are quick to detect. If these products seem to indicate that the subject is too diffused for a circumspect possession of himself, or too concentrated to contain all himself, or too confused to be one single consistent self, the inference is, since there is not complete rational self-possession, that there is some degree of insanity. Now what degree of this is required to dispossess entirely a man of responsibility to his conscience and to society is too delicate an inquiry to be here definitively settled; but it may be said in general terms that moral imputability is proportionate to combined knowledge and consent. When, in a case of

wrongdoing, these are complete, there is knowledge of the law and of its present application; and there is deliberate consent to its violation. Moral law obliges every man, and there is in the grand total of human life no exemption from it. It does not depend upon our will. No man can, therefore, plead for his misdoing an exemption from law, no matter what his station, his creed, or his want of creed; for none is ignorant that he is subject to obligation of natural law even when above such as are imposed by men. No matter how plausibly he may reason he is, to say the best of him, one of the guilty self-deceived; and he knows in his heart of hearts that he is part of a great design, owing to its author conformity to it in his place and according to his rational nature. Deliberate consent implies freedom of will; and freedom of will depends, not upon the mere existence of intellect, but upon the highest form of intelligence, reason, practically exercised. The broad principle then applicable to all cases is this: Where there is sufficient rational self-possession for perfect freedom of election, as between two equals, there are present all actual conditions required for full responsibility to conscience and to man; and in proportion as such self-possession is diminished, a tottering of liberty increases and responsibility declines.

In practical determinations as to condition of mind science alone cannot suffice. Science is a series of reasonings, is theoretical, and theory cannot practically apply the laws which it discovers. A change of circumstances not unfrequently changes the subject entirely, and so withdraws it from the law. We cannot enter the secret recesses of every human heart to learn the strength of its desires and its struggles, its apprehensions, and all the various circumstances that affect it. We are not a *scrutator cordium*, and must rest satisfied with our science of insanity as being useful to direct and correct practical observation and reflection.

It would seem that some benefit to the insane ought to derive from a knowledge of the true theory of their malady, but the different treatments that have been evolved from practical observation of the effects of various insane diseases, accord so well with those that ought to grow out of a true theory of the nature of such diseases, that there seems to be little left to suggest. This agreement is strongly confirmative of the theory set forth. Accordingly it can scarcely be hoped that children born with feeble minds can ever be more than feeble-minded. There is a sensorial inability to perfectly repeat associations, a deficiency that practice and habit may improve so far as to bring out improved rational results, even when complete self-possession is hopelessly beyond reach. The rule of practice and habit is that they beget facility; but it must be remembered that excess is apt to beget difficulty and obstruc-

tion. In the growing stage of the sensorium it undergoes its greatest changes, and much might thereby be hoped for in the way of organic improvement from judicious practice, more than at any other time. Even when fully grown molecular change constantly renews it, whereby existing facilities might be improved and new ones started. The originally torpid brain, if not evidently too torpid, should not be altogether hopeless as a subject of education. It would seem, however, that greater expectations would be justified in most cases of induced insanity, for here there was originally good material; consequently we would not aim at *formation*, only *reformation*; not a new creation, only a restoration. Sometimes insanity is induced by a sudden shock, when the sensorium is so convulsed as to break the continuity of its motions, after which harmony of association gives place to discord. Nature is the greatest of restorers, and sleep is that condition in which she most rapidly rests the brain. Rest is simply restoration, a change from induced abnormal back to normal; and where insanity has been suddenly developed, frequent and protracted sleeping, with proper food, naturally promises the best results. If shock dissipates, calm allows nature to reunite, unless certain distances have been passed beyond which its laws are inoperative. If the molecular chasms become too wide for restorative forces to reach across, the discord of thought must be perpetual. Stupor is calm, even if it is not sleep, and is an imperfect substitute for sleep. Judiciously substituted, it is better than unrest; injudiciously, it may interfere with the laws of restoration. In monomania plentiful sleep is also indicated, for temporarily the deep furrows of thought cease to be worn and measurably fill in. During wakefulness, dissipation of thought accomplishes the same by making a diversion in nature's favor, thus allowing the filling-in process to gain upon the exhaustive. Insanities induced by anxieties, cares and fears, are in character like monomania, only there may be several furrows instead of one. There must be an exhaustion of some elements of nutrition in certain territories of the sensorium, which can be restored only during complete repose. Generally monomania results from the ascendancy of one great passion, whose indulgence increases rather than exhausts it. Here the cultivation of its opposite tends to beneficially obscure it, and in time a new habit may come to balance the weight of an old passion, even when principle does not control it. When any mind is not too concentrated, complete suspension of thinking beyond the ordinary hours of sleep is seldom required for the mind's healthful restoration, and a recruiting of strength can take place during activity. A change of thought, without relaxing, is rest and recreation. Intellectual men often attain great age, and constantly recreate themselves with the mental springs unbent. There is a change

of molecular motion, of wear of tissue; and a constant, but properly distributed, wear is compatible with a vigorous and healthy brain. The mere rambler is generally so born, and is hard to concentrate, unless by pain, or fear of pain, either physical or mental. He does not dwell on things, and his share of suffering in life is small, for our greatest suffering consists in dwelling upon it, by which we repeat and pile it up unbearably. When anticipation is accomplishing its worst, relief often comes with the reality.

There is another class of insane that has been termed *confused*. Here the sensorial groups of motions cross each other's boundaries, or fail to fill completely up. There may not be too much contraction, nor too much dissipation, nor absence of sufficient nutrition, only a want of perfect natural co-ordination, the physical nature of which we cannot understand. As the order of the motions of the sensorium is a complete mystery to us, whilst its rupture is not entirely one, we may know what is likely to disturb it, from common experience; but we can only reason upon what is likely to improve it, from the closest practical and scientific observation.

The main object of this article is not to suggest remedies or means of improvement, that purpose is subordinate, but to explain the very obscure subject of insanity in accordance with orthodox philosophy, which divides man into two parts, organic and inorganic, that concur in thought; the organic part being subject to disease, whilst the inorganic part is not. No other philosophy attempts any but a pure and poor inductive solution. True philosophy, avoiding induction as to all its important principles, is not only in harmony with all the phases of human insanities as we learn them, but it explains them, and throws light upon conditions of mind that would be, without it, perfectly unintelligible. A full and regular association, major and minor, of ideas sufficient for normal and natural food for thought, is shown to be rational self-possession when played upon by immaterial powers that act according to invariable laws. Moreover, when, waking or dreaming, this self-possession is not had, either through absence or unnaturalness of association, those powers continue their regular and normal action, producing as entire results greater or less errors of the mind. No materialistic theory has ever been deep enough to account for all the parts of thought, and to thus attempt a consistent explanation of insanity; for materialism cannot so much as cross the threshold of psychology. It labors in vain to convert motion into sensation, consciousness and reason. Like the Peri at Eden's gate it stands disconsolate, its transient glimpses of light but dazzling flashes that fail to picture; and the fathomless gulf between it and mystery that baffles it, the infinite diversity of man as *object* of thought from man as *subject* of thought, yawning forever impassable.

## THE ĀRYAN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE.

*Nalōpākhyānam.* The Story of Nala, edited by Monier Williams. Oxford. 1860.

*Panini's Acht Bücher Grammatischer Regeln,* Herausgegeben und erläutert, von Dr. Otto Böhtlingk. Bonn. 1840.

*Kritische Grammatik der Sanskrita Sprache, in Kürzerer Fassung.* Von Franz Bopp. Berlin. 1868.

*Glossarium Sanscritum, in quo omnes radices et vocabula usitatissima explicantur, et cum vocabulis Græcis, Latinis, Germanicis, Lithuanicis, Slavonicis, Celticisque comparantur.* Auctore F. Bopp. Berlin. 1844.

*Grammaire Comparée des Langues Aryennes.* Par J. L. Loiseleur. Paris. 1854.

*Radices Linguæ Sanscritæ, ad Decreta Grammaticorum definivit et copia exemplorum exquisitorum illustravit N. L. Westergaard.* Havniæ. 1841.

WHILE tentative efforts towards philological research have been spasmodically made ever since Plato took the initiative in his *Cratylus*, it is but within the present century that the various genuine contributions to such knowledge have been, in the calcium light thrown on the field of discovery by the study of Sanskrit and its immediately cognate tongues, certainly discernible from the false. Only within the last forty years can philology be said to have taken such fixed form, and to have presented itself with such clear credentials, as to command the recognition of the learned, or to attain the dignity and certitude of a science. Haphazard derivations, sometimes true, much more frequently false, are adduced by Cicero, Varro, and other classic authors. Quintilian and Aulus Gellius give us a multitude both of fair and foul guesses at the tracing of words to their roots. When the Greek scholiasts leave the elucidation of their texts, and attempt to give us their views of the derivational significance of words, they are too often utterly unreliable; and indeed, from the time of the grammar of Donatus down almost to the present day, no real advance had been made in philology. Not much was to be expected from the middle ages, during which period a knowledge of Greek can hardly be said to have existed among the literati of Europe; and the gleaning is even less than the most moderate expectation. In those days the bent of study was directed to other and entirely different objects, and without raising a question as to the value of the studies of the

schoolmen, it is fair to say that those ages have helped us no whit in the direction of a sound philology. Each man's vernacular was a jargon without fixed form, intelligible but within the sweep of a short radius about his native place. Few became learned even in the very limited confines of the *trivium* and *quadrivium*; those who did, wrote Latin (for the most part, with a sublime disregard of Cicero), and however it may be with the "*man of one book*," against whom the Roman proverb warns us, there is no danger of the man of one language ever becoming addicted to philology. The time from the revival of Greek studies until what is currently called the Reformation, was not sufficiently long to make any ineffaceable philological mark; at any rate it made no mark of that kind, and with the schism from the Church arose an exaggerated idea of the importance of Hebrew, a slim knowledge of the very scanty remains of which, united with a floating notion that this language either was the actual tongue furnished ready made to Adam in Paradise, or at least that it contained the reliquiae thereof, combined to introduce and give vogue to a set of absurd derivations which, in the light of our present knowledge, seem supremely ridiculous, but with which our dictionaries of Latin, Greek, and modern languages (more especially English) fairly teemed, and which have done a great deal to retard the progress of the science, and to make all philological treatises regarded as the laughing-stocks, which too many of these intrinsically were. When the Lexicon of Schrevelius gave the Greek word *ἵπερ* as derived from *ἴπετω*, "quia," to use his own words, "*lux diei est appetibilis oculis;*" and *θέσης*, either from *θέω*, "quia percurrit omnia Deus," or from *θέασις*, "quia videt omnia Deus," the dumfounded student might well add disgust to his surprise. One shames to mention that men yet live who were instructed by means of grammars which explained our English 's in the phrase *John's book*, as a contraction of *John, his book*. Men must be pretty thoroughly educated, both by books and travel, to rid themselves of a lurking belief that the term language means exclusively their own tongue, a degree of culture which the Greeks seem never to have attained; and while the few Romans who acquired Greek may have realized that the Hellenic was in many respects a superior medium of intercommunication, yet the ignorant (a term which includes hosts who can both read and write) have in all countries and climes persisted in believing that all who speak a language unintelligible to them, have no ideas that are worth understanding. To reinforce this natural tendency came the absurd and incoherent derivations given in such lexicons as Parkhurst's, Bagster's, Schrevelius's, Donnegan's, and the various Latin dictionaries then used in the schools; hence it is not to be wondered that philology was spoken of as "*derivation run mad*," and that the

whole subject and its devotees were regarded with a suspicion from which they can hardly be said to have yet fully recovered. It was readily seen that the same sort of perverted ingenuity that deduced *āṣṭip* from *anosh*, princeps from *peri*, and horn from *keren*, was perfectly competent if applied to the supposititious Formosan language of George Psalmanazar, to make of it a direct member of the Shemitic, or indeed any other family of languages, for some one has wittily enough characterized the then practice of philologers as "counting the consonants for very little, and the vowels for nothing at all."

Learned as was Dr. Johnson, his lexicon is strangely weak, and even false in the etymological portion; while unfortunately all our lexicons and cyclopædias, partly from the nature of the case, and partly from other causes into which we need not at present too curiously pry, are to a large extent but transcripts of each other. It is very clear that the "*aucupes verborum*" of that day were unable for a long time to learn distinctly whether they should feel more encouraged or ridiculed by the "Diversions of Purley;" and we may fairly state the condition of philology at the time of our Declaration of Independence, as a vague, hazy general idea pervading the minds of the literary world, that a large part of English was derived from Latin by way of Norman-French, while the greater portion of the remainder came from German, or indeed Hollandish, from which latter etymologies were much more frequently deduced. If, in any way, Latin words could be traced to the Greek, everything was deemed accomplished, unless perchance some tag of the Greek word might seem to bear a slight resemblance to Hebrew, when it was incontinently taken for granted that no further progress was possible—that there was no closer approximation to the tower of Babel. The idea of related groups or families of languages had not as yet clearly presented itself, and he who should in England have affirmed that the Hebrew is but a feeble and lacking younger sister in the great family of Shemitic tongues, of which Arabic has at all times been the head, would have been met by a storm of theological indignation that might well have appalled him. Even the modern languages of Latin root were by no means currently learned by Englishmen. German had not as yet taken any literary position, and was, if possible, less studied than is Russian at the present day; so that what is now called philology, was but a vague catching at fancied resemblances by persons who, for the most part, had no full and general knowledge of the language with which they compared the vernacular, or who, knowing Latin, Greek, and the Hebrew (as fully as the latter allows itself to be known), were but slightly acquainted with the modern languages of Latin root—knew none of the Shemitic tongues, save that which their pseudo-

biblical prejudices made them regard as sacred—were utterly lacking in knowledge of the Celtic, Slavonic, Gothic, or Lettish forms of speech, and, crowning disqualification for the philologist, were but dimly aware that the Sanskrit existed. Missionaries furnished more or less incomplete guesses at the grammar and vocabularies of the tribes among whom they labored, and frequent dissertations appeared, showing what were supposed to be striking analogies between the Hebrew and every tongue from the Abenaki of North America to the Araucanian of the South; from the Malaysian Lingua Franca to the Sampan-Chinese of Canton or Foo-Chow. Goropius wrote to prove that Hollandish was spoken in the Garden of Eden, nor did the Erse fail to put forth champions claiming that honor for itself. When learned men in pretentious works seriously derived the English *covenant* from the Welsh *cofen*, the want of ethnologic, historic, and linguistic principle was too great to allow any reasonable expectation of correct, still less of enlarged views of etymology. As when physicians know not what was the matter with the patient, he is said to have died of general debility, so everything apparently inexplicable in Latin was referred to the Etruscan or Oscan, in Greek to the Pelasgic, and in Hebrew to the influence of the Chaldee. Further than that linguistics did not reach.

Unfortunately, it seems to be the rule in the world that the men most competent to the task are not by any means the most ready to "*rise and explain.*" Mithridates and the Admirable Crichton have left us nothing whatever on the subject which they, of all others, seem to have been in the best condition to elucidate; and in their stead here and there an ant, mounted on a pebble, surveyed the to him visible horizon, and enlightened his fellows with his views on the system of rivers and mountains, valleys and plains, divides and watersheds of a continent. Now it is no less a mystery than a fact, that men rarely plume themselves on, or seek applause for, what they really know, but often for what they think they know, or would fain understand; and in our day a Mezzofanti has gone to the grave without leaving us a line on philology. From want of thorough acquaintance with language, mere dialects have been taken for separate tongues, mutual derivations have been instituted between them, and at the times referred to, the derivation of the Scottish *fadge* from the Greek φάγω, seemed to the learned by no means such an absurdity as it should have been even in the eyes of the tyro. The old lady in whose hearing it was proposed to make a smoother version of Rouse's Psalms, who asked indignantly whether they thought they could write "better English than the blessed psalmist himself," formulated for her rank in life exactly the same sort of ignorance which obtained as to language amongst the learned of

her day. The names Indo-European, Indo-Germanic were unknown, as indeed the Sanskrit, a study of which gave rise to these terms, as well as to accurate and trustworthy views on philology in general, had not yet been discovered; for the term *discoverer* best describes the relation of Sir William Jones to that tongue; and for lack of acquaintance with it, learned men who engaged previous to his time in research deemed philological, may without exaggeration be described as having been up to 1790 engaged, so far as the higher walks of the science were concerned, in blowing linguistic soap-bubbles.

But between the first flash of a discovery of this magnitude on the mental vision of a single savant, and its thorough acceptance by the literary world, the distance of time is wide. What is true of languages in general, is superlatively so of Sanskrit. A knowledge of it is not to be acquired in a day. It is even now, with all our grammars and lexicons, in Latin, English, German, French, and the various Prâkritis, a labor of years to acquire any but the most cursory view of it, and while even a superficial knowledge is amply sufficient to prove its importance and value to the philologist, it is of very little value to the student, beyond that of indicating what a vast amount yet remains to him unknown; how immense, indeed, is the ocean upon which he has launched. And if it be so difficult of acquisition to-day, what must it not have been when to its intrinsic impediments were superadded the fact that it must be learned from MSS. in which word was never separated from word, which had essentially no punctuation beyond the period, where our European use of capital letters was utterly unknown, the recognized characters and their contraction amounting to over six hundred, with, of course, those peculiar to each copyist, and a system of grammar so different in its mode of presentation from any to which the Western mind had been accustomed, that it seemed like an introduction into a different universe? Yet another obstacle stood in the way. Men generally study for an object, which is rarely the mere abstract love of progress. There were no professorships of Sanskrit in any university or college,—as, indeed, there are but few now,—nor was it yet fully understood that the study had such an intimate connection with the rationale and inner life of our modern European tongues. False names once imposed are hardly ever corrected, and the phrase *Arabic numerals*, ignorantly applied in the first instance to the Hindoo digits—the terms (to take but one letter of the alphabet) alchemy, alcohol, alkali, alembic, alembroth, algebra, alidade, almanac, almacantar, and alquifou—received by us from the Saracens, who had gotten from the Hindoos the things which they represent, were calculated to produce, and have actually stamped on all our literature to the present day, the im-

pression that the Arabians were the originators of the higher numerical calculation, of chemistry, and of astronomy, than which no assertion can be more false. Once well started in literature, it is nearly impossible to eradicate a lie, whether as to persons or things. For two hundred years yet to come we shall hardly get rid of the falsehood that King Alfred founded the University of Oxford. True, the Mussulman had frequently invaded the country, and finally got a foothold about A.D. 1000, but he never subdued it entirely; is not remarkably gifted with a taste for literature outside the Koran, and of course did not impart that information, which he never fully acquired, as regarded the progress of the Indian Aryas in science and art. Though Alexander the Great reached the Ganges, he can in no proper sense be said to have subjugated the country, much less to have learned anything of the inhabitants; indeed it has been plausibly suggested that the nearest approach that he made to the name of the Raja of the Punjab, was the being fobbed off with the reply, "*Purush asmi*,"—"Homo sum;" and hence that prince has come down to us under the name of Porus.

Notwithstanding the repute and research of Sir William Jones, of Colebrooke, Wilson, Potts, Böhtlingk, Bopp, Burnouf, Troyer, Loiseleur, and Westergaard, the knowledge of Sanskrit spread very slowly, as well from its inherent difficulty as from the want of probable recompense for the pains necessary to its acquisition, and indeed there are, except in a few of the most distinguished institutions of the Old World, no professorships of Sanskrit, while on the continent of America we know of but one, which we are informed is essentially a sinecure. Certainly nothing valuable has as yet been published in furtherance of the knowledge of Sanskrit literature on this side of the Atlantic. Nor do we find fault with this. It is far better not to publish at all, than to add to the already superabundant heap of books that have nothing new, definite, or valuable to propound, and we could well afford to forego an average of forty-nine out of every fifty of the books on the classics, and on Hebrew, that have appeared among us, about that proportion of them being either unmitigated trash, or else a mere rehash of what European authors had already done to the hands of the compilers. Now, as it is manifestly impossible, at least it seems so to us, that any *better* grammar of the Sānskrit should be written than that of Bopp, the German title of which heads this article, but which has also appeared in Latin, and as no one will in the nature of things care for studying Sanskrit, or be in a position to profit by it, who does not know most probably both those languages, there hardly would seem to be any use in a further publication on the subject of Sanskrit grammar. True the Burnoufs in France,

Williams and others in England, have published grammars of the language, and we do not dispute that they are good ones so far as they go, but for thoroughness and system, for completeness in all parts, for judicious retention of all that is valuable in the native system, and for suggestiveness as to all those points on which a hint is of the utmost importance to the philologist, none that we have seen can for a moment compare with that of Bopp. What he has done for the grammar has been accomplished for the lexicographical part of the study by the joint labors of himself and the learned Dane, Westergaard. The titles of both books will show wherein they differ, and in what respects the one is a complement of the other. We do not say for a moment that other lexicons, of which there are many, fail of their aim, but assert most broadly that no two other dictionaries of the Sanskrit so fully cover the entire ground which the Sanskrit student with a philological bent wishes to survey. Being in Latin, they appeal to literary men everywhere. There is consequently no sort of call for a new work, and any such appearing can only be accounted for by that itching desire on the part of writers (with which too many are now afflicted) to see their names on the title-page of a book. There is here no inducement to enterprising publishers, since the purchasers of works on Sanskrit will always be few and far between. Böhtlingk in his two volumes has presented us with the full text of Pānini, facile princeps of all ancient and native grammarians, giving us in his first volume the *Sûtras*, and in the second the various *Bhâshyas*, *Vârtikas*, and *Kârikâs* of the Hindoo authors who have subsequently annotated Pānini, with such a dissertation upon the Sanskrit grammar and grammarians as leaves nothing to be desired. These Germans are mentioned with no disposition to disparage the works in the same direction of England and France, but because it must be admitted as a general proposition that the thorough books connected with all philological subjects have happened by some strange coincidence to be those produced in Germany, a statement that could not be truly made with regard to works on astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, or general philosophy.

Now, no one hitherto has studied Sanskrit with a sole view to its literature, but rather subordinating everything else to the deservedly admitted importance to philology of its elements and inflections, its forms and structure. For, even though its literature were of ten times its actual value, life is too short, and science and literature, art and philosophy are growing too rapidly upon us, for any but the most exceptionally situated individuals, with the most amply endowed and cultivated intellects, to entertain a hope of mastering even a considerable portion of them all. In the very

book at the head of the list at the beginning of this article, written nearly 3000 years ago, Rituparna says

*Sarvas sarvam na janāti, sarvajñā nāsti kascana.*

“ All skill to no man is given, none there is who all things knows.”

And if this were true then, how much more hopeless is it not for us in these days, when with the best talent, the most accurate and condensed books, and the longest life, we should find it not merely impossible to master the round of arts and sciences, but even to become thoroughly conversant with the one specific branch of history? All that we either can or should aim at, is in youth to whet the intellect, drill and prepare it by a discipline that shall fit it for all sorts of research, and consequently for that special one to which either inherent taste or stress of circumstances may impel us. But that training which involves of necessity attention to a great number of different studies, once over, and its end attained, every man should be a specialist. “ Whatever is worth doing at all, is worth doing well,” and the proverb is none the less true for being trite. The mathematician may devote some portion of his time and attention to the peculiar pursuits of the linguist, but one study or the other must suffer by his attention to the rival. Consequently, let us not be understood as intimating, much less urging, that all literary men should study Sanskrit. It has its uses and its applicability. If life were longer, Latin and Greek less absolutely necessary for the mastery of our own language, their literature less extensive or less beautiful, we freely say that it might be well to devote the time thus spared to a cultivation of the masterpiece of the Aryan tongues, but as things are, we merely assert, and hope to show that no man has or can have any claim to rank as a philologist in the fullest sense, without a satisfactory acquaintance with this tongue. And by the phrase *satisfactory acquaintance*, we do not mean the equivalent of an average graduate's knowledge of Latin or Greek, but its literature as embraced in the Vedic, Epic, and Puranic periods of the language, and that will involve a rote knowledge of all the grammatical forms, the rules of *Guna*, *Vridhi*, and *Sandhi*, the paradigms, the *Ganas*, the *Sûtras*, and their complements, the *Vârtikas* and *Kârikâs*, with all the archaic forms in which centres the greatest interest of the philologist. Much less will answer thoroughly the purposes of the general scholar; no slighter familiarity with the Sanskrit will suffice to render one an accurate philologist. Those who have a tolerable acquaintance with the prominent European literary reviews know well enough for practical purposes the phenomena of the Sanskrit that have been investigated since what we have termed its discovery near the

close of the last century ; how it has been incontestably shown to be, if not the very language, at least the highly polished *reliquie* of the original tongue spoken by our ancestors on the banks of the Oxus and Jaxartes, ere any of the present nations of Europe branched off from them,—when Celt and Finn, Greek and Roman, Goth and Slavonian, all spoke one tongue. The import and value, then, of the study of Sanskrit are twofold, viz.: its bearing upon all the tongues of Europe, and the harmony and symmetry of the language in itself. We say nothing of its literature, for as yet that can hardly be said to have been studied on its own merits by Europeans.

In all these remarks, we are going (and we address ourselves to those who go) on the supposition that the object of study is not what Professor Huxley declares it to be, viz., "*to get on in life.*" Material advancement, which would seem to be the chief outcrop of modern civilization, is doubtless a good enough thing in its way, but we strongly object to putting it forward as the chief aim in life. Saying nothing of the theological view of the matter, if such people wish to be consistent they must at once eliminate three-fourths of all that heretofore has ranked as among the objects of study; Latin and Greek, etc., *a fortiori*, Sanskrit, must go by the board. But while there are individuals who for the sake of notoriety or for the purpose of saying a smart thing, of being identified with a pronounced neoterism, would eliminate all of these from the course, both of training and subsequent study, we cannot believe that there are many such, and are loath to think that they represent any considerable constituency.

Chrestomathies of the Sanskrit have been published in England, Germany, and France, and the students of the language, who would seem not to be very numerous even in the learned institutions of the Continent, have usually hitherto read, *first*, extracts from the *Hitopadesa* (a collection of fables), *next*, part of the *Kathā-Sarit-Sāgara* (ocean of streams of narration), *then* extracts from the *Maha Bharata* (Great Ancestral King), or the *Megha-dūta* (messenger from the clouds). Bopp gives in his grammar two cantos of the story of Nala as a "sprachprobe," and a separate edition of the entire episode has been issued at Berlin, under his auspices, but no edition so full, so complete, so accurate, and in all respects so well suited to the wants of learners, has ever been offered to the public as that of Prof. Monier Williams. This gentleman has long been a student and professor of Sanskrit, has had in India ample opportunities of converse with the most learned Pandits, was, if we do not mistake, for many years connected with the governmental college system of Bengal, and now in England has had exceptional opportunities for consultation and comparison of the various manu-

scripts stored in that Vatican of Hindoo literature, the East India House. His edition has a vocabulary adapted to the text; issuing from the University press of Oxford, it may deservedly be called the *ne plus ultra* of Devanâgari printing, and we strongly recommend this publication as the very best edition of the most suitable book probably in the entire range of Indian literature for the student who desires to become acquainted with the Sanskrit. Now this language, with all its fulness of grammatical forms, with its literature, religious, scientific, and metaphysical, had existed long before the days of Alexander the Great, and yet, strange to say, with the single exception of a comparatively modern work on the history of Cashmere, by Turangiri, which dates the first monarchy of that country at 3714 B.C., nothing exists in the whole range of Sanskrit writing to which the name of history can properly apply. Doubtless this is due to the fact that the Brahmans, the sole depositaries of learning, knowing full well what was necessary to enhance their influence and secure their tenure of power, deemed it best to overlook men as they lived and events produced by their agency, till by lapse of time they might serve as an addition to that monstrous mythology, which after all, except for our less familiarity with it, is not a whit more monstrous than the genealogy of the Grecian gods as advanced by Hesiod, or of the Roman, as narrated by Ovid.

When therefore the student shall have attained sufficient knowledge of Sanskrit to enable him to perceive that not merely Greek and Latin, but all our modern European languages, how diverse soever they may seem at first, are kinsfolk, more or less removed, in the descending line from the Sanskrit, a knowledge that is not long in dawning on him, he will subsequently be enabled to judge, at least approximatively, of the times at which the various original migrations took place, by the greater or less divergency of each tongue, and the peculiarities of each divergency from the original mode of speech so perfectly enshrined in the language under present consideration. It will be quite clear to him that the grammatical structure of the Aryan tongue was already quite thoroughly fixed before some of our ancestors left the Asiatic plains, and at least equally evident that some of the migrations took place before that process had been completed. He will further find that full one-seventh of the people of the earth, inhabiting the present India, use as a vernacular one or the other of seven prominent Prâkrits immediately derived from and almost intelligible by means of that original Aryan speech, whence as from a fountain-head are derived our own as well as all the languages of the ruling nations of the earth. By the way, Sanskrit means *polished, refined*, as opposed to Prâkrit, *natural, rude*. Nor is the language even

dead, in the sense in which Greek and Latin are popularly but incorrectly said to be dead. The religious books, the civil laws, the science and literature of all these 200,000,000 of people are still in the Sanskrit, though itself have not been the vernacular language of any nation among them since about a century and a half B.C. All their learned class, their priests and teachers, *pandits* and *gurus*, acquire in it to this day the instruction deemed essential to their professions, and but the other day we have the testimony of Professor Williams (who was in the train of the Prince of Wales on his late visit to the East), that the Brahmins constantly use it as a medium of intercourse amongst themselves, and that their students still devote themselves to the memoriter acquisition of its stupendous religious literature, and still more prodigiously complicated grammatical system. And here we may remark *a parte* that those persons who declaim amongst ourselves so violently, both against the possibility and reliability of persistent oral tradition, find no encouragement for their views in the history of Brahmanian literature, of which it is sufficient to say that the whole of it was transmitted for more than 1000 years, as indeed, the purely religious portion of it still is, *viva voce*, from teacher to student, and that it was only when it had by gradual accretion of authors and systems outgrown "even the colossal memory of the Brahmins," that any portion of it was committed to writing. This fact has been made so clear by various writers on Sanskrit literature, more particularly by Dr. Hermann Brockhaus, that we shall not adduce in its support the arguments, which are simply irrefutable. But those who fail to be convinced of the possibility of a veritable oral tradition, in the face of the existence of the unwritten "work" of Free-masonry among European nations, will hardly give credence to the oral transmission of the Vedas and Upanishads, the aphoristic Sûtras, and the Puranas among the Aryas of remote times, and the distant East. Full true is the proverb, "Quod volumus facile credimus," nor is its converse less certain.

It has been stated that we have not a single native treatise on early Indian history. But books on morals as well as on civil law cannot well be written without giving us an accurate and vivid insight into the condition, the greater or less degree of civilization, of the people among and for whom they were produced. Now neither the four Vedas, which show by their great diversity both of style and subject-matter, that very considerable intervals of time must have elapsed between them, nor the "Laws of Manu," so well rendered into English by Sir William Jones, furnish any textual dates whatever. Hindoo authors unanimously assert that the last of the Vedas was completed over three thousand years before our era. But Colebrooke, most ingeniously and by astronomical argu-

ment founded upon the position assigned in the fourth Veda to the solstitial points, cuts off nearly sixteen centuries from this alleged point of departure. His argument is perfect, unless the position assigned in the Veda referred to be hypothetical; for the succession of the equinoxes is an invariable quantity, and by counting backward and successively deducting this quantity, the true date of any given solstitial points, and consequently of those given in the Veda referred to, will appear. This would fix the date of the completion of the last Veda somewhat previous to 1500 B.C. Now the Laws of Manu refer to the Vedas as productions even then venerable for their antiquity. How much more recent the laws may be, does not admit a strictly definite answer, but what with the comparatively primitive system of religion therein inculcated, the sanction of usages and rites known to have become obsolete many centuries before the Christian era, and the failure of allusion to many sects which must have been mentioned had they then been in existence, it is the most generally admitted belief that they must have appeared as early as the ninth century B.C. This, of necessity, carries us back to a much higher antiquity than appears at first view, since the state of society corresponding to the laws and manners detailed in the work must have by several ages preceded the writing thereof. Hence the Laws of Manu, which are but a compilation from and commentary upon the Vedas, furnish of themselves incontestable evidence that India was, at least twelve hundred years B.C. densely populated, dotted with large cities, abounding in towns and villages, largely tilled, well supplied with people engaged in manufacture and commerce, and made up of a number of independent states. These states raised large revenues, supported immense standing armies, and executed magnificent architectural structures. The temples of Elephanta, Ellora, Adjunta, and Salsette, which still remain, are admitted by those who boggle most at the Hindoo chronology, to antedate by far the Christian era. The first definite account that we have of India from a Western author is that given by Herodotus about 450 B.C. The next from Ctesias, who having been a resident of the Persian capital and a favorite at the court of Artaxerxes for the seventeen years preceding 398 B.C., wrote a book on India, of which, however, we have only the fragments preserved by Diodorus Siculus in his *Bibliotheca*. Both coincide with what has been above written of the condition of the country. According to Ctesias, India was overrun by Sesostris or Rameses of the nineteenth Egyptian dynasty fourteen hundred years B.C.; was subsequently unsuccessfully assailed by the Assyrian Queen Semiramis, and afterwards subdued by Cyrus the Great, though it would seem that the present Lahore and the Punjaub were all of India owning to the sway of

the Medes under Darius Hydaspes. For the rest, Justin and Quintus Curtius give us the outlines of all that occurred to India from without under Alexander and his successor Seleucus, and in Greek history Chandragupta and his capital Pâtaliputra figure respectively as *Sandracottus* and *Palibothra*. From that time, as far as history gives us any information, India would seem to have relapsed into quiet, trading however largely, though indirectly, with Egypt and Phenicia. Strabo makes mention of an embassy sent to the Emperor Augustus by a king whom he calls Pandion, whose territory would appear to have corresponded with the modern Scindh. Indian gems, precious woods, and perfumes, gotten by way of Egypt, seem to have been among the many articles of luxury in use amongst the Romans; but there is no reason to believe that the boasted masters of the world ever possessed a rod of territory in India itself. Large quantities of coins lately discovered pertaining to this era, and some progress made in deciphering certain monumental inscriptions in an alphabet nowhere else found, and apparently less designed to inform than to puzzle posterity, have already given some, and it is hoped will yet furnish valuable information on this portion of Indian history. From the rise of Mohammedanism, the outlying western and northern portions of India were subject to periodical usurpations of Arabs, sometimes successful and sometimes the reverse, until A.D. 1020, when the prince known in history as Sultan Mahmoud finally succeeded in making good his hold upon Central or Gangetic India. Beyond this brief outline of events we are not concerned with the history of that country, which actually divides itself into *ancient*, viz., till the invasion of Alexander, *medieval*, till the invasion of Sultan Mahmoud, or as others make it, till the establishment of the first European trading forts, and *modern*, covering everything since.

Without going into any detail as to the astronomy of the Hindoos, the most moderate men and those most qualified to judge the matter, admit that while we cannot carry back actual recorded observations of the Indian astronomers further than the year four hundred of our own era, yet the science had made large progress among them at least two hundred years before it was even mentioned among the Greeks; and the coincidence between the zodiacal signs of the Arabs and Hindoos is only, in their opinion, to be accounted for on the hypothesis that the Hindoos were the original framers. The first division of the belt of the heavens into twenty-seven portions or lunar houses, each marked by its own constellation, could not possibly have been made in the early infancy of astronomy, yet we find it already existing in the time of Parasara, the earliest Hindoo astronomer of whose writings any portion is extant. The Brahmans place him in the year 1442 B.C., but he certainly lived

before the promulgation of the Laws of Manu, and consequently before the days of the oldest known attention to astronomy. Most complete among Hindoo astronomical writings is the *Sûrya-Sidhânta*, which, however, is not believed to be earlier than A.D. 420. In this work clear rules are laid down for the calculation both of solar and lunar eclipses; the precession of the equinoxes is calculated, the monthly revolutions of the moon on her own axis, and the globular form of the earth are demonstrated. But from the complicated system invented by the Brahmans for the purpose of keeping all knowledge under the control of their own caste, it is so abbreviated, so veiled in forms and enigmatical utterances, that the knowledge of the meaning of the abbreviations and application of the formulæ is almost as difficult as the acquisition of the Sanskrit itself.

Even better established is their claim to an early and accurate knowledge in mathematics. The early Hindoos had surpassed the Greeks in establishing the exact ratio between the radius and the circumference of the circle, in using sines instead of chords for forming trigonometrical tables, as well as in exhibiting the ratios of the sides and angles in all possible triangles. Now the *Sûrya-Sidhânta* contains a highly satisfactory treatise on trigonometry, which could not have been written in the infancy of the science, and indeed reference is made in the work itself to other works on the subject and methods then extant of accomplishing the same results. About A.D. 360, Diophantus wrote in Greek the first Western treatise on algebra, and a certain process of algebraic analysis yet bears his name in all our books. Yet we now know that his Indian contemporary, Arya Bhatta, treats the resolution of equations, containing several unknown quantities, as something well known among calculators, and gives a general method for resolving indeterminate equations, declared by Professor Wallace to be "*a singularly refined process, and unknown in Europe till 1624.*" The Hindoos had already applied algebra to geometry, and both to astronomy, to such an extent as to have "*hit upon many matters in calculation which have been reinvented in modern times.*" Though their religion prevented their acquiring a knowledge of anatomy by dissection, yet they performed surgical operations, and had invented the *speculum* and *tourniquet*. In the very earliest ages they practiced inoculation, procured safe and speedy salivation by fumigation with cinnabar, administered mineral preparations internally, and procured chemically nitric, sulphuric, and muriatic acids, as well as oxides, sulphates, sulphurets, and carbonates of various metals.

Far more minute and comprehensive than the English common law are the laws of the Hindoos under the various heads of hus-

band and wife, parent and child, master and servant, metes and bounds, purchase and sale, inheritance and succession, crime, fraud, police, etc., etc. These laws, founded upon the Laws of Manu, have been much modified by the interpretation of commentators, so that there have been, since soon after the Christian era, five distinct law schools named after the provinces in which they are received. But neither the Vedas nor the Institutes of Manu make any mention of the execrable practice of the Suttee, while the marriage of a widow is stigmatized as "*not even to be mentioned in legal phrase;*" and the Jewish practice of raising up seed to a deceased brother, while not absolutely forbidden, is stigmatized as "*fit only for cattle.*" No law of marriage exists by the oldest writings, and the prohibition of marriage between persons of unequal caste (allowed by the Vedas) has been subsequently foisted upon Hindoo jurisprudence by the wily Brahmans. It must be allowed, however, that the criminal code is very imperfect and arbitrary when compared with the civil, and the principle permeating Indian law by which not only were punishments meted out according to the caste of the offender, but the higher the rank of the culprit the less was the penalty, is one which never can have appealed to a natural and unperverted sense of justice. Did not our own ancient common law rate the composition for the life of a man in accordance with the rank of the slayer? In this regard, then, we have still nothing to boast over the Hindoos, to whose honor be it said that gaming was by their law punished as a crime.

As regards systems of philosophy, neither ancient Greece nor modern Germany exceed, if they even equal, the zest with which the Hindoos have in all ages "soared after the infinite and dived after the unfathomable." Their learned men have not been behind others of their class in Western lands in wasting upon such subjects time and research which they might well have employed upon the neglected history of their country. That the facts have been as they are, is partly to be accounted for by the apparent natural proneness of the Hindoo mind to abstract and metaphysical subjects, and partly by their system of theology. All the questions touching the existence, nature, and qualities of the Supreme Being, the nature of mind and matter, what we call the Berkeleyan theory, or the negation of the existence of matter, the controversies of our own Nominalists and Realists, the essentiality of virtue and vice, the knowable and the unknowable, in short, everything that the wildest nightmare of a German philosopher ever presented to his mind, these and many more form the bulk and subject-matter of Hindoo philosophy. To give in a reasonable compass any fair idea of the subtlety and ethereality of their speculations is a hopeless task, and as each individual's reason was the court of last res-

sort, and there existed for them no possibility of a supreme and infallible arbiter, to whom an appeal might be made, unanimity was not to be hoped, and there have arisen among them nearly as many schools as individual writers on abstract subjects. Colebrooke, probably the best read of all Europeans in this sort of Indian literature, gives six different schools as the most important, and we shall content ourselves with merely naming them, viz.: 1. The Purva Mimansa set forth by Jaimini, which by a peculiar system of logic seeks to ascertain the meaning of the Vedas and the actual duties therein enjoined. 2. The Uttara Mimansa, by Vyâsa (the compiler), the explications of which appear as early as the sixth century B.C. It is essentially our Pantheism, much more ingeniously presented. 3. The Nyâya, or logical school of Gotama. 4. The Atomic School of Kanade. 5. The Sankhya, by Papila, which is atheistic. 6. The Theistic School of Patanjali. The teachers and devotees of these systems are called *Munis*, and assert, each that the Nirvâna or emancipation from the shackles of the body, is to be attained by his system, and by that alone. Others, with Professor Wilson and the Pandits, group each successive two of these together, forming thus the *Vedanta*, *Nyâya*, and *Sankhya* schools, the disciples of each of which have in different ages written volumes upon volumes thereon, in which they treat *de omni scibili* (very much as has been done nearer home), leaving untouched no one of the various questions which have set their Western brethren at loggerheads, while raising a great many others which have never been treated by our philosophers. Of course the Yoga, or state of entire abstraction of mind from body, that highest idea of happiness to the Hindoo intellect, and the doctrine of metempsychosis present ample scope for treatise and query, for doubts and possibilities without number, nor have the *Munis* left them *unimproved*, as our preachers phrase it. Most noteworthy to us among all this farrago, seem Gotama's sixteen logical categories, and his syllogism, consisting of five members, viz.: 1. Proposition. 2. Reason. 3. Example. 4. Application, and 5. Conclusion, which is really the exact method naturally followed by the human mind. The theories also of Kanade touching sound, gravity, light, and color are well worth attention, in regard to the former three of which he was far in advance of anything known in Europe till long after, and his mistake in the last is a very pardonable one in an exceedingly ingenious theorist.

It would be interesting, did our limits allow it, to give the distinctive points of the ancient Vedic faith; to show how it became modified and corrupted in the Code of Manu, which may be called the initial promulgation of the Brahmanic practice; how it changed into a sort of monasticism under the mighty reformer Buddha, who

raised the standard of revolt against the caste system and the sacerdotalism of the Brahmans; and how when Buddhism lost ground in India it was replaced by the corrupt Krishna-worship now so popular throughout that country. Let it be said in passing, that the old saying, "Cujus regis, ejus religio," which has held good of every country of Europe with the honorable exception of Ireland, has not been verified in India. For, though the Mohammedans held sway in the country for full six hundred years, yet Islam never took any hold among the Hindoos, while the attempts to spread the Gospel under British rule have been almost utterly wanting in success. It is useless for us to cherish any illusion in the teeth of facts, and while immemorial customs and ancient modes of thought are admittedly dying out, it is not the doctrines of Christianity, but dead apathy and indifference that succeed in their stead.

But by far the greatest curiosity of the Hindoo literature is the language in which it is all written. It was once the vernacular of all India, and of several outlying regions. "It is," says Sir William Jones, "*more perfect than Greek, more copious than Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either.*" Spoken over this vast area—as near to perfection as we can imagine language of mortal—cultivated in its grammar to the height of refinement—embodying hymns, legends, and poems, repeated in ordinary life and rehearsed at festivals and public worship—and all this from the date of at least 1700 years B.C., it had already, a century and a half before the Christian era, ceased to be the language spoken by any but the learned; and though then and since, all works of any pretensions have been written in Sanskrit, yet the five great Prâkrits of the north, Punjabi, Mathili, Bengali, Gujerati, and Kanoji, differing from it somewhat as Italian and Portuguese from Latin, had at that time, essentially in their present form, become the conversational medium of the people, and have so continued till this day; while of the five tongues of the Deccan, two (those of Orissa and Maharashtra) are so full of Sanskrit that they would cease to be languages were the words subtracted with which that tongue supplies them, and the Tamil, Telugu, and Carnata, though their base and terminology be different, have incorporated as much of the Sanskrit as our English contains of Latin. Some extraordinary political convulsion, some exterminatory process like, but even greater than the irruption of the northern hordes of Barbarians into the Roman Empire, would seem to be necessary to account for the overthrow of the Sanskrit as a spoken tongue. But India has no native ancient history, save such as can be picked out by implication from literary remains intended for far other purposes, and neither Greek nor Roman story gives us any account of such invasion of India.

The face of the country was not changed. The various nationalities remained as in the Vedic days until the time of Jehangir; yet the universal language was changed within a century into a number of tongues, formed upon and made of it, it is true, but so thoroughly transformed that those speaking one of them ceased to be able to use it as a medium of oral communication with any of the rest. It is a mystery in language greater than any that has occurred since the great confusion on the plains of Shinar. Yet, just as we see the innate force of the Latin in that it being dead yet speaks to us daily in the Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, French, and largely in our own English, so is the mastery of the Sanskrit indicated in the direct impress left by it not merely on the Prâkrits, but upon the Greek and Latin, the nations speaking which tongues came originally from that great Aryan *officina gentium* on the plains northwest of the present India. For, constant and unswerving Brahmanic tradition asserts that themselves were not the first inhabitants of India, but that "*men of another race, called DASYAS (SAVAGES, BARBARIANS), at first dwelt in the land, who being conquered by the Aryas (VENERABLE; REVEREND), took refuge in the mountainous regions, where they are found even to the present day under various tribal names, as Bhilli, etc., distinct in features, habits, religion, and speech.*" The Brahmans assert this to have taken place over four thousand years ago.

It will not appear surprising, in view of what has been said of the habit of transmitting the records orally, that nearly everything intended for permanence in law, medicine, theology, in short everything literary, is composed in verse, and as some subjects do not lend themselves to poetry quite so well as others, it follows that there is among the remains of ancient Sanskrit literature a great deal of very elaborate verse which is far from being poetry. Is there not something answering this phenomenon in all the modern languages? Did not Klopstock write the Messiaude? Is there not a poem called the Columbiad, by Joel Barlow? and did not Silius Italicus leave some writings in Latin that have been preserved, when much more valuable literature was allowed to perish? Now the mass even of the learned are obliged to form their estimate of Sanskrit poetry through the always inadequate and frequently misleading medium of a translation, often unsatisfactory in prose, and by consequence likely to be still more so in poetry. We do not speak of the logical stanzas of the Nyâya, nor of the grammatical Kârikâs (*versus memoriales*) of Patanjali, in which, while we do not deny the excellence of the versification, poetry is not to be expected. In all the higher range of poetry, very generous allowance must be made for the difficulties inherent in the work of approximating even a tolerable performance of the translator's task. In general,

who that can read an original ever reads a translation? Who ever attained even a half way appreciation of the Faust or the Divina Commedia through any of the numerous versions of either? What would be the repute of Homer or Virgil, were we only acquainted with them by means of their translations by the most competent hands? Yet it will be readily granted that the translators of the few Sanskrit poems of which we have English versions, were not by any means the equals of Dryden and Pope, or perhaps even of Cary and Fuller. But again, this is no fair comparison, for there is a general similarity of structure and tone, both of thought and expression, permeating our Western tongues. The Greek, indeed, is remarkable for the striking analogy that it bears to our own language in both respects. But the whole tone of word-building and idealizing—the philosophic and theologic tint, the eyes with which life is regarded—the system of ornament and illustration, all differ in the Sanskrit so widely from our Western tongues, that a version can hardly do more than give the sense. But the mere sense without the subtle aroma of the language in which it was couched, is the pouncet box without its contents, and the Sanskrit facility and latitude in forming verbal and idealistic compounds would, if imitation were attempted in English, render the translation unnatural or even shocking. What, therefore, is largely true of versions in general, is peculiarly so of the Sanskrit poems when dished up in modern style. The game was excellent, but we have allowed it to cool; it needs a certain sauce which we have not, and our Worcestershire will not answer; besides we present it to men who have no relish for *high* game, but prefer the yellow-legged barn-door fowl. No, the graces and excellences, the felicity of diction and the play of fancy, all evaporate to a great extent under the hands of the translator, leaving behind a residuum of the bare, bald, bleak sense, on examining which the Western reader very naturally thinks that part is dull, part unnatural, and all stilted and overpretentious.

Of the two great epics of the Hindoos, the older, called *Ramayana*, was written, or at least arranged, by Valmiki, and the burden of it is the Conquest of Ceylon, by Rama, one of the most celebrated of their ancient kings, and of course an incarnation of deity. Like all Indian narrative, the actual story is but the thin thread on which are bound episode upon episode, each amounting in bulk and interest to a fair average epic. It is admitted on all hands that the Ramayana was known and quoted in its present form in the fourth century B. C., and its boldness of metaphor, its vivid presentation of natural scenery, the touching manner in which it depicts the domestic as well as the more lofty sentiments, is certainly not excelled by the Greek or Latin, nor often equalled by

more modern poets. The second grand national poem of the Indian Aryans is the *Mahâbharata*, consisting of nearly 120,000 *slokas* or stanzas, traditionally asserted by the Brahmans to have been composed, but much more probably arranged, from a number of separate and already in his day, ancient popular chants or rhapsodies by Vyâsa, famous in Indian legends as the compiler of the Vedas. We know him principally by his agnomen of Vyâsa (the arranger), given him as having put in form the four Vedas, but also by the name of Krishna (dark), from his color, and also by that of Dwaipayana (island-born), from his birth on an islet of the Jumna. There is, however, intrinsic evidence in the poem that not more than one-fifth of it can have been the work of Vyâsa, whether as author or compiler, its present form having been given it by the Muni Rishi Santi. Without laying any stress on the dates assigned to the various portions by the Brahmans (which, however, we are far from rejecting, as many do, merely because they cannot be proved, or because if admitted they put to shame our hitherto venerable antiquity), irrefragable proofs can be adduced that large portions of this epic were current among the people, read and recited at the public festivals, and quoted just as we have them now, as early as the second century B.C. How long before the first proved date in regard to either, both the Ramayana and Mahâbharata may have been known, cannot, unfortunately, be fixed beyond cavil. The subject of the latter poem is the war between the Pandus and Kurus, two branches of the lunar race, for the dominion of Hastinapura, a region lying northeast of and including the present Delhi, or Indaprâshtha. Krishna, the Apollo of the Hindoos, takes part with the Pandus, other divinities side with the Kurus, and all the princes of India become engaged as allies of one or the other side. It will thus be seen that the story is, in ground plot, essentially similar to the Iliad, and indeed in other respects not less so, since its author or authors, its date and the date of its respective parts, its being actual history or mere fancy, are all subjects of inappeasable doubt and interminable argument. Even the merest sketch of the contents would be too long to attempt in a general outline of the language, but among the numerous episodes is one which he who has read once, will read frequently, and with renewed pleasure upon each occasion. As regards language, the story of Nala recommends itself in being largely free from the multiplied compounds which render most of the Ramayana, as well as a great deal of the direct narrative of the Mahâbharata, and some of the episodical digressions of the same, doubtful, difficult, and laborious reading to the beginner, while the story itself, with some incongruities and extravagances (as how should it be otherwise among a people living under such a system, civil and theological?), is yet less marred

by these, and more conformable to our modes of thought than perhaps any other poem of the classic Sanskrit. Add to this that in the edition before us the Devanâgari print is the clearest and cleanest that we have yet seen, that the font contained type for all the compounds, that Prof. Williams has adopted our European mode of separating words, though not to the extent recommended by Bopp, which seems to us both possible and desirable. An English translation, fairly literal, by Dean Milman, faces each page, and a vocabulary is appended in which each word appears in its textual form. The learner is thus spared the excessive annoyance and great loss of time which students of Arabic and Hebrew have experienced, but which nowhere blooms forth into such a luxuriance of cactus and chapparal as in the attempt to thread the tangled and thorny maze of words in search of one's imaginings of a Sanskrit root. Schlegel, Wilson, and Burnouf join enthusiastically in praising the beauty of the poem, which all of them have translated into their country's speech; nor are the literary suffrages of such men of slight weight. The whole poem consists of less than two thousand lines, in the heroic measure of the Hindoos, divided into twenty-six sargas or cantos, and its summary is as follows:

The young Nala, king of Nishadha, described as "gifted with choicest virtues, holy, skilled in the Vedas," incomparable as a charioteer, but with the one fault of being *askshapriya*—fond of dice,—while in his garden sees some flamingos (*hansas*) near him, and catches one of them, which promises that, if it be released, it will fly to the bower of Damayanti, daughter of the neighboring king of Vidarbha, the fame of whose beauty had already reached Nala, and will so praise him before her, that she shall never think of another as husband. The bird keeps contract, and inspires Damayanti with a passion for Nala, pining under which she droops, till King Bhîma, her father, seeing her condition, proclaims her *svayamvara* (own choice) or public selection of a husband, similar to the legendary *Brautjagd* of the Island Rügen,—and at that day the custom of India. Not only the princes of the adjoining region, but the divinities Indra, Agni, Varuna, and Yama, enticed by her beauty, hasten to the assembly, and meeting on their way Nala, enjoin upon him to plead their cause with the princess. Confessing his own love, he asks to be excused, but being adjured by his fealty to religion, he promises to carry their messages, is by their power secretly conveyed into the bower of Damayanti, who, despite his pleadings in behalf of the gods, confesses her love, and avows her intention to choose him alone. At the *svayamvara*, the deities all assume the shape of Nala, but Damayanti, having prayed for light, discerns Nala from the immortals, by his drooping garlands, his moving eyelids, and his shadow, which the gods have not. Then

the deities bestow on Nala transcendent gifts; but on their return, meet Kali, an evil genius, on his way as suitor to the *svayamvara*, who, when informed that the wedding is over, through jealousy vows the ruin of Nala. After a watch of twelve years, he finally detects on the part of Nala a trifling omission of the enjoined ablutions, takes possession of his body, and induces him to play at dice with his brother Pushkara. The game continues for months. Nala constantly losing, pays no attention to the remonstrances of his queen or of his subjects, and Damayanti, foreseeing the result, sends off her two children to her father's court, under charge of a faithful servant. Finally, having lost kingdom and possessions, Nala and Damayanti are driven outside the city walls, and Pushkara makes proclamation that "whoever shall harbor or assist Nala shall suffer death." Wandering in the forest, Nala, under infatuation of Kali, deserts Damayanti, who after fearful perils, at last finds shelter, being received as handmaiden by the queen-mother of "pleasant Chedi." Nala meantime rescues from the flames a serpent, which turns out to be Karkotaka, a semi-divine being, possessed of supernatural powers, who, in return for the favor rendered him, delivers Nala from the power of Kali. He transforms Nala into Vâhuka, a charioteer, giving him, however, a vest, by putting on which, he may at any time resume his proper shape, and advises him to enter the service of Rituparna, "all skilled in the heart-science of dice," who stands in need of a skilful driver. King Bhîma, having sent many Brahmans in quest, by their means finally discovers his daughter, and brings her home to his palace. Pining for her husband, and believing from the account of Parnada, one of her father's messengers, that Nala still lives disguised as Vâhuka, she causes word to be brought to Rituparna that King Bhîma is to celebrate on the morrow a second *svayamvara* for Damayanti. Rituparna resolves to present himself thereat, but can only do so by the skill of Vâhuka in driving from his capital to Vidarbha in a single day. On the way thither, the monarch and his charioteer agree to an exchange, the former giving his mastery of the dice for the latter's skill "in all horsemanship," and when they reach the palace, Nala, free from the influence of Kali, resumes his own form and is reunited to Damayanti and their children. Returning to Nishadha, he wins back his kingdom from Pushkara, forgives the latter with noble generosity, and reigns long and happily with Damayanti.

The Hindoos boast with great reason many other poets, both ancient and modern, but in especial the nine called the "jewels of the throne" of Vikramaditya, who reigned about the middle of the first century B.C., and seems to have been, in gathering about him and liberally patronizing literary men, the Indian Augustus of

that age. Most celebrated among the productions of the "nine" are the *Meghaduta*, already mentioned; and the *Ritusanhara* (return of the festival), which are both by Kalidasa, have been translated into English, German, and French, and are excellent specimens of descriptive poetry. This same Kalidasa is the author of the very popular Hindoo drama *Sakontala*, early made known to Europe by Sir William Jones, which has lately been translated from a more accurate MS. text by Professor Williams, and of the *Mikromorvasi* (Hero and Nymph), translated by Professor Wilson, to whose "*Hindoo Theatre*" we would refer those who may wish to become conversant with the most interesting dramatic works of the Hindoos, as well as to be informed on the general subject of the Hindoo drama. We say nothing of the *Gîtâ Govinda* (Lays of the Shepherds), which, like all the pastoral poetry of the Indians is comparatively modern; and though in good Sanskrit, does not belong to the days of the orally spoken tongue, and consequently to what is called the golden age of the great Aryan language. Beautiful it is as any pastoral poetry in any language, and in making the assertion, we bear thoroughly in mind Theocritus and his translator Virgil, as well as Bion and Moschus. But the following out of the various styles of Hindoo poetry opens too wide a field for our space; our affair being principally with but a few of the best known works as illustrative of the ancient literature at the time already spoken of, when India had no written native history.

It must have been with a surprise and pleasure bordering on the delight of the successful inventor, that Sir William Jones found his labors in the acquisition of the Sanskrit (by him first made known to Europe) rewarded by the discovery of the almost entire analogy between the inflections of the Sanskrit and those of the Greek and Latin noun, and by the striking similarity in all these languages of most names denoting the parts of the body, kinship, household utensils, the domesticated animals, and in general of all those objects which are soonest known, least liable to change, and longest retained among men. We see him next unearth the thorough coincidence of the mode of comparison in adjectives. Anon, he finds the numeral system of the three languages the same in principle, and essentially so in words. Once on the track of research, the gemininity of the Sanskrit and our classical system of pronouns both as to roots and development is gladly hailed as a strong point of corroboration. With a rare exception he finds that every preposition and conjunction in Sanskrit has not merely its correlative in sense and use, but its twin-brother in form in the Greek, in the Latin, or in both. To crown all, he finds the Sanskrit verb present constantly the Greek form in  $\mu\acute{\iota}$  (already strongly regarded by the German scholars as the original form), a middle voice and verbal

inflections analogous throughout with those of the Greek; the clear prototypes of syllabic and temporal augment, the original of the dual forms in  $\tau\omega\tau$  and  $\tau\gamma\tau$ , with the selfsame division as to primary and historical tenses, the doctrine of reduplication worked out to a perfection far surpassing the Greek remnant thereof, but which had nearly vanished from the Latin. Here was before him the explanation of the Roman supine in the Sanskrit infinitive, of the anomalous form of the passive imperative in *mini*, of the arbitrary rules given in Latin grammar for the names of places, and in general of all the archaic forms of Livius Andronicus and of Ennius, as well as of the dialectical varieties of the Greek. In addition to all which, the verbal roots themselves descriptive of the most usual and necessary actions were shown to be for the most part essentially identical in all these languages. Higher than these points philology seeks not to go in determining the relationship of languages, and he who discovers in *widely separated tongues so many and such structural points of similarity cannot refuse to believe that the languages involved are either derived from each other or all from a common base*. Chance words may and most likely will have a frequent, casual, and superficial resemblance to each other in languages that never had a single point of contact, but a sound philology only gives credence to such likenesses when they involve whole classes of words, many of them, and likeness in intimate grammatical structure. The discovery of Sanskrit made not a new era in philology but the science itself. When one meets such sentences as the following, many of which might be found, he needs not to be a very learned philologist to discover the resemblances existing among the languages of which they may form part, *e. g.*:

*Sanskrit*.—Pitā dadāti bhrātre dānam mahat.

Bhūmi papāti kalasa.

*Greek*.—Πατήρ δίδωσι (ἀδελφῷ) δῶρον μέγα.

Xaμὰ πίπτει κάλυξ.

*Latin*.—Pater dat fratri donum magnum.

Humi (cadit) calix.

However incredulous one may have been rendered by the twaddle, of which too much has been written, founded on fancied but mistaken resemblances, he can no more refuse his assent to the similarity of origin of these languages than he could justly say on reading the two following, that the resemblance between German and Hollandish is entirely accidental, *viz.*:

*German*.—Ein Herz von Eis hat ihm der Herr gegeben.

*Hollandish*.—Een hert van Ees heeft hem de Heer gegeven.

At this point, inasmuch as the study of Sanskrit has not made much progress on this side of the Atlantic, it may be of interest to insert here a few radical words of each grammatical class, together with some examples of the inflectional similarities above stated in general terms, so as to present a curt view of the sort of resem-

blances that exist between the Sanskrit and the classic tongues. We say nothing of the anomalies or ill-understood points in the inflectional forms and syntactical rules of Latin and Greek grammar, which are elucidated by a knowledge of Sanskrit, merely premising that such exist. It may be well to state in advance that the ancient Aryans pronounced the short *a* like our *o* in *not*, and that the *s̄* is currently believed to have been sounded in a manner somewhat similar to the Greek *χ*.

<i>Nouns.</i>		<i>Adverbs.</i>	
Aksha,	oculus,      ὄκελλος.	Naktam,	noctu,      νύκτωρ.
Asru,	lachrima,    δάκρυ.	Adya,	hodie,
Asthi,	os (ossis),    ὅστεον.	Hyas,	heri.
Asvas,	equus.	Svas,	cras.
Danta,	dens,      δόδονς.	Alam,	satis,      ἀλις.
Dâtri,	dator,      δω-ῆρ.		
Deva,	Deus,      Θέος.		
Hansa,	anser,      χὴν.	Eka,	ἕκα(ς).
Hrid,	cor (dis),    καρδία.	Dvi,	duo,      δύω.
Kesara,	cæsaries.	Tri,	tres,      τρεῖς.
Kupi,	copa,      κυπέλλος.	Catur,	quatuor,    τέτταρα.
Lôbha,	lubido.	Panca,	quinque,    πέντε.
Mâtri,	mater,      ματήρ.	Shash,	sex,      ἔξι.
Nâsâ,	nasus.	Saptan,	septem,    ἑπτα.
Nâva,	navis,      νᾶνς.	Ashta,	octo,      ὀκτώ.
Nâma,	nomen,      δνομα.	Navan,	novem,    ἐννεα.
Nri,		Dasa,	decem,    δέκα.
Pad,	pes (ped),    ποῦς (πόδ).	Ekadasa,	undecim,    ἑνδεκα, <i>et rel.</i>
Pasu,	pecus.	Vinsati,	viginti,    ἑκοσι.
Râja,	rex.	Trinsat,	triginta,    τριάκοντα, <i>et rel.</i>
Svasr,	soror.	Sata,	centum,    ἑκατον.
Sarpa,	serpens,    ἔρπων.	Ekasata, }      }	
Svan,	canis,      κίων.	Pra,      prae,	πρὸ.
Sâla,	sala.	Prathara, }      prior,	πρότερος.
Svapna,	som(p)nus,    ὑπνος.	Pratama, }      primus,	πρῶτος.
Udaka,	aqua,      ὕδωρ.		
Vâc,	vox.		
Vâtsa,	vitulus.	Sas,	is,      ὁ and ὅς.
Vîra,	vir.	Sâ,	ea,      ἡ and ἥ.
		Tat,	id,      τὸ and ὁ.
		Ayam,	idem.
		Iyam,	eadem.
Harid,	viridis.	Idam,	idem.
Maha,	magnus,    μέγας.	Yas,	quis.
Sreyas,		Yâ,	quæ.
Sreshtha,		Yat,	quod.
Scruta,	inclytus,    κλυτὸς.	Kas,	quis?
Yuvan,	juvenis.	Kâ,	quæ?

*Adjectives.*

Harid,	viridis.
Maha,	magnus,    μέγας.
Sreyas,	
Sreshtha,	
Scruta,	inclytus,    κλυτὸς.
Yuvan,	juvenis.

*Pronouns.*

Sas,	is,      ὁ and ὅς.
Sâ,	ea,      ἡ and ἥ.
Tat,	id,      τὸ and ὁ.
Ayam,	idem.
Iyam,	eadem.
Idam,	idem.
Yas,	quis.
Yâ,	quæ.
Yat,	quod.
Kas,	quis?
Kâ,	quæ?

Kim,	quid?			<i>Verbs.</i>
Aham,	ego,	<i>iγῶν.</i>	Ad,	edere.
Mam,	memet,	<i>μέ.</i>	Ap,	apisci.
Mā,	me,	<i>μέ.</i>	Bhed,	findere.
Mat,	med.		Bri,	ferre, <i>φέρειν.</i>
Mahyam,	mihi.		Dah,	<i>δαίσειν.</i>
Nas,	nos.		Dhans,	<i>δάκνειν.</i>
Nau,	nos,	<i>νω̄ι.</i>	Dis,	dicare.
Tvam,	tu,	<i>σὺ.</i>	Han,	<i>θάνειν.</i>
Tvām,	temet,	<i>σέ.</i>	Hu,	<i>θίσειν.</i>
Te,	te,	<i>σέ.</i>	I, ri,	<i>ἰέναι.</i>
Tvat,	ted.		Lih,	lingere, <i>λείχειν.</i>
Tubhyam,	tibi.		Lubh,	lubet.
Vas,	vos,	<i>σφῶι.</i>	Lip,	libare, <i>ἀλείφειν.</i>
Svas,	suus.		Jan,	gignere, <i>γινέσθαι.</i>
Svā,	sua.		Madh,	madere, <i>μέθυειν.</i>
Svam,	suum.		Mri,	mori.
Itaras,	uter.		Mih,	mingere.
Itarā,	utra.		Pi,	bibere, <i>πίνειν</i> <i>πίπτειν.</i>
Itaram,	utrum.		P.t,	sudare.
Ekatara,		<i>ἐκάτερος.</i>	Svid,	scandere.
Ekatama,		<i>ἐκαστος.</i>	Sthā,	stare, <i>ἴσταραι.</i>
Svayam,	sui, se, sibi.		Stri,	sternere, <i>στρωννυννατ.</i>
<i>Prepositions and Participles.</i>				
An, }	a ( <i>neg.</i> )	<i>ἄ, ἄνα.</i>	Tund,	tundere.
A,	ad ( <i>comp.</i> ).		Vad,	vadere.
Apa,	ab,	<i>ἀπὸ.</i>	Vac,	vocare.
Api,		<i>ἐπὶ.</i>	Vam,	vomere.
Antar,	inter,	<i>ἀντὰρ.</i>	Yaj,	<i>ἀξεῖν.</i>
Dus,	dys,	<i>δύς.</i>	Yuj,	jungere, <i>ζενγνίειν.</i>
Para,		<i>παρὰ.</i>		
Pari,		<i>περὶ.</i>		
Prati,		<i>πρὸς, ποτὶ.</i>		
Sam,		<i>σὺν.</i>		
Su,		<i>ἐν.</i>		
Upa,		<i>ὑπὸ.</i>		
Vi,	ve ( <i>sanus</i> ).			
<i>Conjunctions.</i>				
Ca,	que,	<i>καὶ.</i>		
Vā,	ve, vel,	<i>όν.</i>		
Terminations of Ind., pres., act.				
			S	āmi-asi-ati.
			P	āmas-atha-anti.
Terminations of Ind., imp., mid.				
			S	am-as-at.
			P	ama-atha-an.
Pres. Ind. of the verb “esse.”				
			S	asmi, asi, asti.
			P	svas, sthas, stas.
			P	smas, stha, santi.

We purposely omit calling attention to any of the equally numerous and striking analogies with the Gothic, Celtic, and Slavonic tongues, which might be of minor interest, these languages being less generally understood. The words also which we have presented must be regarded not merely in their outward form, but from a point of view furnished by a full acquaintance with that

elaborate system of *Guna*, *Vriddhi*, and *Sandhi*, of which all languages have more or less, according to the degree of their striving after harmony in utterance, in which the Greek surpasses most other tongues, which in Sanskrit is carried to the highest pitch of refinement, and which withal, abstruse and minute as it seems at first sight, is found on examination to be merely the carrying into effect of the natural laws of facile enunciation. It is sufficient here to say that the *Guna* (qualification) is a change, usually a weakening, operated upon the quality of a vowel sound; the *Vriddhi* (increase) is the lengthening or strengthening the same into a cognate vowel sound, and the *Sandhi* (combination) is a change wrought upon the initial or final letters of two words when brought together in discourse, by which either, or both, must, under certain circumstances, be supplanted for the time by other cognate letters and sounds. It is by *Guna* that the final syllable *tri* in the word *mâtri* (mother) becomes *tar* in the nom. plural, *mâtaras*; *Vriddhi*, when *dâtri* (giver) becomes in the same case *dâtâras*; *Sandhi* of the vowels, when *pâda* (foot), and *ûrus* (breast) being joined, as frequently happens in the Sanskrit, without a conjunction, become *pâdôrus* (foot and breast); and it is by *Sandhi* of the consonants that *tat* (this) and *srtvâ* (having heard) become one in the phrase *tac-chrtvâ* (having heard this). This had doubtless been elaborated into a system by the Brahmans, but it certainly existed from the earliest times, as is evidenced by the quotation in the oldest of the Vedas of a proverb apparently then ancient, in which these rules seem almost as perfectly observed as in the Upanishads and Puranas of classic and post-classic date. Most remarkable is the regularity with which given vowels and consonants or sets of either become changed from the Aryan form, the same word passing into one shape in Greek, another in Latin, suffering yet another sea-change in Celtic, till they become in the various Slavonic tongues but mere phantasms of their original being.

Of course, we assume on the part of the reader a thorough conviction that the Latin and Greek are not cognate languages in the sense of the one's being derived from the other; but rather that both have been developed and modified by a tongue more ancient than either,—that sometimes both have retained large portions of the original radicals and inflectional forms,—that frequently both have abbreviated, corrupted, or otherwise masked the origin of words, connectives, and ideal expressions, that they diverged at different epochs from a stem, if not primeval, at least deserving to be so called till further research shall find out the real source of language; that the different tribes with which they came in contact during and subsequent to their migration from their original habitat would more or less modify the speech with which they set out; that time

itself invariably changes written and still more unwritten language, and that each change, of necessity, enhanced the divergence. With these facts in view, it became quite evident that the philologist must be familiar with the Sanskrit, and that the science has already made such progress as to entitle us to predicate a close correlation of all the tongues of Europe, so far as we know anything of them (except the Basque), with the Sanskrit, as no longer a theory, but a fixed fact. The study of the Zend is useful to the investigator, but only as ancillary to that of the Sanskrit, since it, like the Old Persic, is but little more removed from the language of the Vedas than Chaldee from Hebrew, or the ancient forms of Piers Plowman from the English of the nineteenth century.

It is reasonable to suppose that the most ancient grammar that has come down to us in complete form of the oldest language known to literature, should be an object of interest to the philologist, and as the Sûtras of Pânini, the great native grammarian of the Sanskrit, answer this description, we may well devote a few lines to himself and his work. That he is not, in point of fact, the oldest Sanskrit grammarian is plain, as well from the fact that a first treatise so complete and minute on such a subject would be a sheer impossibility, as from the fact that he incidentally mentions by name twelve other more ancient writers on the same subject, concerning whom, however, we cannot decide with certainty, whether they all had composed complete systems or merely written on particular points of grammar. One of them, Yâska, acknowledges but four parts of speech, and Pânini sets himself to a refutation of his views. Of two others, Apicali and Bhâradvâga, we know that they had covered the entire ground of the study, because their systems are said by Vâmîni, centuries after the time of Pânini, still to have had adherents. Certain it is that though Pânini belonged to the Eastern school, as distinguished from the Northern, his grammar has effectually superseded all others, and is now the highest authority for the Sanskrit. Pânini himself was born in the village of Calatûra, not far from the mouth of the Indus, and is represented as having presented his Sûtras at a concursus of learned men under Nanda, the father of Candragupta, consequently about the middle of the fourth century B.C. In native works he appears, more frequently than by his own, under the various names of Calaturia (from the place of his birth), Daksheya, and Pakshiputra (from the name of his mother), Sûtrakâra (the maker of aphorisms), and most frequently as Acârya (the teacher). The entire number of his Sûtras is 3996, the whole divided into eight books, on which there have been written apparently by various hands the Mahâbhâshya (great commentary), sundry Bhâshyas (commentaries) on specific books, a large number of Vârtikas (glosses), prob-

ably by Katyâyana, and a series of Karikâs (memorial verses), believed to have been made by Patanjali. All of these taken together form the grammar of Pânini, and it covers every possible question in grammar that can arise, from the most trifling doubt about an accent up to the most difficult knots in interpretation.

Pânini regards every word as derived from some verbal root (*dhâtu*), which root, however, never appears practically in the spoken language without some affix. Every word as used in a sentence must have either a personal or a case ending. The finite verb always consists, except in the reduplicated tenses, of three parts, *i. c.*, a root, a personal ending, and an inserted affix (*vikarana*). The noun must in like manner consist of the root, the case ending (*krit*), and (when euphonic or other causes demand it) the *vikarana*. The noun may have three kinds of affix, *i. c.*, those modifying the sense (*tadhlita*), marking its gender (*stripatyaya*), and the casual termination (*sup*). Every other addition that a word receives takes place by an augment (*âgama*) which has no meaning, while the affixes have always a distinct significance. All other changes that take place in a word are called substitutions (*âdsâ*). Pânini gives lists (*ganas*) of affixes, substitutes, and augments; but these never consist simply of the letters that are to be added, supplied, or conjoined, but there are added to each what Colebrooke calls "mute letters," and the Indian grammarian's postfixes (*anubandha*), which point out the mode of juncture with a word, the formation of its nominative, the declension, gender, accent, etc. For example, every affix has regularly the acute accent on the first vowel, but *tara*, *tama* in comparatives and superlatives, *mat* and *â* and *i* in feminine suffixes, form an exception, taking the grave. Instead of mentioning these terminations one by one, a *p anubandha* is attached to each of them in the list, and the exception simply states that all affixes having *p anubandha* are to be pronounced with the grave accent. All the ganas of Pânini having been arranged with great care, and with a view to all the exceptional cases in the language, have the words in them supplied with different *anubandha* letters, so that all those coming under a given exception have the same mute letter, thus abbreviating space in giving the rules and exceptions. Indeed the great aim which Pânini and his successors seem to have set before themselves, is the attainment of brevity, in which they have been so successful as to render the native grammar very hard of comprehension to the Western mind. If we regard the Sûtras from this standpoint, much becomes clear and even admirable, which in any other view would seem strained and harsh. The student was expected to commit everything to memory from the oral delivery of his teacher, and hence every rule bears the impress of the utmost brevity. "The abbreviation of a sentence

by half a short vowel," is said by one of the commentators, in hyperbolical Indian phrase, to be "equal to the birth of a son." The predicate is not once expressed in the Sūtras; but one is supposed to see how the subject is to operate or to be affected, from the nature of the subject and the cases in which the other words of the rule stand. We quote from Williams's "Introduction to the Nala," a fair instance of this "brevity in excess," which renders all native scientific disquisition so difficult to us, and renders a key absolutely necessary for the mere understanding their *modus celandi*.

"I here extract at haphazard a rule out of Pānini's, sixth chapter (I. 77). The rule is *iko yan achi*. This is not Sanskrit, but the arbitrary or conventional language used to explain Sanskrit. *Ik* is a species of algebraical symbol, standing for four vowels, *i*, *u*, *ri*, and *lri*, and gifted with an imaginary nominative case, *iko*. Similarly, *yan* is the symbol for the letters *y*, *v*, *r*, and *l*; and lastly *ach* (here supposed to possess a locative case, *achi*) represents all the vowels. The whole rule in plain English means that if *i*, *u*, *ri*, or *lri*, short or long, are followed by any vowel, they are changed to *y*, *v*, *r*, and *l* respectively. Hence as a preparation for learning one of the most difficult existing languages, another imaginary language has first to be acquired; and the grammar, which ought to be an easy key to unlock the literature, requires first to be unlocked by a key of its own."

Every one will see at a glance how desirable such a system must have proved in the days of entirely oral instruction, by the comparatively slight burden that it imposed on the memory of the students, and its suggestiveness to the master; but as the Professor very well says, "to think of keeping up such a system amongst European students of the language, is to suppose printing uninvented, and Sanskrit grammar the sole occupation of the literary world."

We do not, however, propose to write an abstract of Pānini, and will therefore barely refer the reader to the learned Böhtlingk's version of it for the use of Occidental learners; a work by means of which the student will acquire a clear view of native Indian grammar, which, without such aid, would require the hard study of at least a year. As points particularly well deserving attention, from their intrinsic interest to the grammarian, the fulness and peculiar method of their treatment, we would specially instance—1. The meaning and derivation of the casual and personal endings. 2. Anomalies in number of nouns and verbs. 3. The Vedic dialect. 4. The formation of Patronymics. 5. Augment and reduplication. 6. The uses of *iti* (by means of which our cumbrous *oratio obliqua* is avoided). 7. The doctrine of accents. 8. The various kinds of *composita*. On all these, as well as on many other points, the clear-

ness of Pānini's rules, and the high state of perfection of the language whose grammar he wrote, will surprise the most thorough scholar in Greek, the only language we know that can at all compare with it, and which does so only *longo intervallo*. Few things are better calculated than Sanskrit study in general, and a perusal of Pānini in particular, to cure the modern mind of the unacknowledged but too current idea, nowhere more generally prevalent than in our own country, that "*we are the men, and wisdom will die with us.*" The best edition of Pānini in the original is that published at Calcutta, 1809, under the auspices of Sir Thomas H. Colebrooke, by the Pandits Dharanidara and Kāsinātha, of which Böhtlingk asserts that it is so correct as to obviate entirely the necessity for collating MS. readings. It may be laid down as a fact that the work of Pānini is both basis and superstructure of Sanskrit grammar, and wherever any deviation from his rules takes place in the whole of Sanskrit literature, ancient or modern, it must be taken for a solecism, a poetical license, or a mistake of the transcriber.

Under the impression that but few in our country have hitherto taken an interest in the study of the Sanskrit, it has been deemed well to present thus cursorily, and with as few technical terms as possible, the claims of that language upon students of philology. Those claims are the value and extent of its ancient literature—the direct and all-pervading influence which it has had on our own tongue through those languages which are admitted to have most directly formed our own. Indeed, the general science of philology must, to the non-Sanskrit scholar, look like a very uninviting field, and those cultivating it as something hardly to be characterized in respectful words. Men do not like to spend time and labor upon a study without prospect of valuable (so far as our own country is concerned, we might say *pecuniary*) result. The valuable result is, in the case before us, a knowledge of philology, now one of the mightiest levers of research into history and ethnology. The same information given in this article might have been gotten from detached sources, but it is believed that the putting it thus compactly together in popular form may have the effect of adding to the number of Sanskrit students in the United States. With this object in view, it was plainly impossible that the article should do more than suggest and superficially touch on the various points; but the few hints herein contained may awaken the curiosity of students. For our country needs scholars, and has too many bearing that name who are wittingly or unwittingly mere pretenders, men who are all the more ready to lay down the law in language, from the fact that their own lingual horizon is very limited. Some attention to the study of Sanskrit would tend to increase the number of the former, and put a stop to the blatancy of the latter.

## THE SURVIVAL OF IRELAND.

*A Compleat History of Ireland, from the Earliest Accounts to the Present time.* By J. H. Winne, Esq. 2 vols. London, 1774.

*The Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland, Swift, Flood, Grattan, O'Connell.* By William Edward Hartpole Lecky, author of *History of Rationalism.* New York, 1872.

*Christian Schools and Scholars.* By the Author of *The Three Chancellors* (Mother Raphael Draine, St. Dominic's Convent, Stone, England). 2 vols. London, 1867.

*New Ireland.* By Alexander M. Sullivan, Member of Parliament for Louth. London and Philadelphia, 1878.

PERHAPS it is not too much to say that no people are prouder, nay, vainer, of their national past than the Irish, or more imperfectly informed as to its historic details. Vanity in a nation or in an individual may be smiled over as a trivial fault; national pride is so akin to individual vanity that it is entitled to similar indulgence, even when not well founded; but if a claim to a kind of pre-eminence rests upon many centuries of heroism in which everything perished except the faith and the courage of a people, the implied fault takes on the modest aspect of a virtue, and the world may grant the right of pride to a race who have been permitted to inherit only that and their religion. The ignorance of the Irish people concerning the early and the mediæval periods of their national existence is scarcely to be charged upon them as a reproach.<sup>1</sup> Their poverty was made a part of their faith, and scrupulous care was taken that ignorance should be a part of their poverty. Robbed of the right to make their own laws, despoiled of their lands upon every frivolous pretext or upon none, as circumstances embarrassed or favored the Saxon intruder;<sup>2</sup> transformed from a simple military and farming people, whose island had been the university of Europe when learning languished on the Continent (and whom Danish marauders had previously transformed from a studious and peaceful into a warlike race), into a nation of stubborn, wretched, and intrepid rebels, whose career for seven hundred years has been an alterna-

<sup>1</sup> "Fifty years ago the schoolmaster was not abroad in Ireland. Indeed in the previous century he had better not have been, if he wished to avoid conviction for felony under the 8th of Anne, cap. iii., sec. 16." *New Ireland*, p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> "Ireland is not simply a *conquered* country, she is a *confiscated* country. . . . It was the land itself which the victors claimed and seized. . . . Conquest and confiscation were simultaneous." Abbé Perrand, *Ireland under English Rule*, p. 3.

tion of secret conspiracy and open insurrection; trampled under the cavalry of "penal laws" which the genius of Burke confessed itself unable adequately to characterize, and prostrated by a long succession of raids, of famines,<sup>1</sup> of subsidies, of confiscations;<sup>2</sup> its virtues punished as crimes, its weaknesses, follies, and crimes rewarded as virtues; its brave spirit strangled a thousand times, its vitality reduced by hunger<sup>3</sup> and wasted by compulsory emigration, its churches forfeited to a foreign crown, its schools erased, its leaders sent to the scaffold, or banished, or alas! bought; buried in poverty and illiteracy under a pyramid of statutes,—why should a people thus pursued know anything of its past except its horrors, cherish anything so much as its bitter and imperishable resentment?

The purpose of this essay is not to discuss the methods proposed from time to time to sever the English connection<sup>4</sup> or to maintain it modified by a repeal of the act of legislative union, and the rehabilitation of the Irish Parliament abolished in 1800. The attention of the reader will be invited chiefly to facts throwing light upon these three queries:

1. Was there any civilization in the land prior to the English invasion?
2. Did the English crown formally create and constitutionally recognize the right of the Irish people to a native Parliament? What was the character of the native Parliaments?
3. Do undisputed facts justify the assertion that English concessions of acknowledged rights to Ireland have been generally made under the influence of fear?

It is, of course, impossible, in the brief space of a review article, to present all the evidence which may be had under these heads. In selecting that which the prescribed limits will admit, the candor of the presentation will not, it is believed, be called in question. Of the four volumes which will be mainly followed, the first was written by an English Protestant, Mr. Winne, more than a century ago, when the temper of the two countries to each other was calmer

<sup>1</sup> Population of Ireland:

1841, . . . . .	8,175,124	} Reduced by famine and emigration.
1851, . . . . .	6,552,385	
1861, . . . . .	5,764,543.	
1871, . . . . .	5,411,416.	

<sup>2</sup> Queen Elizabeth said that when she gave an appointment in Ireland she did not expect the recipient to claim any other reward.

<sup>3</sup> Sir John Davys expressed surprise that the priests did not run away from Ireland during the reign of James I., "for they get nothing but bacon and oatmeal, the people are so poor."

<sup>4</sup> The union of the wolf and the lamb. Dr. Johnson.

than it has ever been since. The author of the second is the well-known historian of rationalism, an Irish Protestant, Mr. Lecky. Mother Raphael Draine is an English Catholic, and Mr. Alexander M. Sullivan, author of *New Ireland*, is an Irish Catholic. Other authorities will be freely used, without discrimination as to nationality or faith, and, since an enemy's testimony possesses a peculiar value, the opinions of English Protestants will be particularly welcome.

I do not propose to devote a page to Irish fables, picturesque, beautiful, and suggestive as so many of them are. Not that fables have in themselves no intrinsic historical value, for they are, as it were, hand-mirrors of national morality and customs; but if we should begin repeating them, where should we stop?

The story of "Deirdre," which Dr. Joyce has woven into verse,<sup>1</sup> is a good specimen of a large class. Nor is it useful for the present purpose to repeat any of the exploits of early Irish kings, about whom there is a legendary literature almost as voluminous as that of the demigods of Greece. Like the Greeks, the myths of the Milesians relate not only to battles, but to arts, and they have this significance as accessories to history,—that, although the heroes whom they celebrate may never have existed, and the date assumed for the events described may be purely fictitious, the fabric of the story reveals the loom and the weavers of an actual period, and is therefore, in some degree at least, historical. There may never have been a Troy, but that the descriptions of the siege are, to a great extent, truthful so far as they relate to the morals, the religion, and the military science of the early Hellenes, nobody can doubt. There may never have been an Ollamh Fodhla, although the Irish annalists are very positive about him;<sup>2</sup> but that an elective monarchy, an organized military system, and some considerable cultivation of arts existed at the very early time when the chronicle was written, it is very reasonable to believe. Ollamh reigned more than seven hundred years before Christ, "a prince distinguished for many amiable qualities, but above all for his wisdom and knowl-

<sup>1</sup> The legend is given by Winne, vol. i., p. 33. Dr. Joyce's descriptions of the arms, domestic customs, etc., are very accurate and faithful.

<sup>2</sup> "The great conventions or legislative assemblies of Tarah were instituted by the celebrated Ollamh Fodhla, a king whose reign is placed by our annalists and chronologers about seven hundred years before the Christian era. . . .

"These triennial legislative assemblies at Tarah, which were the parliaments of ancient Ireland, were held there for many centuries, and continued down to about the middle of the sixth century. . . . Great conventions or legislative assemblies, similar to those of Tarah, were held in ancient times in other provinces. . . . The last great national convention mentioned in Irish history was that . . . convened at Athboy in Meath, A.D. 1167, by King Roderick O'Conor to make laws and regulations for the Church and State. . . ." Annals of the Four Masters, p. 298, note.

edge." He convened his parliament at Tarah every three years to revise the laws and prepare the records of the kingdom. The Parliament included the "nobility, gentry, priests, historians, and men of learning, and persons distinguished by their abilities in all arts and professions."<sup>1</sup>

Whether parliaments were thus composed under other fabulous or real monarchs, it is certain that there were assemblies of a parliamentary character at a very early period in authentic Irish history; and we find one in the first century of the Christian era, also at Tarah, proclaiming the legitimate heir king, against a usurper, after whose death in battle the assembly solemnly swore to maintain the dynasty of the rightful monarch. The democratic spirit is represented to have been strong enough to keep the crown elective,<sup>2</sup> and the princes and people appear to have taken an active and controlling part in their political affairs. In the second century of the Christian era King Tuathal approved of laws relating to arts and manufactures, and appointed commissions to regulate trade. The military system of King Carnac, in the third century of the Christian era, is worthy of something more than allusion. He had a standing army, drilled in the best science of war then known, and governed by a code which, whether wholly or partially accurate, is certainly remarkable. The soldiers ate but once a day, and the meal followed a bath; the hygiene of the men being zealously cultivated. They were men of extraordinary strength, agility, and endurance, and before being enrolled were compelled to subscribe to certain articles. By these they agreed not to insist upon dower with their wives, but to choose a woman for her culture, her courtesy, and her good manners, without regard to her fortune; that they would be charitable and kind to the poor; that each would be willing to fight nine men of any other nation that set upon him; and that they would obey the king in all matters pertaining to the defence of the state against foreign assault, and maintain the peace by enforcing the laws and carrying out the decrees of the courts. One of the qualifications required before enlistment was, that the soldier should be so swift and light as not to break a rotten stick in treading upon it; another, that he

<sup>1</sup> "They met by a royal summons in a parliamentary manner, once every three years at the palace of Tarah, to debate upon the most important concerns of state, where they enacted new laws and repealed such as were useless and burdensome to the subject, and consulted nothing but the public benefit in all their resolutions." Keating, quoted by Winne, vol. i., p. 31.

<sup>2</sup> "However, we find that the elective form of government was not abolished, and the successors of this prince who filled the throne were obliged to the people for their suffrages, though they had sworn that the election should light upon his family." Winne, vol. i., p. 62.

should be able to leap over a tree as high as his forehead, and that without stopping or lessening his speed he should draw a thorn from his foot, should he happen to get one in. Possibly this knightly *corps* never existed, but the period in which the culture of the Irish writers recorded its existence was long prior to the reception of Saxon enlightenment, and the principles of morality involved in the code are not surpassed by those of the most refined epoch of mediaeval chivalry.

The authentic history of Ireland begins by the common consent of historians in the fifth century.<sup>1</sup> There is no dispute about the character, the mission, or the principal acts of Saint Patrick. It is conceded that, before the close of that century, a bishop's see existed at Clogher, that Armagh was the seat of a metropolitan, and that public schools and seminaries flourished. Irish learning and civilization have here their authentic beginning. The cathedral school at Armagh rose rapidly in importance, and became the first university of Ireland. The number of students, both native and foreign, so increased that the university, as we may justly call it, was divided into three parts, one of which was devoted entirely to students of the Anglo-Saxon race. We need not stop to determine how many other establishments similar to those of Armagh were really founded in the lifetime of Saint Patrick. In any case, the rapid extension of the monastic institute in Ireland, and the extraordinary ardor with which the Irish cenobites applied themselves to the cultivation of letters, remain undisputed facts.

"Within a century after the death of St. Patrick," says Bishop Nicholson, "the Irish seminaries had so increased that most parts of Europe sent their children to be educated here, and drew thence their bishops and teachers."<sup>2</sup> In the eighth century, grants were made by the kings for the extension of education. In the ninth, there were 7000 students at the university of Armagh, "and the schools of Cashel, Dindaleathglass and Lismore vied with it in renown."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "Whether the Irish had an alphabet or a literature of their own before the arrival of St. Patrick in the fifth century was for a long time a contested question. It is now, however, generally admitted that there is every reason to believe they had both. Dr. Todd, a writer exceedingly cautious in making any assertions, or advancing any opinions without being prepared to corroborate them by sufficient proof, has indorsed this view in very explicit terms. . . . Dr. Todd also states that there is every reason to believe that . . . this ancient alphabet was superseded by the present Roman characters, introduced by (the Saint)." Dublin Review, 1871. Article "The Brehon Law of Ireland."

<sup>2</sup> Christian Schools and Scholars, pp. 62, 63. Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History, p. 279: "Irishmen . . . cultivated and amassed learning beyond the other nations of Europe in those dark times."

<sup>3</sup> Christian Schools and Scholars, p. 63, vol. I.

Montalembert says that Ireland was one of the principal centres of Christianity from the fifth to the eighth century,<sup>1</sup> "and not only of Christian holiness and virtue, but also of knowledge, literature, and that intellectual civilization with which the new faith was about to endow Europe, then delivered from heathenism and the Roman Empire."<sup>2</sup> "While the Gothic tempest<sup>3</sup> was trampling down the classic civilization, Ireland providentially became the nursery of saints and the refuge of science. Her two most ardent passions then were to learn and to teach. In Iceland, the Orkneys, Scotland, Britain, Gaul, Germany, even in Italy, her missionaries were everywhere transplanting in the loosened soil the pagan tree of knowledge and the Christian tree of life. As the Goths conquered Rome, the Celts conquered the Goths."<sup>4</sup> "There were also trained an entire population [in a monastic city] of philosophers, of writers, of architects, of carvers, of painters, of calligraphers, of musicians, poets, and historians; but above all, of missionaries and preachers, destined to spread the light of the Gospel and of Christian education; not only in all the Celtic countries, of which Ireland was the nursing mother, but throughout Europe, among all the Teutonic races, among the Franks and Burgundians, who were already masters of Gaul, as well as amid the dwellers of the Rhine and the Danube, and up to the frontiers of Italy." "This preponderance of the monastic element in the Irish Church . . . maintained itself not only during all the flourishing period of the Church's history, but even as long as the nation continued independent,"<sup>5</sup> and the Church preserved learning until learning and the Church and independence passed away together.<sup>6</sup> "They survived internal feuds and the fierce inroads of the Danes; the schools flourished even in the presence of famine, and one of the general rules was that students who came from abroad should be fed and lodged free. From Ireland as from a fountain-head contemporaneous nations 'drew those streams of learning which afterwards so copiously overspread the Western world. . . . It was thence that many foreign churches received their greatest ornaments. It was there our own

<sup>1</sup> "From the sixth century the fame of the Irish schools stood high in Europe." Dublin Review, vol. xvi., 1871, "The Breton Laws of Ireland."

<sup>2</sup> Monks of the West, vol. iii., p. 84.

<sup>3</sup> Attempts to Establish the Protestant Reformation in Ireland. Thomas D'Arcy McGee, p. 22.

<sup>4</sup> Among the most noted of the Irish missionaries were St. Boniface, the Apostle of Germany, in the eighth century; Willibrod, who was consecrated bishop at the request of Pepin; Kilian, in Germany; Caidoc, in Gaul; Marianus and his companions at Ratisbon; Aidan in Northumbria; Ultan and Foillan in Brabant; Barr in Ghent; Ar-bogast in Alsace; Albin at Paria, and Donatus at Fiesole.

<sup>5</sup> Monks of the West, vol. iii., p. 87.

<sup>6</sup> Ib. p. 93.

Alfred received his education;<sup>1</sup> and at what time soever the Irish gained the knowledge of letters that period must have been an early one, and is justly set down as such by the writers of that country."<sup>2</sup>

Over to the court of Charlemagne went Clement and Dungal;<sup>3</sup> in the court of Charles the Bald John Scotus Erigena<sup>4</sup> taught science and philosophy; the life of the great saint of Iona, written by Adamnan in the seventh century, was carried to the principal churches of the Continent, by many a saint and scholar who had seen the Book of Kells,<sup>4</sup> and the monks of St. Gall sang the psalms to music which they had learned from Irish choir-masters. The seed that Columba had planted in Scotland had ripened into many harvests, and Ireland supplied teachers to the Hebrides as well as to the Continent,<sup>5</sup> and on the rocks of Iona as well as on

<sup>1</sup> "In the latter end of the seventh century Alfred, an Anglo-Saxon prince, son of Oswy, king of Northumbria, and who was himself afterwards king of Northumbria, having been exiled from England, retired to Ireland, where he studied for many years in its seminaries." . . . Awards of the Four Masters, p. 441, note. . . . "Alfred the Great also received his education there." Ib. p. 101, note.

<sup>2</sup> Tiraboschi quotes an edict of the Emperor Lothaire published in 823, for the re-establishment of public schools in nine of the chief cities of Italy, from which it appears that Dungal was at the time still presiding over the school of Pavia. He seems to be the same who in 811 addressed a long letter to Charlemagne on the subject of two solar eclipses, which were expected to take place in the following year, and may be yet further identified with the 'Dungalus Scotorum præcipuus,' who is noticed in the catalogue of the library of Bobbio, where he at last retired, bringing with him a great store of books which he presented to the monastery. Among them were four books of Virgil, two of Ovid, one of Lucretius, and a considerable number of the Greek and Latin fathers."—Christian Schools and Scholars, vol. i., p. 196.

<sup>3</sup> Hallam says, "but two extraordinary men, Scotus Erigena and Gerbert, stand out from the crowd in literature and philosophy."—Literature of Europe, vol. i., p. 32.

Interesting notes on this subject will be found in Very Rev. Bede Vaughan's Life of St. Thomas of Aquin.

<sup>4</sup> Written by St. Columba in the sixth century, and deposited in the Church of Kells. It is now in Trinity College, Dublin.

<sup>5</sup> "We again repeat what it required all the learning of Usher, White, Colgan, and Ward to prove, namely, that the holy and learned Scotia of the ancients was Ireland. The name of Scotia became the exclusive possession of the Scotch, that is to say of the Irish colonists in Caledonia, only in the eleventh or twelfth century, in the time of Giraldus Cambrensis, at the moment when the power of the true Scots declined in Scotland under the influence of the Anglo-Norman conquest."—Montalembert, Monks of the West, vol. iii., p. 162, note.

"Joannes Duns Scotus, a native of Down, and hence surnamed Dunnensis, signifying of Donn, was born near Downpatrick in the latter end of the thirteenth century. . . . Being educated for some time in the schools of Ireland, he went to England and entered Merton College in Oxford; he became a Franciscan friar, and was a lecturer at Oxford and afterwards at Paris, on theology, philosophy, etc., and from his great abilities and acuteness of intellect he was denominated *the subtle Doctor*. In theology, metaphysics, and philosophy he was scarcely equalled by any man in Europe, and his great rival as a theologian, St. Thomas Aquinas, divided the literary and religious world into two great sects, the followers of the one being denominated *Thomists*, and of the other

the Scottish highlands lingered for ages the hymns of the disciples of Columbkille. Wherever an Irish college was founded, on whatever soil it flourished, religion and learning were hand in hand; and to the labors of the student were joined those of the scribe and the artisan. Europe was enriched by manuscripts made by Irish hands; "and the researches of modern bibliopolists are continually disinterring from German or Italian libraries a Horace or an Ovid, or a sacred codex whose Irish gloss betrays the hand which traced its delicate letters."<sup>1</sup>

Music, poetry, and art were assiduously cultivated in Ireland until the Danish invasions, by the sacking of Armagh, the destruction of nearly every monument of art which fell in their way, and the prohibition by them of letters, broke up the schools in the portions of the island they overran; but with the victorious ascendancy of Brian Boru<sup>2</sup> the schools were rebuilt, and the arts again resumed their sway. So profoundly peaceful did Brian's kingdom become after his chastisement of the Danes, that the poets, to illustrate the tranquillity, good order, and chivalry of the time, devised the legend of a beautiful lady "in the richest attire, and with a quantity of gold and jewels about her, travelling over the kingdom without damage either to her honor or her property."<sup>3</sup> Wherever the Irish bards went they carried their love for the national instrument, the harp; and their poetry was rhymed.<sup>4</sup> The historians of art declare that the Irish founded Celtic art in Europe, which was a formidable competitor against that of Byzantium, and Irish illuminations furnished the schools of Europe with models.

Was this civilization all gone when Strongbow landed?<sup>5</sup> Absurd

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*Scotists.* . . . And it may also be observed that Joannes Scotus Erigena, an Irishman, and one of the most learned and celebrated men in Europe in the ninth century, and Marianus Scotus, as well as Duns Scotus, have been all absolutely claimed by . . . Scotch writers as natives of Scotland, for which they had no grounds but the surname Scotus; but the Irish in ancient times . . . were called Scottii or Scots, and Ireland was named Scotia."—Annals of the Four Masters, p. 583, note.

<sup>1</sup> Christian Schools and Scholars, vol. i., p. 75.

<sup>2</sup> "Besides repairing the schools burned by the Danes, and everywhere giving orders for students to be sought out to fill them with, he likewise erected many new seminaries of education for the increase of science and useful knowledge in his country."—Winne, vol. i., p. 163.

A chronological poem on the Christian Kings of Ireland, written by the Abbot Giolla Moduda in the twelfth century, is among the preserved Irish MSS.

<sup>3</sup> The origin of Moore's "Rich and rare were the gems she wore."

<sup>4</sup> "Rhyme, if not invented in Ireland, was at least adopted by her versifiers so generally and at so early a period as sometimes to be designated 'the art of the Irish.'"—Christian Schools and Scholars, vol. i., p. 76.

<sup>5</sup> "But as the ravages of the Danes seldom penetrated further than the seacoast, many copies (of the Brehon Laws) were still preserved, especially such as were in the custody of the Brehons themselves. That office was hereditary in certain families, and with the office were transmitted from father to son the manuscript copies of the

supposition! "Whatever exaggeration may have been committed by the national annalists, when they speak of the foreign students who resorted to the Irish schools,<sup>1</sup> it is impossible to doubt that they were eagerly sought by natives of the most distant lands, who, in an age when the rest of Europe was sunk in illiterate barbarism, found in the cloisters of Armagh, Lismore, Clonard, and Clonmacnois masters of philosophy and science, whose learning had passed into a proverb. Camden remarks how common a thing it is to read in the lives of our English saints that they were sent to study in Ireland, and the same expression occurs quite as frequently in the Gallican histories. Even in the eleventh century, Solgenus, Bishop of St. David's, spent ten years studying in the Irish schools, *which were then as famous as ever.*"<sup>2</sup> As the early architecture of their native island is of itself an imperishable monument of the civilization which confronted the Saxon invader only to be overthrown by him, so the churches and monasteries of mediæval Europe, the seminaries, and the universities, refute the false assertion, industriously propagated and so commonly believed in our own day, that letters and civilization were carried over the Channel "on the long lances and mailed steeds"<sup>3</sup> of the soldiers of Henry II.<sup>4</sup> For two hundred years after the invasion the history of Ireland is the story of battles, pursuits, and retreats, of which the sanguinary details contain the names of the monasteries assaulted and robbed—and every monastery was a seminary; of churches pillaged—and nearly every church was the centre of a group of schools. The annals of the Four Masters are studded during the twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries with a brilliant chronology of doctors, poets, and philosophers, as with saints and martyrs. Instead of the Saxon invaders carrying letters and civilization to Ireland, they came to destroy both, and it took them six hundred and fifty years to do it. The civilization<sup>5</sup>

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laws. . . . One of the fragments in the Trinity College manuscripts (H. 3, 18) is undoubtedly upwards of 500 years old." Dublin Review, 1871, article "The Breton Laws of Ireland," p. 399. Mr. Gladstone in his Mansion House speech, during his recent visit to Ireland, had the candor properly to acknowledge the debt of Europe to the Irish schools.

<sup>1</sup> The Irish professors went over to Oxford to teach after the invasion.

<sup>2</sup> Christian Schools and Scholars, vol. i., p. 79.

<sup>3</sup> Abbé Perraud, p. iii.

<sup>4</sup> Hallam (Literature of Europe) grudgingly admits that "as early as the sixth century" there was learning in the Irish monasteries, and that Ireland "both drew students from the Continent and sent forth men of comparative eminence into its schools and churches."

<sup>5</sup> "With this antique guide in our hands (*Senches Mor*, or code of Breton Laws) we cross the borders of the English Pale, with its belt of watchtowers garrisoned by wardens, who day and night scrutinize the woods spread before them, ready to flash a warning of the approach of the Irish enemy. Into the woods we enter, as it were,

which they found in Ireland it was necessary to efface before they could obtain the lands—their principal object—and thoroughly crush the spirit of the people.

It has been already shown that Parliaments<sup>1</sup> were an established legal feature of the government of Ireland at a very early period. From the time of Ollam Fodhla they may be traced at irregular intervals; generally the monarch summoned the several estates together at his own pleasure, to amend the laws and provide for the better government of the kingdom. The Brehon Law itself, a monument to the legislative wisdom of the people, was revised by a council, in which three bishops, three kings, and three brehons, sat, after the introduction of Christianity. The labors of these eminent men were extended to a period of nine years. They discussed all the laws previously in force, and arranged a new code from which pagan rites were excluded; and the Irish constitution and laws “were finally embodied by these three spiritual, three temporal, and three judicial authorities into the *Senchus Mor*, or Great Book of Irish Law, which bishop, king, or brehon never attempted afterwards to alter.”<sup>2</sup> After the lapse of a thousand years they were in force in their original integrity. A triennial Parliament was provided for. The code forbade any monarch, or any assembly, to levy or impose any tax other than the constitutional articles authorized. The Leinster tribute, made necessary by protracted wars, was the only known exception to this rule. King Roderic called

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and pass from them into the clearings where the dwellings of the chiefs are placed. And as we journey along, in place of the savage neglect we expected to find, we observe a certain order and regularity. The roads and pathways are kept clean, and free from brambles and brushwood, the streams are spanned with rustic bridges, and here and there the sound of a mill is heard. The land, too, is tilled, and where the countless cattle are browsing we hear the sound of bells tinkling from the necks of the foremost leaders of the herds, and observe that the fields are irrigated. . . . Now this is no ideal sketch. There is not a single feature of the landscape we have thus brought before us, for which law and authority cannot be quoted from the *Senchus Mor*. . . . And the orchard and its beehives are all mentioned in its pages. Not only so, but distinct provisions are laid down for their protection, and recovery of their estimated value.”—Dublin Review, 1871, article “The Brehon Laws of Ireland.”

In 1612, the Brehon Law was first declared illegal, and the common law of England was formally substituted for it. “In that year the judges first proceeded on circuit, and held assize in districts where for ages the Brehon Law had alone been promulgated.” Outside the Pale, the native code continued in force.

<sup>1</sup> “The first synod or Parliament of Aedh’s reign had been convoked in a place called Drumceitt (Londonderry), the ‘whale’s back,’ situated in his special patrimony, not far from the sea and the gulf of Loch Foyle, where Columba had embarked, and at the further end of which was his dear university of Derry. It was there he returned with his royal client, the new king of the Caledonian Scots, whose confessor, or, as the Irish termed it, ‘friend of his soul,’ he had become. The two kings, Aedh and Aidan, presided at this assembly, which sat for fourteen months. . . .” Montalbemont, Monks of the West, vol. iii., p. 190.

<sup>2</sup> Dublin Review, art., “The Brehon Laws of Ireland.”

his Parliament together to devise ways and means to repel the English invasion.<sup>1</sup> As a means of winning the good will of his Irish subjects, Henry III. sent an assurance to the Irish nobility that they should have the full benefits of *Magna Charta*, which had been reluctantly granted in England during the previous reign by his father, a promise, broken of course, as were so many subsequent ones, which had it been kept, might have won the Irish—of that generation at least—into loyalty; but they held their Parliaments as boldly as if the right to do so were English<sup>2</sup> and not Breton. The Parliament which met at Kilkenny during the reign of Edward I. preserved some instincts of native patriotism; and another, in the same reign, called, as the previous one had been, by the English Lord Justice, assumed an attitude of independence against the king. Two Parliaments were held, in two succeeding years, during the reign of Edward II., nominally to rectify abuses and examine into acts of violence; but so contemptible an opinion did the crown entertain toward the native legislators that *Magna Charta* was still denied, and to Edward II. belongs the unenviable distinction of being the author of the law that to kill an Irishman was no crime, since he was “a mere Irishman;”<sup>3</sup> that no Englishman should marry an Irish wife, or if he did, that he should forfeit her dower; that no “mere Irishman” could sue in the king’s court or make a will. The Parliaments held inside the Pale<sup>4</sup> fell rapidly under Eng-

<sup>1</sup> “The last such Parliament held before the leaving of the troops of Henry II., was the celebrated assembly of Tara, convoked in 1169, by Roderic O’Connor, the last king of all Ireland.

“Established in Ireland by right of conquest, the English introduced their own institutions within the territories they occupied, and they afterwards recognized the right of Ireland to have as one of them a Parliament of her own, and to pay only the taxes voted by her Parliament.” Abbe Perraud, p. 500.

<sup>2</sup> Matthew Paris states that Henry II. granted the laws of England to the people of Ireland. . . .” Dublin Review, April, 1863, p. 332.

“The earliest mention of apportionment by name, on the records of Ireland, is on the great roll of the Pipe, of 10 to 12 Edward I. . . .” Ib. 333.

“An entry in the Black Book of the church of the Holy Trinity, Dublin, of the year 1297, the twenty-sixth of King Edward I., [is] of the utmost importance in showing the component parts of the Parliament held in Dublin, in that year.” Ib. 333.

“Sir John Davies is tempted to assert that the Parliament of 1613 was the first general representation of the people which was not confined to the Pale.” Ib. 327.

<sup>3</sup> Nor was it a punishable offence to violate the honor of an Irishwoman.

<sup>4</sup> The Pale was the English part of the island, and its boundaries varied according to the success of the spasmodic wars, some of which curtailed and others of which enlarged it. In the reign of King John it comprised, nominally, Dublin, Meath, Kildare, Louth, Carlow, Kilkenny, Wexford, Waterford, Cork, Kerry, Tipperary, and Limerick. At the close of the reign of Edward III. it was restricted to Dublin, Carlow, Meath and Louth, and under Henry VI., the rebels still further reduced its limits. During the reign of Henry VII. an act of Parliament was passed for making a ditch to inclose it.

lish control, and while too cowardly to compel the king to give to his loyal subjects the benefits of the principles of the English constitution, were soon rendered base enough, by fear, ambition, reward, and bribery, to impose cruel statutes upon their countrymen. When Edward Bruce caused himself to be crowned king of Ireland at Dundalk, there does not appear to have been any opposition by members of Parliament, and soon afterwards the Burkes and Geraldines united to support the English government in Ireland; and had it not been for the victories of Edward Bruce, it might then have been overthrown.<sup>1</sup> During the reign of Edward III. the Irish within the Pale petitioned the crown for *Magna Charta* and the English laws; the king, evidently understanding the controlling elements in Parliament, sent word to the Lord Justice to obtain its voice upon the petition;<sup>2</sup> but the "mere Irish" remained outlaws without any rights whatever, and in 1351 the king and Parliament of England made laws for Ireland.

The bitter quarrel about the confiscated lands provoked a secession from the Parliament of the Pale, at Dublin, and the meeting of a Parliament of malcontents at Kilkenny, in which it was decided to send three queries to the king, one of which was, "How an officer under the king, that entered very poor, could, in one year, heap up more wealth than men of great estates in many years?" The next Parliament, at Kilkenny, summoned by the Duke of Clarence, declared the Brehon law treason; punished with the loss of lands or imprisonment the use of the Irish name, apparel, or language; and made it treason to marry or gossip with or nurse the Irish. It enacted that no Irishman should be presented for any ecclesiastical benefice or be received into any monastery or religious house. The impotency of the Irish Parliament of the Pale was so fully realized, in the middle of the fourteenth century, that petitions for the redress of grievances in Ireland, instead of being addressed to it, were sent over to the English Parliament during the reign of Richard II. But the Irish Parliament spasmodically displayed some sense of patriotism and of independence, and resorted even to an immoral method to get rid of the Earl of Oxford, Lord Deputy, who was at last compelled to fly; but when Richard went over to Ireland, many of the native princes received titles from him according to English law, the first creation of English "nobility" on Irish soil. Irish Parliaments were summoned by Henry IV., by which the odious statutes, enacted at Kilkenny during the reign of Edward III., were repeated and made still more cruel. The Irish Parliament, which granted a subsidy to Henry V., enacted that any prelate who should bring an "Irish rebel" to any

<sup>1</sup> Winne, vol. i., p. 298.

<sup>2</sup> Id., p. 299.

Parliament or council should lose his temporalities, and Irish governors were forbidden to issue pardons in such cases, and after thus sufficiently demonstrating its humanity and patriotism, it voted a second subsidy to the king. During the reign of Henry VI., a significant fact is recorded having much to do with subsequent Parliamentary history in Ireland. The King's Bench in England refused to take cognizance of a judgment of the Parliament of Ireland to reverse it.<sup>1</sup> The defendant in the case, the Prior of Llantheny, whom the Irish Parliament had found guilty under the Kilkenny statutes, then petitioned the king to have the record transmitted for examination to the English House of Lords; thus the jurisdiction, afterwards so bitterly contested, was first recognized in Ireland.

When Richard, Duke of York, became Lord Lieutenant, after his removal from the regency of France, he stipulated with the king that he should be Lord Lieutenant for ten years; that he should be entitled to the entire revenue of Ireland without accounting for it; that he might do as he pleased with the "king's lands"—all the land the Crown chose to claim; that he might raise what armies he pleased, and govern Ireland by a deputy, at his pleasure; and he held several Parliaments which do not appear to have found any fault with these extraordinary arrangements. While Sir Edward Fitz Eustace was Lord Deputy, an Irish Parliament ordered that no appeals should lie to England except for treason against the king's person; a succeeding Parliament ordered that a Parliament should be held every year, and passed other statutes indicative of partial independence. During the reign of Edward IV., mints were established at Dublin, Drogheda, Waterford, and Galway, and it was decreed that the king's money should be advanced in Ireland one-fourth above its current value in England. The Parliament which met in 1475 declared that it would be treason to bring bulls from Rome, and that any Englishman injured by an Irishman outside the Pale should avenge himself according to his pleasure against the Irish nation.

During all these times, it is needless to say, there had been no peace in Ireland. The Pale was still a few counties on the eastern side of the country; it was occupied by English colonists and a small minority of "loyal" Irish, who preferred the advantages "loyalty" procured; but outside the Pale there was an almost unbroken series of insurrections, first in one part of the country, then in another, and the English governors were content to send small detachments here and there to seize an estate, rob a monastery, pillage a church, and massacre a clan; and this method of "civiliz-

<sup>1</sup> Winne, vol. i., p. 337.

ing" the rebels was always followed by confiscation and seizure of their lands and the expulsion of those who escaped the massacre. The Parliaments in the Pale carried out, as a rule, the ambitious designs of the English colony and lent color of law to measures of extreme barbarity; but so general was the insurrectionary spirit, aggravated at last by frenzy into union, that the safety of the Pale itself was menaced during the reign of Henry VII., and the conciliatory policy of that monarch is the first record of the English crown making concessions to the Irish people under the influence of fear. His indulgence, however, was shortlived. The Parliament of the Pale began to display some instincts of genuine independence and a disposition to consult the wishes of the Irish in their enactments, and Sir Edward Poynings, the Lord Deputy, induced the Parliament to rob itself of any future capacity for patriotism by procuring, in 1494, its adoption of the famous "Poynings' Act," namely, that no Parliament should thereafter be held in Ireland until the King of England should call it, specifying in the call the business to be transacted, the king's deputy and council in Ireland having first certified to his majesty the acts proposed to be passed. The same Parliament made the statutes of the English Parliament binding in Ireland. Whatever talent the native members of the Parliament of the Pale might have developed for redressing the wrongs of their country, they thus abdicated the little power for good which still lingered in their possession.<sup>1</sup>

King Henry VIII.'s Irish Parliament confirmed the king's marriage with Anne Boleyn, and made it treason to act or write, and a misprision of treason to speak against it; it confirmed Henry's supremacy over the Church as well as over the State; ordered that there should be no appeals to Rome; that treason committed "beyond sea" might be tried in Ireland; and established tithes of first fruits for the support<sup>2</sup> of the Protestant conformists. This Parliament prohibited the wearing of hair on the upper lip, and gravely commanded Irish women to abandon their kirtles, and mantles, and hoods, and adopt the English style of dress. The English language was made compulsory; an order was issued for the suppression of abbeys and against transporting wool and flocks; and many statutes were passed besides these, which were wanton, cruel, op-

<sup>1</sup> "And it is to be noted that this act was in the statute of 28 Henry VIII. suspended as to that Parliament; and by the statute of 3, 4 Philip and Mary, it is at large explained; and by the statute 11 Elizabeth, Poynings' Act was again suspended or superseded as to that Parliament; but upon second thoughts, and in another session, a law was made (11 Eliz., c. 8) that no bill should, for the future, be certified into England for the repeal of Poynings' Act until first such bill should be approved of by the majority of both houses of Parliament in Ireland." Winne, vol. i., p. 357.

<sup>2</sup> George Brown was now appointed first Protestant Archbishop of Dublin.

pressive, and ruinous. That the king should graciously have acquiesced in a suspension of Poynings' Act in order to give greater liberty of action to this Parliament, was a condescension on his majesty's part surely deserved by its grateful recipients! Fierce and moderately well-organized rebellion followed as a matter of course; the Pale was invaded, and the whole country became a scene of terror within and outlawry without the English colony.<sup>1</sup> In 1453 Parliament met at Dublin and declared Henry VIII. and his successors kings of Ireland; preceding monarchs, with one exception, having been content to be king of England and only "Lord of Ireland." In 1546 the money was debased.

The insupportable brutality of the laws threatened a union of the Irish outside the Pale and the semi Saxonized Irish inside in a common cause against the colony, and extra troops were sent over and the Pale enlarged; the utmost rigor being used to compel all classes to recognize the king's spiritual supremacy.<sup>2</sup> During the reign of Mary an effort was made to restore the patriot prelates to their sees and to show some humanity in carrying out the laws; but insurrections arose as usual, nothing was done to amend the iniquitous methods by which the lands had been stolen, and little or nothing to improve the general state of the country. . . . Parliaments which assembled after the accession of Elizabeth gave the queen the right to nominate bishops, confirmed all the worst of the statutes of Henry VIII. and Edward VI., confiscated all the monasteries and religious houses,<sup>3</sup> disfranchised every person who would not take the oath of spiritual supremacy, hampered what little trade had grown up in wool, flax, yarn, beef, tallow, wax, and butter; and made the English language compulsory and exclusive in the few schools that existed. Perhaps it is not improper to mention that one of these Parliaments revealed the facility with which desirable legislation can sometimes be procured, for it was shown in the de-

<sup>1</sup> "In the meantime, through the course of many succeeding reigns, though the chief governors had exacted the oaths of allegiance from the Irish, and put them often to death as rebels and traitors, when taken in arms against the English, yet the English laws, to say the most of them, extended no farther than the Pale, and the Irish were so far from being considered as bound by them that they could not be admitted to share in their benefits when they repeatedly and earnestly desired it." Winne (English Protestant), vol. i., p. 391.

<sup>2</sup> The order to read only the English liturgy in Ireland was presented to an assembly of the hierarchy and clergy. The Catholic primate of Armagh, Dowdal, and a large following, refused, and left the assembly; but George Brown accepted the order of the king, "unto whom," he said, "I submit, as Jesus did to Cesar"! Archbishop Dowdal was removed and had to leave Ireland.

<sup>3</sup> The number which still survived and were seized was 563. Among them were the schools and libraries which Danish and English barbarity had thus far missed; and the convents of Augustinian, Benedictine, and Cistercian nuns, as well as asylums and houses of refuge, were sacrificed with the abbeys and cathedrals.

bates that the election laws were so arranged by the English office-holders as to return themselves as members, without regard to the choice of the voters. Catholics and Protestants were still in the Parliament at this time, the Catholics in the minority; the members being chosen, of course, only from among the residents of the Pale. The Irish outside the Pale were not recognized as existing politically, although exceeding the colony by millions, and rebellion continued to be the rule. The Irish Parliament<sup>1</sup> of James I. contained 135 Protestants and 101 Catholics. A dispute arose about the election of speaker, and was referred to the king, who decided against the Catholics, and declared them "half subjects," entitled to only "half privileges." The English colonists in the Pale were able to control the king for their own purposes. From this time until the Act of Union the Protestants controlled the Parliaments, and (Poynings' Act being in force) the penal laws were rapidly spread upon the books. Catholic lawyers were disqualified to practice, and the last privilege of the Catholics of the Pale destroyed, since they could be no longer represented at the bar, or obtain a hearing from the bench.

It would be idle to detail the succession of enactments by which the most detestable series of statutes ever devised were adopted by the successive Irish Parliaments. The proscription of Catholic lawyers was followed by the exclusion of all Catholics from Parliament and from the right to vote for members of that body. It need not be added that this sweeping and complete disfranchisement did not refer to Irish rebels against English authority; no vestige of political rights had ever been conferred upon them, and there was none to take away. It applied to the loyal Catholics within the Pale who had been faithful English subjects and participated in the wars to put down the insurrections of their countrymen. They were now reduced to a condition of slavery, no worse and no better than that of those whose ancestors had remained rebels. The framing of the penal code went on, reign after reign,<sup>2</sup> and what kind of code it was let the Protestant historian of Rationalism tell.<sup>3</sup> "The last great Protestant ruler of England was William III., who is identified in Ireland with the humiliation of the Boyne, with the destruction of Irish trade, and with the broken treaty of Limerick.

<sup>1</sup> His majesty wanted to secure a majority for his plan of "stripping the ancient possessors of the soil of their property," and conferred electoral rights on forty new boroughs. These boroughs, of course, were so many additional votes for the king's party; but many of the forty contained no more than seven or eight inhabitants.

<sup>2</sup> The portion of Irish history which followed the coalition of the "Ancient Irish" with the Anglo-Irish of the Pale, in 1641, can be most satisfactorily obtained in the *Confederation of Kilkenny*, by Rev. C. P. Meehan, 1846.

<sup>3</sup> Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland, p. 120.

"The ceaseless exertions of the extreme Protestant party have made him more odious in the eyes of the people than he deserves to be, for he was personally far more tolerant than the great majority of his contemporaries, and the penal code was chiefly enacted under his successors. It required, indeed, four or five reigns to elaborate a system so ingeniously contrived to demoralize, to degrade, and impoverish the people of Ireland. By this code the Roman Catholics were absolutely excluded from the Parliament, from the magistracy, from the corporations, from the bench, and from the bar. They could not vote at parliamentary elections, or at vestries. They could not act as constables, or sheriffs, or jurymen, or serve in the army or navy, or become solicitors, or even hold the positions of gamekeeper or watchman. Schools were established to bring up their children as Protestants, and if they refused to avail themselves of these, they were deliberately consigned to hopeless ignorance, being excluded from the university, and debarred under crushing penalties from acting as schoolmasters, as ushers, or as private tutors, or from sending their children abroad to obtain the instruction they were refused at home. They could not marry Protestants, and if such a marriage were celebrated, the priest who officiated might be hung. They could not buy land, nor inherit it, nor receive it as a gift, from Protestants, nor hold life annuities, or leases for more than thirty-one years, or any lease on such terms that the profits of the land exceeded one-third of the rent. If any Catholic householder by his industry so increased his profits that they exceeded this proportion, and did not immediately make a corresponding increase in his payments, any Protestant who gave the information could enter into possession of his farm. If any Catholic had secretly purchased either his old forfeited estate, or any other land, any Protestant who informed against him might become the proprietor. The few Catholic landholders who remained were deprived of the right which all other classes possessed of bequeathing their lands as they pleased. If their sons continued Catholics, it was divided equally among them. If, however, the eldest son consented to apostatize, the estate was settled upon him, the father from that hour became only a life tenant, and lost all power of selling, mortgaging, or otherwise disposing of it. If the wife of a Catholic abandoned the religion of her husband, she was immediately free from his control, and the chancellor was empowered to assign to her a certain portion of her husband's property. If any child, however young, professed itself a Protestant, it was at once taken from its father's care, and the chancellor could oblige the father to declare upon oath the value of his property, both real and personal, and could assign for the present maintenance and future portion of the converted child such pro-

portion of that property as the court might decree. No Catholic could be guardian, either to his own children or to those of another person, and therefore a Catholic who died while his children were minors, had the bitterness of reflecting, upon his deathbed, that they must pass into the care of Protestants. An annuity of from twenty to forty pounds was provided as a bribe for every priest who would become a Protestant. To convert a Protestant to Catholicism was a capital offence. In every walk of life the Catholic was pursued by persecution or restriction. Except in the linen trade he could not have more than two apprentices. He could not possess a horse of the value of more than five pounds, and any Protestant on giving him five pounds could take his horse. He was compelled to pay double to the militia. He was forbidden, except under particular conditions, to live in Galway or Limerick. In case of war with a Catholic prince, the Catholics were obliged to reimburse the damage done by the enemy's privateers. . . . To facilitate the discovery of offences against the code, two justices of the peace might at any time compel any Catholic of eighteen years of age to declare when and where he last heard mass, what persons were present, and who officiated; and if he refused to give evidence, they might imprison him for twelve months or until he had paid a fine of twenty pounds. . . . A graduated scale of rewards was offered for the discovery of Catholic bishops, priests, and schoolmasters, and a resolution of the (Irish) House of Commons pronounced 'the prosecuting and informing against papists' 'an honorable service to the government.' . . . Such were the principal articles of this famous code. . . : It was framed by a small minority of the nation for the oppression of the majority who remained faithful to the religion of their fathers. . . . It was framed and enforced, although by the treaty of Limerick the Catholics had been guaranteed such privileges in the exercise of their religion as they enjoyed in the reign of Charles II.; although the sovereign at the same time promised as soon as his affairs would permit, to summon a Parliament in this kingdom, and endeavor to procure the said Roman Catholics such further security in that particular as may preserve them from any disturbance on account of their religion; 'although not a single act of treason was proved against them, and although they remained passive spectators to two rebellions which menaced the very existence of the Protestant dynasty in England."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The curious reader will find the details of the enactment of the penal laws in a convenient form in Thomas D'Arcy McGee's *History of the Attempts to Establish the Protestant Reformation in Ireland*, and in John Mitchell's continuation of Mac-Geoghegan's *History of Ireland*.

The worst thing which may be said against this code is not that it was levelled against the property, the political rights, or even the lives of the Irish people. It was levelled against human nature in them. Its penalties were laid upon virtue; its rewards were held smilingly out to sin and crime. The wife's infidelity to her husband was legally recompensed; the affection of the child for the parent robbed it of its inheritance in favor of the son who, by apostasy, would become owner of his father's estate and make his father a dependent upon his sufferance. It cultivated a system of national espionage, educated the race of informers and traitors, of high and low degree, who tracked the priest to the altar in the mountain nook to betray him to his death, and who burrowed into the secrets of patriots in every subsequent period in the national history to get the price of their countrymen's blood and their country's hopes.

The Irish informer was the natural child of the penal code.

Perhaps there is a little comfort to be had in the reflection that the bigotry in the Irish Parliament was not of itself capable of originating this masterpiece of fiendishness. After the passage of Poynings' Act, and the exclusion of the Catholics from the Irish Parliaments,<sup>1</sup> the latter became only the recorders of the English plans for the complete subjugation of a people who, it was evident, could not be politically destroyed until after their consciences were seared and their hearts broken.

Occasionally, as has been remarked, the Irish Parliament showed a feeble spark of independence. In 1690, a subsidy bill was thrown out by the Commons because it had not originated in that house. In 1692, two money bills which had not been first certified in Ireland and sent over to England, were ordered passed. One was passed, as it related only to additional duties, the other was rejected on the ground that it was not originated in Ireland, and the Lord Deputy, Sidney, angrily prorogued the Parliament. In 1709, a financial bill was thrown out because the queen's privy council altered it. In 1731, George II.'s request for a grant of subsidies for twenty-one years was denied. In 1768, a subsidy bill was thrown out because it had not originated with the Commons. When

<sup>1</sup> "The beginning of the Irish penal code was a law passed in 1691 by the English Parliament for excluding all Catholics from the Irish one." Lecky, *Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland*, p. 124.

"In matters of religion, if the Irish Parliament acted harshly and cruelly in the earlier and middle parts of the last century, so did the British; and towards the end of the century, the former set eagerly about repairing the evil, having in twenty years, up to 1794, passed no less than four important enactments for removing disabilities." *An Argument for Ireland*, by John O'Connell, Esq., M.P. Printed by order of the Loyal National Repeal Association, Dublin, 1844.

Molyneux's book appeared denying the right of the English Parliament to make laws for Ireland, he only expressed the opinion of a respectable minority of the Irish Parliament, which was at the time of the publication exclusively Protestant. What chiefly surprises one is that the Irish Parliament should have passed, at English dictation, commercial regulations which absolutely ruined Irish trade and manufactures, in which many of themselves must have been interested, and nothing could more clearly show how perfect was the English ascendancy in that body. There is only one principle discoverable in these prohibitory laws, namely, that Irish prosperity was not consistent with English profit, and, accordingly, whenever the English market evinced signs of Irish prosperity, a word went up to the crown, and a new commercial restriction was passed and sent over to the Irish Parliament for adoption. Thus the Irish woollen trade was destroyed in 1699; and the "Navigation Laws," practically forbidding Ireland to have any direct commerce with any countries except England, being in force, to cut off the export of woollen cloth to England was a fatal stroke upon that industry. The exportation of live cattle had been previously forbidden. These laws created the extensive class of expert smugglers, who carried on a thriving illegal trade with France. The linen trade was mildly encouraged until it interfered with the English market, and was then repressed. To be brief, the commercial laws arrived at only one purpose, that of making Ireland a slave for English service. The exportation of cattle being forbidden, the exportation of any article produced by the soil or by the industry of the people being either wholly prohibited or so restrained as to render it profitless, nothing remained except to turn the country into sheepwalks; but the law forbade the manufacture of wool.<sup>1</sup> These repressions afflicted the Protestant tradespeople, who had ambition, liberty, and capital, more than the Catholics, who had neither; and as the Protestant tradesman could vote for his member of Parliament, that body began slowly to recognize the national instinct. It was unquestionably the trade restrictions

<sup>1</sup> A full and accurate transcription of the laws by which every effort of Ireland to establish manufactures was destroyed or repressed, or, in a few subservient exceptions, encouraged for the benefit of English "shopkeepers," may be obtained from Dr. Madden's *Connection between the Kingdom of Ireland and the Crown of England*, Dublin, James Duffy, 1845; from the speeches of Grattan and of Sheil; and the following volumes, somewhat rare in the United States now, are full of valuable information: *Essays on the Repeal of the Union*, Dublin, Duffy, 1845; *Rise and Fall of the Irish Nation*, by Sir Jonah Barrington, LL.D., K.C., member of the last Irish Parliament, New York, 1833, D. & J. Sadlier; *The Industrial Resources of Ireland*, by Robert Kane, M.D., Dublin, 1844; *An Argument for Ireland*, by John O'Connell, Esq., M.P., Dublin, 1844. The writer is indebted for most of these to William J. Onahan, Esq., of Chicago.

which supplied the steady impulse that formed, in the time of Swift, a little nucleus of an Irish patriot party, which gradually grew in numbers, intellect, and intrepidity, until, when Flood and Grattan, Ponsonby, Burgh, and their compatriots led the Irish House of Commons, presented at last the aspect of an organized Opposition to the king's government; and even the insidious policy of buying over a man with an office as soon as he indicated that he meant to have some regard for his country, began to fail of effect. The patriot party struck its first effective blow at the pension list; then began the agitation for a revision of the commercial restrictions. In 1763, Mr. Fitzgerald delivered a speech in the House in which he showed that, owing to the laws, two-thirds of the people were unemployed, "there was neither foreign trade nor home consumption sufficient to distribute the conveniences of life among them with reasonable equality, or to pay any tax proportionable to their number. What new mode of taxation could be devised? Would they tax leather when no shoes were worn, or tallow where no candles were burned?"

In 1763, the financial distress opened the door to the first attempt at mitigating the penal laws. Shut out from political power and compelled to give their entire time to securing enough to live on and pay taxes, some of the Catholics had been thrifty enough to save a little money. The few Protestant capitalists wanted it, but the Catholics could not lend on mortgages (lest the land should fall into their hands). The money was so badly needed, however, that a bill was introduced to empower Catholics to lend money on real estate. Can it be believed? The bill was cushioned in the English Privy Council! An effort to secure the lenders the right to foreclose the mortgages, if default occurred, was at first defeated in the Irish Commons. On several occasions, long intervals elapsing, the Irish Parliament had found courage to refuse to the king the right to originate money-bills. Poynings' Act was bad enough, but the patriot party had now acquired sufficient strength to insist on getting whatever good there was in it, and under its text the Lord Deputy and the Council in Ireland were required first to certify to the crown what acts the Irish Parliament proposed to pass. The Council had to recognize the majority of the Parliament in making up the record to be sent to England; and thus to a limited extent the right to originate legislation for Ireland was inherent in the Irish Commons. In 1769 a money-bill was defeated after a vigorous debate by 94 to 71, because it did not take its rise in the Irish House. This was the first substantial victory of the first Home Rulers.

The American war, and the menace of France, infused into English legislation for Ireland the first confession of the influence of

fear. In 1773 a bill was brought in by the representatives of the government to secure Catholics repayment of money lent on mortgages to Protestants, and explicit orders were sent over from London that Parliament should pass some conciliatory measure, which would have a soothing and quieting effect; and in 1774 a bill was introduced permitting Catholics to testify their allegiance to the English sovereign! Such was the first recognition by the English crown that it had Catholic *subjects* in Ireland—such the first formal act of conciliation, after six hundred years of bitter cruelty; and the motive nothing better than abject fear of the patriot Protestant party in Parliament and the millions of Catholics out of all political rights, who might organize an insurrection at a time so exceedingly inconvenient! The hour was at hand when more substantial conciliation had to be granted. In 1775 encouragement was ordered to be given to the Irish fisheries; bounties were given to Irish ships; the laws about the exporting of clothing and accoutrements were modified in Ireland's favor, and a bounty granted for the importation of flaxseed. Whale fishing was encouraged, and the duties were removed from oil, blubber, and bone, and from seal skins. In 1775 his majesty needed the services of 4000 men, on duty in Ireland, in the American colonies, and proposed to replace them in Ireland with Hessians. This provoked a bitter debate, resulting in an agreement to let the troops go, but to decline the Hessians.

The Parliament which assembled in 1777 is the most memorable in the history of Ireland. Grattan organized in it a campaign for the repeal of Poynings' Act, and the recognition by the crown of the independence of the home legislature. The influence of fear operated strongly on his side. American independence was certain to be accomplished, and France had declared itself an ally of the colonial rebels. Lord North instructed the Irish Council to bring into Parliament a bill making slight relaxations in the penal code; Catholics were not to be permitted to have arms, horses, education, a seat in Parliament, a vote at the elections, a right to sit on juries, or entrance into municipal corporations, but the first relief bill granted them a few slight privileges, and had only the effect of waking them up from their profound lethargy to ask for more. An unsuccessful attempt was made to secure liberty of export, but no modification of actual benefit was obtained. French and American privateers were running through the Channel; the Irish government became alarmed, and the mayor of Belfast asked for a garrison. He was informed that only half a troop of dismounted cavalry and half a troop of invalids could be spared to defend the commercial capital of Ireland. A militia bill was introduced

authorizing the enlistment of volunteers to repel possible invasion. In a short time 60,000 men were in arms, Protestant and Catholic. Before the government discovered its fatal blunder, this suddenly created force of rebels, drilled, and well commanded, determined on abolishing the commercial laws in order to liberate the manacled trade of the country. They drew up before the Parliament-house, and their cannon were labelled with "Free Trade, or this." England was left no alternative. She had no troops with which to disband the volunteers, and in 1779 the prohibition on exporting woollen cloths was removed, and the colonial trade thrown open to Ireland. But this did not satisfy the volunteers. Grattan pressed his bill for the repeal of Poynings' Act, and the volunteers enthusiastically supported him. The government resisted to the last, but the volunteers had increased to 80,000. Again there was no alternative. In 1780 Grattan offered a resolution that only "the King, Lords, and Commons of Ireland had a right to make laws for Ireland." On April 16th, 1782, the government yielded.

The Irish Parliament had now the welfare of Ireland in its own hands, subject to royal assent to its enactments. The commercial restrictions were nearly all abolished, the judiciary was reformed, the army became subject to Parliament, the appellate jurisdiction of the Irish House of Lords was restored, and the patriot party had at its command a good working majority. Agitation began for the absolute repeal of the penal laws; but what it had taken centuries to build up was not to be pulled down all at once. In 1793 Catholics were admitted to the elective franchise; England had as much as she could do watching France. They were also admitted to the magistracy and to the jury-box. The refusal of the government to acquiesce in absolute emancipation aroused anew the spirit of disloyalty, which culminated in the rebellion of '98. It was the outburst of angry Protestant patriotism, alive to the monstrous injustice inflicted upon their Catholic countrymen. England could not afford to tolerate longer an Irish Protestant Parliament which was likely to turn rebel for the sake of emancipating Irish Catholics; and as there was no longer any means of effectively controlling its conduct, resort was had to the Act of Union, by which the Irish Parliament was forever abolished in 1800. The means employed to procure the passage of the act it is unnecessary to describe. Two Irishmen, Clare and Castlereagh, disbursed gold, offices, and titles, until they had secured a majority in favor of the act. The country was filled with English troops, *habeas corpus* suspended, popular meetings forbidden. The English suborners of treachery spent two years in their task; everybody was bribed who could be reached by any kind of temptation; gold enough

and 120,000 soldiers accomplished it at last.<sup>1</sup> From 1782 until the wholesale bribery of 1800, the Irish Parliament had an opportunity to show whether the country had gained anything by Parliamentary independence. Grattan declared that in the short period of its independent life it had conferred more benefits on Ireland than British Parliaments had conferred for a century. The inland navigation of the country is a monument to its original patriotism and intelligence. It made large grants for canals and for improving the navigation of the Shannon, Barrow, and Boyne; canals were constructed between Dublin and the Shannon; from Newry to Lough Neagh, between Loch Swilley and Loch Foyle, and many other important works of the same character were completed. The material progress of the country was rapid and substantial. In ten years from 1787 the exports were more than trebled. Perhaps the effect of the Act of Union upon Ireland is best illustrated by a small group of figures:

Debt of Ireland, 1801,	.	.	.	.	.	.	£28,545,134
" " 1817,	.	.	.	.	.	.	112,704,773
" " England, 1801,	.	.	.	.	.	.	450,504,984
" " " 1817,	.	.	.	.	.	.	734,522,104

Thus the union, in a period equal to that of legislative independence in Ireland, only doubled the English debt, but quadrupled that of Ireland.<sup>2</sup>

The Duke of Wellington candidly admitted that in 1829 he brought in the Catholic emancipation bill reluctantly, and solely under the influence of fear. "The ministers," says Lecky, "feeling further resistance to be hopeless, brought in the emancipation bill, confessedly because to withhold it would be to kindle a rebellion that would extend over the length and breadth of the land."<sup>3</sup>

The Irish Church Establishment was the next object of attack. Did fear have any influence in securing Disestablishment?

In closing the debate which resulted in the passage of the Disestablishment bill in 1868, Mr. Gladstone was asked by Mr. Disraeli why he had not brought in the bill in 1866 when he asked for a suspension of the *habeas corpus* act. Mr. Gladstone's reply was a confession like that of the Duke of Wellington. An insurrection was to be avoided! "Circumstances were not ripe," he

<sup>1</sup> The last Irish Parliament was monstrously corrupt after the English agents had made it so, but "there may be something worse for a people than to have a corrupt body of representatives, and that is, to have none at all." De Beaumont, *vide Abbé Perraud*, p. 501.

<sup>2</sup> Mitchell's History of Ireland, pp. 152-400, gives a comprehensive view of the character of this Parliament, and ample details of the manner in which the Act of Union was consummated.

<sup>3</sup> Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland, p. 248.

said, "in so far that we did not know so much then as we know now with respect to the intensity of Fenianism." So it was fear, says the conservative *Dublin Review*, "which at last succeeded in compelling statesmen to give that attention to the affairs of Ireland for which justice, charity, and policy had previously pleaded in vain."<sup>1</sup> In 1865 the same cautious authority had declared that "it only needed some more effective organization of their political power on the part of the Irish people" to persuade Mr. Gladstone or Mr. Disraeli that it would be his interest, if not a necessity, to have "a clear and comprehensive policy for Ireland." The influence of fear dictated the policy.<sup>2</sup> Cardinal, then Archbishop, Manning, discussing the same subject said, "We Englishmen can be cool and calm in this matter, but we must not forget that the accumulated animosity of the past is borne in the blood of Irishmen. My surprise is, not that they control it so little but that they control it so much." Of the Land Question he wrote :

"But the 'Land Question,' as we call it, by a somewhat heartless euphemism, means hunger, thirst, nakedness, notices to quit, labor spent in vain, the toil of years seized upon, the breaking up of homes, the miseries, sicknesses, deaths of parents, children, wives; the despair and wildness which spring up in the hearts of the poor when legal force, like a sharp arrow, goes over the most sensitive and vital rights of mankind. All this is contained in the Land Question. It is this which spreads through the people in three-fourths of Ireland with an all-pervading and thrilling intensity. It is this intolerable grief which has driven hundreds of thousands to America, *there to bide the time of return.*"

While Ireland is apparently calm, and England is not menaced abroad, the Land Question<sup>3</sup> will remain neglected. It must,

<sup>1</sup> April, 1868, Article VIII.

<sup>2</sup> "It was indeed an exciting time when, avowedly on this one question, the three kingdoms were summoned to the polls in the autumn of 1868. In Ireland the days of 1829 seemed to have come again." New Ireland, p. 433.

<sup>3</sup> The following table is made up from the Statesman's Year Book, 1877:

England and Wales,	Acres.	Owners.	Inhabited houses.	Proportion of owners to population.	Proportion of owners to inhabited houses.	Average estate of each owner.	Average es- timated rental of each owner.
37,319,221	972,836	4,259,117	1 in 20	1 in 4	33 acres.	£102	
19,496,132	132,230	412,185	1 in 25	1 in 3	143	141	
20,819,829	68,758	961,229	1 in 79	1 in 14	293	195	

Land was acquired easily in Ireland by foreigners or apostates. Henry II. divided one third of the island, all he pretended to govern, among ten of his barons. After the revolt of the Earl of Desmond, 600,000 acres were confiscated in Munster, in 1586, and 200,000 of these were given free to foreign colonists on the single condition that "the Irish should be hunted off."

Toward the close of the reign of Elizabeth, one of her lieutenants wrote to her majesty that there was nothing left of the Irish except bones and ashes, and Elizabeth concluded that Ireland was at last pacified ("Pacata Hibernia"). The land was there, however, and the English lieutenants received additional estates. Under James I., the crown

sooner or later, be settled, and settled in the interest of the tenant; but the principle appears to be established that England will make concessions only when subjected to the same influence which extorted free trade and legislative independence when the volunteers of '82 had arms; the same influence which wrung Emancipation in 1829 and Disestablishment in 1868.

Suppose the legislative union of the two countries remains permanent in its present form, will the time ever come when Saxon and Celt, mutually unconscious of the past, will fraternize in hearts and purposes? If Xerxes had been victorious, would the Persians have absorbed the Greeks, and, had Alexander lived, Macedonia the Persians? Empires have risen, conquered, declined, and passed away; but there is no record, ancient or modern, fabulous or authentic, of two nations, one to the other, "aliens in race, aliens in country, aliens in religion,"<sup>1</sup> becoming absolutely identified through conquest or penal acts. Assyria passed away after extending its domain to the Indus and Central Africa; Cambyses conquered Egypt, placed his governors in Asia Minor, and collected tribute from Greek colonists in the Mediterranean; the Asiatic soldiers counted their subjects from the Red Sea to the Euxine; and when the legacy of antiquity fell to Rome, the eagle of the Cæsars commanded civilization and barbarism from the Columns of Hercules to the harbors of Britain, from the Rhine and the Danube to the Euphrates and the Nile. Rome, too, passed away; it had not absorbed its vassals; England, Spain, France, Italy, Austria, Turkey, and Greece survive. The Ottoman power arose and conquered, and is fighting to-day for its very existence. Spain cast a gigantic shadow over the world, and is now sluggish and decrepit. England "beats her drums" in more continents than Rome supposed to exist; her colonial dependencies (not including Ireland, Scotland, or Wales) embrace one-third of the surface of the globe and one-fourth of its population. Will the principle, perpetual and universal in history, fail of application in her case? Has she not yet attained

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took 450,000 acres, and Strafford seized upon 240,000 acres in Connaught; on the pretence of rebellion, six northern counties were handed over to colonists; and, in the seventeenth century, drought, famine, pillage, and English law had so effectually done their work that "there was not water enough to drown a man, wood to hang him, or earth to bury him." Cromwell, however, confiscated 7,708,237 acres. The Catholics were banished to Connaught, but were required to "clear the towns," and any found outside their prescribed pen—man, woman, or child—might be legally killed. William III. imitated the example of his predecessors in confiscation, as in everything else, and at the close of his reign the total of the confiscated land was 10,360,000 acres. In 1692, the Catholics, four times as numerous as the Protestants, owned one-eleventh of the land. The subsequent penal laws deprived them of that. For information in fuller detail, see Annals of the Four Masters, reign of Elizabeth.

<sup>1</sup> Sheil, in the House of Commons, 1837, quoting Lord Lyndhurst, in his speech on the Irish Municipal Bill.

her zenith, or is the power of the Cossack headed toward the road that leads to the beginning of her decline?<sup>1</sup> For seven hundred years she has been engaged in conquering twenty million acres of land and from two to nine millions of people, and has not succeeded. She tried force, broken treaties, confiscation, persecution, disfranchisement, bribery, exile, famine, and a few favors, far apart, always granted under the influence of fear. Then the bullock was suggested as a judicious substitute<sup>2</sup> for "bad subjects and worse rebels," "and the view of the more enlightened English of the present day takes the direction of depopulation."<sup>3</sup> From 1846 to 1875, seven millions of the natives of Ireland were swept by the besom of English law to America and Australia. The winds and the birds have borne the seeds of the flora of one clime over wide seas to remote but hospitable shores. England has expelled her Irish subjects laden only with the burden of their wrongs, and in every great city and every little hamlet of the new world, and the expanding world of the Southeastern Pacific, she is educating enemies and training rebels. In Ireland she sowed her laws in dragons' teeth, and the seed has been wafted in emigrant vessels and penal ships to every kindly soil on the habitable globe.<sup>4</sup> A race

<sup>1</sup> "Destruction will come upon the British Empire like the coldness of death. It will creep upon it from the extreme parts." Flood, in the Irish Parliament, 1778.

No less a personage than a member of Mr. Gladstone's cabinet, Mr. Lowe, advocates the abandonment of India (area, 897,004 English square miles; population, 189,613,238) on the ground that England was not consulted about acquiring it, and that it is "the greatest, if not the only source of danger" to the British Empire.

<sup>2</sup> The familiar opening lines of "The Coming of Arthur" have been quoted as felicitously describing this phase of English policy in Ireland:

"And still from time to time the heathen host  
Swarmed over seas, and harried what was left.  
And so there grew great tracts of wilderness,  
Wherein the beast was ever more and more,  
And man was less and less." . . .

<sup>3</sup> Dublin Review, vol. xii., 1869.

<sup>4</sup> "England has sown her laws in dragons' teeth, and they have sprung up as armed men." Hussey Brugh, in the Irish Parliament, 1789.

"Nor can we pay them the compliment of allowing that their motive was religious, that they wanted Ireland for the professors of a faith which they considered true. They wanted Ireland for themselves. The Irish were the owners of the soil, and, as such, were in the way; for that reason the Irish should go. Cato was not more intensely or bitterly bent upon the destruction of Carthage than were the members of James's English garrison upon the utter expulsion, or utter extinction, of the Irish race. We should be sorry to say that the English policy in Ireland has always been directed to the same end. We should be still more sorry to say that the English people themselves have always prompted and patronized such a policy. We believe that for one brutal block-head who can chuckle over the yearly decrease of the population of Ireland, there are one hundred Englishmen who see in the necessitated emigration of the Irish people one of the greatest losses as well as one of the greatest dangers to the British empire,

which has resisted seven centuries of efforts for its subjection, which by distribution has escaped from a "machine, wise and elaborate in contrivance, as well fitted for the oppression and degradation of a people, and the debasement in them of human nature itself, as ever proceeded from the perverted ingenuity of man,"<sup>1</sup> may be intended for a destiny worthy of its marvellous survival.

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## THE BIBLE IN AMERICAN HISTORY.

*A List of Editions of the Holy Scriptures and parts thereof printed in America previous to 1860, with Introduction and Bibliographical Notes.* By E. B. O'Callaghan. Albany: Munsell, 1861.

*History of the American Bible Society, revised and brought down to the present time.* By W. P. Strickland, D.D. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1856.

**T**HREE is no expression more common than "the Bible." It meets us at every turn, it takes its part in religion and even in politics. It is in requisition in the court and the custom-house, and ever and anon cases arise to decide whether "the Bible" is or is not to have a certain anomalous position in the public schools, neither a text-book nor a book of religious instruction.

Yet with the words on the lips of thousands it will be admitted as a strange and unprecedented fact that the term has never been defined either by legislature or high judicial authority. The last case where the question was argued at length was in Ohio, but not even there was there any attempt made to determine accurately and precisely what "the Bible" was, about which the whole argument turned.

It is by no means creditable to the legal mind of judge and counsel that arguments should have run on to an interminable length, and elaborate opinions should have been given without ever

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and who deplore the causes, whether of the present or of the past, which make it only too likely that if the Irish are going with a vengeance, they will try to return with abundance of the same commodity." Dublin Review (extreme conservative), vol. xv., 1873, p. 44.

<sup>1</sup> Edmund Burke on the Penal Laws. "The legislature of Ireland, like all legislatures, ought to frame its laws to suit the people and the circumstances of the country." Letter to his son, 1793.

once touching the positive fact as to what the whole question was about.

Like the Royal Society of London, they seem to have gone on taking for granted what should have been examined in the first place when King Charles, of witty memory, propounded his question.

But it may be said, every one knows what "the Bible" is; the Bible Society and publishers turn them out by the thousand. But surely it is not enough for a society or publishing house to print a number of sheets of paper, with a title-page "Holy Bible," to make it a Bible.

If we ever get so far into the reign of common-sense as to have the question of a definition raised, it will be conceded that the Bible is the collection of writings inspired by God, and that it must be in the original languages, with a text attested beyond doubt, or a translation directly or indirectly from such a text made by an entirely impartial hand.

If the question of the Bible arises, this is all the State can define. The first point will be what God has inspired. No commission issued by the courts can ascertain directly the divine counsels. The only test on the point to which, on American principles, we can rely is the rule of the majority of Christendom; and court and legislature must, to act fairly, lay down as a rule that all books which are held as inspired by a majority of Christians throughout the world must be recognized as inspired.

It may be said that the English Parliament, in adopting the Thirty-nine Articles, declared some books received by a majority of Christians not to be inspired, but it will not be pretended that the English Parliament had any divine authority in the matter, or that a body which went wrong in taxing tea in the colonies was infallible in its knowledge of God's counsels. In fact, the very wording of the article on the point disclaims any such power, and rather unfortunately gives reasons. It professes to receive no book as to which there was ever any doubt in the Church. This makes God depend on man's doubt, and carried out would overthrow Christianity entirely. We must reject the resurrection because Thomas doubted. But in point of fact the reason given fails utterly, because they retained many books as to which grave doubts long existed. The reason given is logically unsound and historically false. Neither the Thirty-nine Articles nor the majesty of the British Parliament can decide the matter for us.

The original texts we may regard as unknown. The Hebrew, transcribed in foreign characters after the captivity, was re-edited after the Christian era and put in a form to prevent any further defections from the synagogue to the Church. As the originals

are no longer in existence, there is no means which the State can recognize of deciding as to the purity of either Hebrew or Greek. The Samaritan, written in the old Hebrew letters, is nearer to the Septuagint than the modern Hebrew, and many, like Charles Thomson, the secretary of the Continental Congress, give the Septuagint the preference. That old patriot was so earnest in his view that he issued a translation of the Septuagint, and his original manuscript was recognized by the writer in the library of the Bible Society where it was incorrectly catalogued. With utter doubt as to the Hebrew text, how is court or legislature to decide? Follow the modern Hebrew based on the anti-Christian recension of the schools of Massora and Babylon, or adopt the Septuagint? As to the Greek, it cannot adopt the absurd "received text;" it must fall back on the most ancient manuscripts or adopt the Vulgate, which is a carefully prepared Latin version of what all proof shows to have been a very pure text. But in very sooth the honorable body would be sadly involved in these questions of texts, and would be still more perplexed to find the impartial hand to translate the text when once decided on. Canon, text, translator. Here are three elements which take the question almost absolutely out of the domain of legislation or judicial investigation.

But, it may be urged, public repute is enough. What has always been called "the Bible" is to be taken as "the Bible." It is not easy to see how a wide circulation of counterfeit bills can make them genuine, so that those who have refused to take them can be legally compelled to accept them in payment. If it is not what can be logically called the Bible, no acceptance by those who choose to accept it can justify forcing it upon those who have rejected it.

But this question of repute is an historical one, and our purpose is to study the Bible in American history. The work as issued by the Bible Society and in common use in Protestant churches in this country, and the one really forced into the schools as "the Bible," is an anomalous affair, that has no prescription whatever in its favor.

Let us go back to the earliest English settlement on the coast. After the voyage of Amidas and Barlow, under the auspices of Sir Walter Raleigh, in 1584, a body of colonists, led by Lane, settled on Roanoke Island in the following year. The earlier emigrants to Carolina and Virginia are not generally esteemed a religious body, but these Englishmen, many of whom as "rufflers of the court and camp had little time to pray," were not without religious feeling. We have it on record that they brought Bibles with them. "In every town which the scholarly Hariot entered," says Bancroft, "he displayed the Bible and explained its truths. The Indians revered the volume rather than its doctrine." Hariot himself, in

his brief and true report, says: "And although I told them the book materially and of itself was not of any such virtue as I thought they did conceive, but only the doctrine therein contained, yet would many be glad to touch it, to embrace it, to kiss it, to hold it to their breasts and heads, and stroke over all their body with it, to show their hungry desire of that knowledge which was spoken of."

The first English Bible of which we have any record was thus introduced into Carolina in 1585, used in the little colony on Roanoke Island, and borne through the primeval wilderness from one Indian town to another.

What was the English Bible thus primarily used on our shores by the Oxford bred mathematician? It was not the Bible Society's issue certainly; it was not the King James version, then unwritten. His college life, his acquaintance with Raleigh and Northumberland, and association with the court circles, all lead to the inference that Hariot's Bible was that officially recognized at the time by the Church of England and the crown, that commonly known now as the Bishop's Bible.

Coverdale's first Bible, issued in 1535, was followed by that of Matthews, in 1537, and two years later by the "Great Bible," printed by Richard Grafton. In 1540 appeared Cranmer's Bible, and for some years editions of all these were struck off and circulated among the Reformers. It was not, however, an easy matter to coin either new dogmas or a new set of religious terms that would suit all men. The refugees from England during Mary's reign sought refuge in Switzerland, and became thoroughly imbued with the doctrines of Calvin, of which, under Elizabeth, they were the earnest propagators in England.

They did not accept any of the Bibles then current, though Matthew's was so popular as to run through three editions in one year. They made a translation entirely in the Calvinistic sense, which was printed at Geneva, in 1560, by Rowland Hall, and they first boldly excluded the deutero-canonical books, hitherto retained in the English Bibles. This Geneva Bible in the hands of earnest men soon became so popular that, though Cranmer's continued to be printed, it was deemed necessary to revise that work. Under the direction of the famous Bishop Parker, a new edition was prepared, which it was fondly hoped would suit all. This was that known as the Bishop's Bible, first printed at London, by Richard Jugge, in 1568, a Cranmer and a Geneva appearing in the same year. The court and the Church of England used every effort to make the new Bible prevail. The Convocation of the Province of Canterbury ordered copies to be placed in every cathedral, and directed every church dignitary to expose a copy in his hall or dining-room for the use of the household and visitors.

Cranmer's Bible was indeed laid aside, but the Geneva was in the hands of men who were far more zealous than the adherents of the Church of England. Edition after edition appeared of both the Bishop's and the Geneva Bible through the century, and even into the next, the last edition of Parker's dating in 1606, when the translators of King James were busily engaged on the edition that was to supersede it, and only awaiting the appearance of the Douay to issue theirs.

At the time of the Roanoke settlement there were thus two Bibles in the hands of English Protestants, but from the whole tenor of Raleigh's life, and from the entire absence of any Puritan element in the colony, and the university breeding of Hariot, we are led to infer that the Bible used by him in the little settlement was a Bishop's Bible, perhaps the convenient octavo struck off in his old age by the veteran printer, Grafton.

Twelve years after this first introduction of the English Bible, two attempts were made to settle our coast. One party in the delightful month of May entered the Chesapeake, and running up the James, began a town near the site of a forgotten Spanish attempt. Then while the August sun flashed from the rocky coast and spray of Maine, another party, under George Popham, landed at the mouth of the Kennebec.

Both attempts at colonization were controlled by men of influence at court, adherents of the Church of England. In regard to Popham we may safely conjecture that the Bible he bore was a Bishop's Bible. So far as Virginia is concerned, there can be little doubt. The Rev. Robert Hunt, selected by Archbishop Bancroft, the opponent of the Calvinists, is declared by Wingfield, "not any to be touched with the rebellious humor of a papist spirit, nor blemished with the least suspicion of a factious schismatic." This clergyman lost all his library in an Indian attack, and he certainly would have been open to suspicion if that library contained the Geneva, instead of the accepted version of his Church.

The colony grew up strongly attached to the English Church and monarchy, and hostile to the Puritans, who at a later day, when arriving as settlers, were soon driven into adjacent colonies. Virginia was the home of the Bishop's Bible until the gradual popularity of the King James replaced it.

The Calvinist Pilgrims who landed at Plymouth, December 11th, 1620, were no readers of the Bishop's Bible. To them, and to the settlers at Massachusetts Bay, all that savored of the episcopacy was obnoxious. They might in words, say: "We esteem it our honor to call the Church of England, from whence we rise, our dear mother," but when John and Samuel Browne, two of the counsellors, wished to use the Book of Common Prayer, in 1629,

they were put on a ship and summarily sent back to England. Their Bible was undoubtedly the Geneva, and this version held its popularity among the non-conformists in England and America, down to the days of the Commonwealth. That the Genevan version prevailed exclusively in New England for many years is evident from the early sermons and treatises in which the quotations are from the Genevan, and not from the Bishop's or from the King James, although the latter was published nearly ten years before the settlement of Plymouth.

The Geneva Bible continued to be printed in England for the use of non-conformists to as late a date as 1644, and this was the Bible of the followers of Cromwell. The Soldier's Pocket Bible, issued by that leader, is made up entirely of extracts from the Genevan version. The editions were so numerous and so generally disseminated among the Puritan bodies, that copies are constantly met in the old New England families: in fact, in those parts even now copies of the "Breeches Bible," as that version is often called from a curious rendering in Genesis, are by no means uncommon.

Two Bibles thus appear to claim recognition as "the Bible" in America. A third came before many years elapsed. The colony which under Calvert settled Lord Baltimore's territory of Maryland, was to a considerable extent Catholic, and so far as a regular ministry is concerned, at first only Catholic. The settlers of the ancient faith and their devoted priests brought neither the Bishop's nor the Geneva Bible. They had one purer and nobler in its English, embodying all the time-honored religious language of our tongue, with all the books received by the majority of Christians throughout the world, an honest translation made from the Vulgate, which reproduces so faithfully the Septuagint and the earliest Greek manuscripts. They brought the grand old Douay-Rheims Bible, issued in the land of exile, amid difficulties and trials that compelled a delay of nearly thirty years between the first volume in 1582 and the third in 1610. This Douay Bible, introduced by Catholics in 1634, with occasional revisions, remains the Bible recognized by that body, now forming one-sixth of the population of the country, and claiming for their Bible a prescription of two centuries and a half on American soil, a prescription beyond that of any other version in use in the country.

These are the three Bibles first used among the English settlers on our coast. When then our orators "in turgid period and bombastic phrase," point to the Bible Society's volume as the Bible brought over by the Pilgrim founders of New England, the refrain of Holmes's poem, "The September Gale," rises involuntarily to the mind, and we are left in perplexity, as we often are, to determine

whether this is done in sheer ignorance or with a deliberate suppression of truth.

Even Strickland in the substantial octavo devoted to the history of the American Bible Society, thus ingeniously rather than ingenuously attempts to make out that the King James version was the version brought over by the Pilgrims, and used in early days in New England. "Only nine years previous to the landing of the Pilgrims the translation of the Bible by King James had been made, and the edict by Henry VIII. which restricted its reading to royalty, and barred access to all the rest of mankind with few exceptions, was revoked, and the living oracles were opened to all who could procure them. The 'May Flower' was freighted with the precious legacy of heaven, and the dim eye of age together with the flashing eye of youth, caught new fire in poring over its sacred pages, and even melted at the recital of its messages of mercy and love."

Strickland quietly ignores the Bishop's Bible and the Geneva, with their numerous and almost yearly editions, and leads his readers to suppose the King James as eagerly sought by all, the first Bible accessible. In fact, however, the King James gained ground very slowly. It was not reprinted as rapidly in the ten or twenty years succeeding its issue as the Geneva had been during the decade or two preceding that event. The judges of the Scotch Court of Sessions in 1826 well observed: "The translation of the Bible now in use was that of King James, but had it been proclaimed by authority as the only one to be adopted, it would have been rejected by all the sects then in England, but he wisely left it to find its own way." It does not seem to have become popular until during the Commonwealth editions of it were printed with notes from the Geneva Bible as a kind of compromise. It was not till the reign of Charles II. that advantage was taken of the fact that most of the Geneva Bibles were struck off hurriedly and with almost criminal negligence, to introduce a thorough reform.

It is said that a bishop having to preach on some public day, obtained a small Bible on his way to the church, but on opening it in his pulpit was thunderstruck to find that his text was missing from its pages. Further examination showed it to teem with errors. He brought the matter before the King, and the result was that the exclusive privilege of printing Bibles was reserved to the universities and specially appointed printers.

From that period the King James version, which, like the Great Bible, Cranmer's, and the Bishop's Bibles, still retained the deutero-canonical books, has been exclusively printed in England. And within a few years the official printers were severely censured for omitting the deutero-canonical books in some of their Bibles. In

the eye of the English law no Bible is the whole Bible without them, so that by the standard of the English Government the American Bible Society has issued no Bibles at all. Then the printing of the Geneva version ceased, and as the old copies had from time to time to be replaced, the Puritans of New England and those scattered in the other colonies were forced from actual necessity to purchase the royal and prelatical version of the malignants, which they had hitherto loathed, and to take it, deutero-canonical books and all. There are few more strange things than to see their descendants boasting over a modified edition of that Bible as that once introduced by their ancestors.

The writings of the time show that during the days of the Commonwealth the Geneva or Breeches Bible was still the choice of New England. The King James Bibles were introduced into Virginia and apparently in small numbers, but from the Restoration it gradually supplanted the other versions, and during the last century was that in general use among the Protestant colonists, the Catholics adhering to their time-honored Douay, of which within a few years the writer has met three early copies in old American Catholic families.

The position of the Bible in colonial times is another curious point. The New England churches, though professing a love for the Church of England, which does not look sincere, rejected her ministry and her Book of Common Prayer. The service in that book, like that in the Missal and Breviary of the Catholic Church, from which it was drawn, is mainly scriptural. It has its psalms, lessons, epistle, and gospel for the day. That service was read by the clergy in Virginia, so that the people had some portion of the Bible read to them during divine worship. The Catholics in Maryland had portions of their Douay Bible read to them, and read the Psalms at the vesper service, but the Puritans of New England had an utterly non-scriptural service. It is admitted among writers in that section that the service was made up of preaching, prayer, and the singing of the Psalms in metre, while reading of any appointed or selected part of Scripture formed no part of their worship.

At a later day the Labbadists, Dankers and Sluyter, describe the service as they saw it in Boston in 1680. "We went into the church, where, in the first place, a minister made a prayer in the pulpit of full two hours' length, after which an old minister delivered a sermon an hour long, and after that a prayer was made and some verses sung out of the Psalms. In the afternoon three or four hours were consumed with nothing except prayers, three ministers relieving each other alternately; when one was tired another went up into the pulpit. There was no more devotion than in other churches, and even less than at New York. No respect, no

everence. In a word nothing but the name of Independents, and that was all."

But if the Bible was not read in the New England meeting-house it had a place in the school. The Massachusetts Order of 1647, Connecticut Code 1650, establishing schools, begins: "It being one chief project of that old deluder Satan to keep men from the knowledge of the Scriptures," and a New Haven ordinance as to children's education directs endeavor to be made "that all their children and apprentices, as they grow capable, may, through God's blessing, attain at least so much as to be able to read the Scriptures." The reading of the Bible was the aim of the education, which was essentially religious, as the New England Primer shows; that little volume not only has an abridged catechism, but imbrues the very letters with doctrine, teaching original sin with the letter A. "In Adam's fall we sinned all."

It is, therefore, by no means surprising that the Bible gradually made its way into schools, but it was there only as a convenience, not as a book of moral and religious teaching.

Noah Webster, in a rare and curious volume, *A Collection of Essays and Fugitive Writings, Moral, Historical, Political, and Literary* (Boston, 1790), has a paragraph on the "Use of the Bible in Skool," and as the volume meets the eye of few with its queer proposed reforms in spelling, we cite the passage at length. As this was written before any discussion had arisen in this country on the subject of the use of the Bible in schools, and is from one who knew New England well, it deserves additional consideration.

"There is one general practice in schools," says Webster, "which I censure with diffidence, not because I doubt the propriety of the censure, but because it is opposed to deep-rooted prejudices; this practice is the use of the Bible as a schoolbook. There are two reasons why this practice has so generally prevailed: The first is, that the families in the country are not generally supplied with any other book. The second, an opinion that the reading of the Scriptures will impress upon the minds of youth the important truths of religion and morality. The first may be easily removed, and the purpose of the last is counteracted by the practice itself.

"If people design the doctrines of the Bible as a system of religion, ought they to appropriate the book to purposes foreign to this design? Will not a familiarity, contracted by a careless, disrespectful reading of the sacred volume, weaken the influence of its precepts upon the heart? . . .

"Objects that affect the mind strongly, whether the sensations they excite are painful or pleasurable, always lose their effects by a frequent repetition of their impressions. Those parts of the

Scriptures, therefore, which are calculated to strike terror to the mind, lose their influence by being too frequently brought into view. The same objection will not apply to the history and morality of the Bible, select passages of which may be read in schools to great advantage. In some countries the common people are not permitted to read the Bible at all. In ours it is as common as a newspaper, and in schools is read with nearly the same degree of respect. Both these practices appear to be extremes. My wish is not to see the Bible excluded from schools, but to see it used as a system of religion and morality."

Such is his testimony as to the origin of the introduction of the Bible into the New England schools, and the consequent loss of respect for it in the last century. When we consider that the children, to whom the Bible was merely one of the seldom loved schoolbooks, rarely heard the sacred volume reverently read in the pulpit, we can believe Webster's strictures correct.

All the Bibles used in this country in colonial times were printed in Europe, whether Genevan, Bishop's, King James's, or Douay. No English Bible, no Testament, no separate book of the Scriptures, was printed in the colonies during the British rule. The various editions, except the Douay, were freely printed in England, and in such numbers that the price was too low to justify any American competition. The Douay Bible was under the ban of the English law. It was printed on the continent, imported by stealth, its sale subjected the dealer to imprisonment and even to death, and copies when discovered were undoubtedly burned by the hangman. This was the fate of other Catholic books, even in the days of Charles I. Thomas Hearne, the antiquarian, records the fate of an edition of *An Introduction to a Devout Life*, by St. Francis de Sales: "Archbishop Laud had the copies, about eleven or twelve hundred, seized, and caused them to be burned publicly in Smithfield." Catholic Bibles met doubtless the same fate in the American colonies, Maryland and New York, for a time under Catholic rule, excepted. The spirit which sent the Catholic Bible to the flames in England by the hands of the hangman was not unknown here. The Bibles, as well as all other books, of the Jesuit Fathers in Maryland were burned by the Puritans in 1652, after the defeat of Stone; and in 1703 an Episcopal clergyman, Rev. Edward Mars-ton, records in a letter to Rev. Dr. Bray this fact of Governor Moore's invasion of Florida: "To show what friends some of them are to learning and books, when they were at St. Augustine they burnt a library of books worth about £600, wherein were a collection of the Greek and Latin Fathers; and the Holy Bible itself did not escape, because it was in Latin. This outrage was done as soon as they arrived, by the order of Colonel Daniel."

The first Bible printed in the colonies was Eliot's Indian Bible, which issued from the press at Cambridge, in 1663. It is a wonderful monument of the zeal and perseverance of John Eliot, whose lifelong devotion to the cause of the Indian missions has won him among American writers the title of Apostle. This work of wonderful difficulty, presented by a translation of the Bible into an Indian dialect with its limited vocabulary and utter want of abstract terms, was accomplished by Eliot in eight years. The cost of printing was borne by the society known as the corporation established in England for the Propagation of the Gospel amongst the Indians in New England. Of the edition many copies were sent to Europe and distributed as presents among the learned in various parts. All scholars recognized in it a work of immense study and toil. Spain, with her vast transatlantic territories, in her ignorance of the range of the dialect and even of the language in which Eliot wrote, took alarm. The Spanish king beheld in imagination Protestant missionaries armed with Eliot's Indian Bible preaching from it to the people of Mexico and Peru. He appealed to Rome, and the brief of Pope Clement XI. to the Archbishop of Saragossa in 1709 evidently refers to Eliot's Bible.

The New Testament alone had been printed in 1661, and was reprinted in 1680, as the Old Testament was five years subsequently.

The gospel of St. John in Natick, and three chapters of Genesis in Mohawk, comprise all other issues in the colonies, even in Indian dialects.

Cotton Mather prepared a *Biblia Americana*, to form two folio volumes, but his proposals, though issued in America and then in England, met with no response, and the manuscript slumbers now in the collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society. The proposals issued in January, 1688, by William Bradford, Philadelphia's first printer, were equally unsupported; but it is curious that this project of issuing the first English Bible in the colonies was made by a Quaker printer under a Catholic king.

But if Bradford failed, another citizen of Pennsylvania, Christopher Saur, of Germantown, an earnest, persevering German, found among his generally poor countrymen a better support; he issued in 1743 a quarto edition of Luther's German Bible, containing all the deutero-canonical books, as well as the third and fourth books of Esdras, and the third Macchabees. He reprinted it in 1763, and his son was issuing a third edition in 1776, when the British occupied Germantown, and most of the sheets were destroyed. Saur issued also several editions of the New Testament for the use of his countrymen.

This constituted, down to the close of the colonial period, all

publications of the Bible or any part of it. Of the extent to which Bibles and Testaments were imported there is no means of ascertaining. The books of old merchants show both on their invoices, and the writer remembers seeing, years ago, in the journal of Robert and John Murray, the original owners of Murray's Hill, a bill of goods to a dealer in the Mohawk Valley, about 1760, in which both Bibles and scalping-knives were charged. One edition of the Bible is said to have been surreptitiously printed at Boston with an English imprint, but the fact is disputed. A Bible printed in Germany, in 1775, had evidently subscribers in America, as some copies have an imprint stating that it is for sale in Philadelphia. So, too, names of American subscribers appear in Bishop Challoner's revised Douay.

The position of the Bible in colonial times was not then exactly what fancy has so often pictured it. Banished from the New England meeting-house, it was used in the schools, not as the inspired word of God, but as a convenient reading-book. The only edition attainable in the last century being one that the founders of New England detested, tended perhaps to deprive it of respect. In the other colonies, the Episcopalians, Dutch and Germans, made more use of the Bible in their worship, but it nowhere had the dominant influence which is often ascribed to it. At the same time a strong hatred of the Vulgate, and of any translation from it, whether in English, French, or Spanish, was general. There was a total want of popular expositions or works to throw light on the whole Bible or its parts and make its perusal intelligible to the masses.

The Revolution brought many changes. The difficulty of communication with Europe, the non-intercourse with England, the movement, strongly anti-Catholic at first, toned down and modified by an alliance with a Catholic power, as well as a prevailing spirit of infidelity, all seemed to menace the religious ideas of the colonies. But there was still a religious tone, and it led, in 1777, to the issue of the first English Testament. It was printed in Philadelphia, by R. Aitkin, and in each successive year an edition appeared. But the publication of the Bible was an undertaking on which no printer of the time durst venture. At last, in 1781, Aitkin announced in a petition to Congress that he had resolved to make the attempt. The associated ministers of Boston prepared a plan for the publication of a Bible by the General Court of Massachusetts, but the difficulties were deemed insurmountable. It was declared that all the printers in Boston together had not type sufficient, and that fit paper could be procured only from Europe, while Bibles were imported from Holland at a far lower rate than they could be produced here. Yet Aitkin was not discouraged; a committee of Congress recommended his project to its chaplains, who indorsed its general

accuracy. Upon this the Continental Congress approved by resolution "the pious and laudable undertaking of Mr. Aitkin," and recommended the edition to the inhabitants of the United States. The recommendation, however, bore little fruit, the ensuing peace opened our ports to Bibles printed in Europe, and Aitkin was nearly ruined. Indeed, an appeal was made to the Synod at Philadelphia to aid in circulating his edition.

This English Bible, the Congress Bible, was the first printed within the territories of the United States, and the whole action shows how loath people were to sever the union between Church and State or rely on themselves in religious matters. The indifference of English-speaking Protestants to the Bible must have been great at the time, to make the issue of an edition of the Scriptures for their use so ruinous a work. This indifference is all the more glaring when we consider the editions published by Saur for circulation among the German emigrants, few of whom were at all wealthy, and was made still more striking by the fact that in January, 1789, Mathew Carey issued proposals for the publication of the Douay Bible, and actually issued it in the following year, without calling upon Congress or any State legislature for aid. The small body of Catholics in the country took up the edition so readily that Carey, instead of appealing for influence to save him from bankruptcy, issued after a few years another edition. This Catholic edition was all the more costly, as it was complete, while Aitkin's was mutilated, omitting the deutero-canonical books, and Carey's contained notes.

Carey's was thoroughly American, the type cast here, the paper and binding alike American. It was the first quarto Bible issued in the country. Bibliographers had generally overlooked it, and when the writer called the attention of Bible collectors to the fact of a Catholic edition in 1790, he found it no easy matter to convince some that the book was really American, no allusion to it being found even in Archdeacon Cotton's elaborate work.

Bible printing having once begun, was taken by printers in various parts, Protestant, Catholic, and even Jew, some trusting to their own business ability, some like Hodge, Allen, and Campbell, of New York, seeking State indorsement. But this free circulation of the Bible without their control did not please the Protestant clergy. In 1790 the Convention of the Congregational Ministers of Massachusetts petitioned Congress "to take such measures as the Constitution may permit that no edition of the Bible or its translation be published in America without its being carefully inspected and certified to be free from error." The Baptists followed the same course and sent a similar petition to Congress, but

the adoption of the amendments of the Constitution made it impossible for the General Government to interfere in the matter.

Yet it is evident that the ideas of accuracy entertained by these gentlemen extended simply to getting a number of editions together and taking the reading found in most. Any general error like that of "strain at a gnat" for "strain out a gnat," was left untouched and uncorrected, and has been to this day. The Geneva and Bishop's Bibles were forgotten, and it does not seem to have entered their minds that at the opening of the nineteenth century a purer Hebrew and Greek text could be found to translate from, or more impartial or unbiased translators than those of King James. In their eyes, as in the eyes of many now, this translation of 1611 stands not as a version of a wretched text by biased sycophants of a voluptuous king, but as the direct revealed word of God.

The first independent translation made in the country was that of Charles Thomson, secretary of the Continental Congress during its whole existence. He made a translation from the Septuagint, the first English version, and completed his work by a translation of the New Testament. This version appeared in 1808, and is as scarce as he found the Septuagint to be in his time.

After the organization of the British and Foreign Bible Society, associations on the same plan were organized in several States, and began to circulate copies of the common Bibles and Testaments. The New York Bible Society printed a Protestant version of the Bible in French in 1815, and of the King James (suppressing the deutero-canonical books) in the following year. Catholics had anticipated them by publishing a French Testament at Boston in 1810.

Movements were soon made for the establishment of a general society to cover the whole country. In May, 1816, a meeting was held in New York under the guidance of Hon. Elias Boudinot, the last President of the Continental Congress, and at this time President of the New Jersey Bible Society. This led to the organization of the American Bible Society, with Hon. Elias Boudinot as President, on the 11th of May, and many of the prominent men of the country as Vice-Presidents. The sole object was declared to be "to encourage a wider circulation of the Holy Scriptures, without note or comment. The only copies in the English language to be circulated by the Society shall be of the version now in common use."

The society apparently acquired the stereotype plates of the New York society, and began to produce others for English Bibles and Testaments, as well as for the Gospel of St. John in Mohawk and the Epistles of St. John in Delaware. In 1819 they printed a Spanish Testament, a Catholic version by F. Felipe Scio de San

Miguel, Bishop-elect of Segovia, omitting, however, the notes. This was of course intended for circulation in Spanish America, and was followed by the whole Bible in 1824, printed entire with all the deutero-canonical books, but without notes. A French Catholic Testament and a Portuguese Testament, both without notes, were similarly produced. It was soon evident that these were to be used as a mask for attacking the Catholic religion, and that the Society, itself a result of the reaction against the English deistical and infidel tone of the last century, hoped to live by exciting the most envenomed hate of Catholicity. It is impossible to peruse Strickland's *History of the American Bible Society* without being struck with that frenetic hatred of Catholics which seems to carry men away beyond the control of reason or conscience, and vividly impresses one with the idea of satanic possession.

This appeal to anti-Catholic prejudice doubtless gave this Society a strong claim, and few societies have ever met a warmer or more persistent support. The list of legacies, often of thousands and tens of thousands of dollars, fills pages, and amounts to millions of dollars; that of donations is almost as great. A large building was erected in Nassau Street, New York, where its business was conducted till the premises proved too contracted, and the present Bible House, on Fourth Avenue, was erected, covering a whole square. By 1855 the Society had circulated nearly eleven millions of Bibles and Testaments, and the issues of the last quarter of a century have been far greater.

The King James Bible was adopted as a standard, but as the question of the deutero-canonical books had been warmly debated in England it was resolved to exclude them from issues of the Society, and they never appeared except in the early editions of the Spanish Bible. As the Society has supplied the greater part of the Bibles in the hands of the people, it has thus deliberately withheld a part of God's revealed Word. They certainly do not claim infallibility or insist that their decision of the non-inspiration of these books can be free from error. The books suppressed are received as inspired by the Latin, Greek, Armenian, Chaldean, and Coptic churches, forming the great mass of Christianity, and have been so received from time immemorial. They will admit that if inspired their deliberate rejection is a sin against the Holy Ghost of the deepest character, and they never can feel absolute certainty that they have not committed such a sin.

The consequence of this suppression is that millions have grown up in utter ignorance of these books. Many even of the Protestant clergy have never read a line of them or can assign any reason for their suppression. Strangely enough, the exclusion extends even to the book of Ecclesiasticus, which is extant in Hebrew and was

rejected by the Masora doctors because it seemed to teach the doctrine of a Trinity.

A most extraordinary example of ministerial ignorance is shown in Cheever's *Wanderings in the Shadow of the Jungfrau*. He was compelled to spend a Sunday in a little Swiss inn where he could find no English work except the Book of Common Prayer, of the contents of which he seems to have been till then utterly ignorant, though we had, till reading his volume, imagined an acquaintance with it almost a necessary part of a liberal education. He found much to admire, and was enraptured with the Canticle of the Three Children. When he came to "Ananias, Azarias, and Misael, bless ye the Lord," he was perplexed. Carried away by its beauties, he had even admired, "O ye spirits and souls of the just, bless ye the Lord," but of Ananias and his companions he knew nothing, and expresses the opinion that they were some Popish saints. The man never dreamed that he was reading part of the book of Daniel.

The issuing of a Spanish Catholic Bible containing as inspired books which they withheld from English readers as uninspired, French, Spanish, and Portuguese Testaments which contained the genuine Lord's Prayer, while in English they gave only the concededly spurious form, and passages strictly translated which, in the King James, were trimmed to favor Protestant views, was too glaring long to escape scrutiny, especially when the motto on their Spanish Bible instantly suggested the necessity of scrutiny.

The Rev. Mr. Varela, in an article on "The Three Bibles," asked which the Society considered the Word of God. If the Spanish Bible was, why not give it to the people of this country in English; if it was not, why give it to Spaniards? A lame reply was made that the books rejected by Protestants were printed "as a mere compliment to the Spaniards," and that, moreover, there was no substantial difference between these English and Spanish Bibles. This was too flimsy. There was no room for compliment when you presented a book and said: This is the Word of God. Protestant controversialists had assailed the Catholic canon, text, versions, Lord's Prayer, too often and too fiercely to be told by a Protestant Society that there was really no substantial difference. These polemic gentlemen published an edition of the Rheims Testament, pretending to be a reprint of the original edition of 1582, and even certified as such, by men who never should have stooped to such conduct, but really reprinted from Fulke's Confutation. They got it up to show what terrible things the Catholic versions were, and could scarcely be expected now to say anything in their favor in order to save the credit of the Bible Society.

The Society was forced to adopt some course. As the London Society had just resolved not to issue, in any language, the books

they designate as Apocryphal, the New York Society followed their example. The fourth edition of Spanish Bible was issued without the deutero-canonical books, in 1826, although the names were retained in the list of books, and not a word was said to intimate to any purchaser that the volume was not really Scio's Bible complete. We were the victims of a similar fraud on the part of the Bagsters, of London. On importing one of their Latin Bibles, which on the title-page professed to be the Bible according to the Latin Vulgate as issued by Sixtus V., we certainly supposed it to be what it professed, but on opening it Ecclesiasticus, Wisdom, Judith, Tobias, the Macchabees, part of Daniel and Baruch were missing. In a later edition of the Spanish Bible, however, the list agreed with the real contents of the volume.

Rev. Mr. Varela followed up with a comparison of five different Bibles, issued by the Society, showing what varying doctrines were set forth. "The five different Bibles" led to discussion. The Society finally resolved to suppress its Catholic versions entirely and have new translations made in foreign languages which would conform to the King James as issued by them. The stereotype plates of their Catholic editions were accordingly melted up, and the remainders of the editions burned on their premises, thus committing to the flames thousands of copies of the Word of God. No word of censure was raised at the act, it was considered simply a matter of course, but when, about the same period, a French Canadian priest who crossed the boundary to labor among some of his expatriated countrymen, settled in New York, burned a few copies of a French Protestant Bible which had been distributed by men seeking to win them over to Protestantism, the whole country rang with denunciations. Yet the first Bible-burning was done at St. Augustine by the Protestants, the greatest in New York by the same, and the fine editions of the Scriptures and commentaries in St. Augustine's Church in Philadelphia in 1844 by the same.

Though the Society had thus made King James a standard for all the world, all the world were not disposed to accept it. John Gorham Palfrey had like Thomson gone to the Greek. The critical work of scholars had shown that the received Greek text was one utterly unsupported by the best and earliest manuscripts. The Vatican Codex and the Sinaitic were not yet printed, but Griesbach had reached results which those precious relics confirmed. Mr. Palfrey in 1828 issued a New Testament in which the current version was made to agree with Griesbach's text.

A still greater question arose in 1835, when a translation of the New Testament into Bengalee sought publication at the hands of the Society. The translator was a Baptist, and in place of carrying the Greek words baptize, etc., into Bengalee, had given a term

equivalent to *immerse* in English. The American Bible Society had issued editions of Luther's text in which St. John was not called Baptist but *Tanfer*, a word of the same origin and meaning as our *Dipper*; but to have him so called in Bengalee was not permissible. They had already unwittingly published a Burmese Testament, in which the Baptist translators had rendered the word according to their views. The Society, however, now held, in their final resolve, that all translations must comport "with the obvious intention of the authorized English version."

The Baptists on this withdrew from the Society, and organized "The American and Foreign Bible Society," in 1837, with the avowed object of promoting "a wider circulation of the Holy Scriptures in the most faithful versions that could be procured." It was the first important step to free the Bible from the fetters of King James. Out of this movement grew, in 1850, "The American Bible Union," which at once undertook the preparation of a new translation, based on the most accurate text of the original books that could be procured. The translators proceeded to their work calmly, and from time to time published different books in a separate form, giving the revised text, the King James translation, and their own, with critical notes to support their version. The New Testament was completed, but the Old is still, we believe, unfinished; the war and other causes diminished the resources on which the translators and editors depended while engaged on their labors. What they accomplished was highly creditable, as an honest attempt to give a fair translation from a correct text. The Lord's Prayer was brought back to the Vulgate form, many mis-translations corrected, and many more Douay renderings adopted than had been by King James's translators. Their New Testament has been published in a cheap form, but has not apparently met with many adherents.

The effort, however, attracted general attention, and within a few years a body has gathered in England, though not appointed by the English government or Church, which is at this moment engaged on a revised translation. Time must show whether their labors will be acceptable in England, and whether they are to be welcomed here.

It will be a work of great difficulty to introduce a new version, and it will necessarily destroy the value of the stereotype plates owned by the American Bible Society, and by publishers in all parts, while the work of the Bible Society has so impressed the people with the idea that their version is in a manner directly inspired as to render it almost impossible to make the masses believe it to be so faulty as to require a substitute.

Catholics are wedded to no version. The Douay, as edited by

Bishop Challoner, modified by the judgment of other editors, has circulated in this country; and a thorough version, in fact a new translation, was made by the late Archbishop Kenrick, of Baltimore, and issued for the examination of his brethren in the hierarchy and the clergy, with a view to ultimate adoption. Death prevented the issue of an edition with notes for general use. There is a tendency towards a new translation, yet a strict return to the old Douay would have many advantages, the translation being very accurate and the language of the best period of English literature, with all the old religious expressions of Catholic England.

The early New England schools were religious, and as we have seen the Bible was introduced there as a schoolbook. The early schools in New York and other colonies were also connected with the churches, and gave a religious training. About the beginning of the century the Public School Society was formed, the object being, as avowed in its charter, to take charge of children whose parents belonged to no particular Church, and thus were not reached by any of the Church schools. They adopted the common systems of education, the schoolbooks were strongly anti-Catholic, and the Protestant Bible and prayers used. The schools were well managed and drew greatly from the Church schools, receiving aid from the city in proportion to the number of children. The attempt of the Bethel Baptist Church School to obtain more than a fair allowance drew discredit on the Church schools, and in time all subsidy was withdrawn from them, and the public schools, though under private control, were virtually supported by a tax on all citizens.

A movement was made by the Catholic body in 1840 to obtain a restoration of the ancient subsidy to their Church schools, based on the ground that the public schools were sectarian, and compelled Catholic children attending them to learn as truth and fact libels on their own faith, and to join in religious services condemned by their Church. The Catholics took the broad ground that if the State aided education, it could not require the citizen to sacrifice his conscientious religious dictates, that the parent of the pupil should be free to enjoy what he was taxed for, and the pupil entitled to an education that did not militate with his faith. The Catholic appeal was rejected. The school question took its place in American affairs. One result was a reform in the whole system of public schools; they became absolutely State concerns, the textbooks have been more or less improved, though many are still such that no Catholic can conscientiously permit his children to learn. But the great battle has been the determination of a fanatical element to maintain the reading of some form of Protestant Bible in the schools. This has from time to time brought the

matter into the courts, and is a constant subject of discussion in legislatures and educational boards. In Cincinnati the case was, perhaps, argued more at length than in other places, but there, as elsewhere, it was taken for granted that the issues of the American Bible Society must be taken as *the Bible*. That version does not correspond with the edition published by King James, in 1611, either in the books, the preface, the headings, or the text. It has no authority but that of the Society. It is not that originally introduced in New England or Virginia. It is based on a very erroneous text, and is the work of biased translators. On both sides of the Atlantic studious men are engaged on a revision. If the courts hold that which is now losing its grasp on the minds of men to be the Bible, what will they hold as to a more correct and honest one? If it has no legal authority to usurp exclusively the title of the Bible, why is it to be adopted rather than the three oldest versions brought into the country?

In courts of justice a Protestant Bible is almost always used for putting the oath to witnesses. To make the insult to Catholics the greater a black cross is generally made on one side, and this side tendered to any one known or suspected to be a Catholic. In many States any one can at his option swear with the uplifted hand in the presence of the ever-living God, and this Catholics should generally adopt. Sometimes, however, the bench will be filled by one, as overbearing as ignorant, who will insist on a Catholic's swearing on the parody lying on the desk. Such a case occurred a few years ago, in Boston, where a Catholic witness was committed for contempt of court by a judge who probably was ignorant of the fact that the early New England settlers carefully avoided swearing on the Bible as a superstition and swore "by the great and dreadful name of the ever-living God," kissing and touching no book, not even their prized Geneva Bible.

The Catholic stood exactly on the practice of the early Puritans, and the judge who condemned him committed himself more completely than he did the American citizen whose rights he invaded.

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## THE MERCERSBURG MOVEMENT.

AN ATTEMPT TO FIND GROUND ON WHICH PROTESTANTISM AND CATHOLICITY MIGHT UNITE.

*Introduction to Schaff's Principle of Protestantism.* By John W. Nevin, D.D. Publication Office of German Reformed Church, 1845.

*Antichrist; or the Spirit of Sect and Schism.* By John W. Nevin, President of Marshall College. New York: John S. Taylor, 1848.

*The Mercersburg Review, 1849-56.*

SOON after Tractarianism acquired prominence in England a movement began in this country, which in some respects pursued a parallel course, and brought about somewhat similar results. It is erroneously regarded, by those who are not familiarly acquainted with it, as an offshoot from Tractarianism transplanted into American soil, and is commonly known as "Mercersburgism," from the place where the movement started, or as "Nevinism," from Dr. John W. Nevin, its acknowledged leader and head.

Tractarianism started in the bosom of the English Church established by law, among men whose design was not to weaken, much less to destroy, the Establishment, but to strengthen it. Erastianism—the doctrine that the State comprehends within itself all spiritual as well as secular authority, and is the dispenser of all spiritual powers and functions—was the great enemy which the Tractarians set out to oppose. Their leading purpose, at first, was to show that ecclesiastical authority in the Establishment rested on the immovable foundation laid by Christ, and not upon one which the English Crown and Parliament had framed and put together. They taught that the Church of Christ in England was the National Establishment in which it existed, and "was brought into effect in the form of a continuous dynasty and hereditary power, which had descended from the Apostles;" but that the ancient religion of the early Church Fathers, which the Tractarians supposed was substantially the same with Anglicanism, had, to a great extent, disappeared; and the special work which they would set about performing was to restore the ancient religion, to institute a second Reformation, which would be a return not to the sixteenth century, but to primitive Christianity.

How in their studies of the first Christian ages the leaders and chief workers in the Tractarian movement were carried beyond their original design, and brought face to face with the fact that

Anglicanism was not only not identical with Christianity in those ages, but was utterly irreconcilable with it; how their appeals to the ancient faith only subjected Anglicanism to more hopeless condemnation, as both heretical and schismatic; how the antiquity which they invoked declared in all its utterances the supreme primacy of Peter, and vindicated the claim of the Church built on him to possessing solely and alone the notes of the true Church; how when confronted with these unexpected results of their own investigations, the Tractarians became divided against themselves; how some few of them, following the light and corresponding with the grace given them, were brought into the Holy Catholic Church; how others, endeavoring to maintain their premises whilst they denied the consequences legitimately resulting from those premises, became illogical extremists and mere dreamers; and how still others, when confronted with the plain alternatives, Rome or Rationalism, chose the latter—have now already become facts of history.

The Mercersburg movement began with ideas that differed in some respects very widely from those with which Tractarianism started. The Mercersburg men were Presbyterians as regards their notions of the Christian "ministry" and ecclesiastical government. They were Americans, not Englishmen, and consequently were not embarrassed, as the Tractarians were, with questions growing out of the claim of the English government to supremacy in things spiritual as well as secular; neither had they the impossible problem with which the Tractarians were constantly confronted, of reconciling with opposing facts the preposterous assumption that Anglican "bishops" were true successors of the Apostles by an unbroken line of descent. The question which agitated the minds of the Mercersburg men was not concerned simply with this or that doctrine of Christianity, not a question of hierarchical powers and authority,<sup>1</sup> not simply about this or that fact in the history of the Church, not about details of the ritual, or of the number and nature of the sacraments; the question with the Mercersburg men was, How could Protestantism under any of its forms be cleared of the charge of being a schismatic movement, an act of rebellion against the Church of Christ, of separation from the one fold and communion which Christ established? Mercersburg sought therefore not to carry Protestantism back to the Christianity of the first ages of the Church and shape it into a likeness of Christianity in

<sup>1</sup> The Mercersburg men argued correctly that even if the "bishops" of the Anglican Establishment could trace back an unbroken line of episcopal ordination to the first ages of the Church, they still would have to defend themselves against the charge of being both heretics and schismatics; that the Arians and Nestorians had validly ordained Bishops, but, nevertheless, had been excommunicated on account of their heresies, and their revolt against the authority of the Church.

those ages. It advocated not a going back to former ages, but an advance upon them all, primitive and mediaeval; not a restoration simply of the old, but a higher and fuller development both of what once was and of what now is. It not only frankly admitted, but it fiercely contended that Protestantism has not only not realized all that belongs to Christianity, but in some things has travestied and misrepresented it, and in others has exhibited its truths only in a onesided and partial manner. In this, however, Mercersburg did not intend to pronounce sentence of condemnation upon Protestantism, but simply to make good its own theory, that not in the past nor yet in the present, but only in the future, were we to expect that the Church would understand and actualize the fulness of divine revelation, and to enforce the practical conclusion deduced from this theory, that, to help forward the process of development by which the Church would come to realize all that was involved in her mission, it was necessary for earnest Christians to strive to apprehend and unhesitatingly to acknowledge and proclaim all that was true and good in the Christianity of past ages, in order that it might be taken up and preserved and actualized in the present, in order that the way might thus be cleared and straightened for more rapid progress towards that fuller comprehension of truth which was to be expected and looked for in the future. Hence while the Mercersburg men held that "Romanism" as a system involved vast errors, they also insisted that it had preserved most important truths, truths which Protestantism ought not only not to deny or ignore, but ought to freely confess and incorporate into itself. The ground and first cause of these ideas, so far as they can be traced to distinct processes of thought, was a profound conviction that Protestantism, not merely in some of its countless divisions, but as a system, was rapidly disintegrating, that this was mainly due to "sectism," which many Protestants mistakenly imagined was its crowning glory, that "sectism" itself was but the legitimate practical consequence of the "private judgment" theory, that this was destructive of all ecclesiastical authority, of all unity of doctrine, and turned "the Bible" itself into a "mere nose of wax," and that, unless some remedy could be found for this radical evil and error, Protestantism would inevitably dissolve into individualism and lose even the semblance of coherency which it still possessed.

The Mercersburg movement, like the Tractarian, insisted that the Church is no human society but a divine institution, clothed with a real authority, and that this authority is divine; that the Church is one, continuously existing, and indefectible; that its "ministry" has no human origin, but originates in Christ, that the functions and powers of that "ministry" are derived from Christ in

virtue of the commission of Christ to the Apostles, which has perpetual force and validity; that specially among these functions are those of teaching, ruling, and offering sacrifice, or as the Mercersburg men expressed it, "prophetical, priestly, and kingly" functions. They fiercely denounced, as we have already intimated, the "private judgment" theory, and advocated the submission of the individual judgment to Church authority. They insisted that the sacraments were real channels of grace. They formally acknowledge but two, Baptism and the Eucharist. They maintained that the first is the implantation of a new life and the last a real sacrifice in which our divine Lord is actually and truly present.<sup>1</sup> As regards Confirmation, Orders, and Marriage, while they did not claim that these were sacraments, yet they believed that they had a sacramental character, insisting that grace was really bestowed through the two first, and that the latter should only be solemnized by a Christian minister, and constituted an indissoluble relation between the persons married. Like the Tractarians, the Mercersburg men advocated religious education, and a decent and becoming ritual in divine worship.

But while "Mercersburgism" or "Nevinism" resembled Tractarianism in the respects just mentioned, there were points on which they differed widely. In their respective theories of the history of Christianity they were directly antagonistic. The Mercersburg men scouted the notion of the Tractarians (who on that point were in full sympathy and agreement with the most ultra Protestants) that the Church at some indefinable time in the fourth, fifth, or sixth centuries fell away from the truth and became the synagogue of Satan; that the only certain way to recovering the truth and restoring the Church to its pristine purity was to bridge a chasm of more than a thousand years, and by materials brought over from the "primitive Church" and built into that of the present, to strengthen and renovate the crumbling structure. The Mercersburg men had no sympathy with any such theory of "restitution." They denounced it as worse than an idle dream, as an impious supposition, to imagine that Christ for ten or twelve hundred years had deserted His Church and let her become the bond slave of the devil; they insisted that, call the characteristic features and ruling principles of the Church of the first ages what you will, the Church of the middle ages was but a continuation and development of the Church of the first centuries; and that Protestantism, to vindicate its claim to being the true heir to the inheritance be-

<sup>1</sup> The Mercersburg men did not believe in Transubstantiation. They distinguished between the presence of our Lord under the sacramental veil in the Consecrated Host, and in the "sacramental transaction."

stowed by Christ upon His Church, its title to the possession of the functions, privileges, powers, blessings, and constant protection included in Christ's promises and perpetual presence, must trace back its ancestral descent from primitive Christianity by an unbroken chain through the Church of mediaeval times. The Mercersburg men, therefore, vindicated the Church of the middle ages from many of the aspersions which the Tractarians as well as more ultra Protestants cast upon it; they defended the Papacy on historical grounds; they eulogized the great Saints and Doctors of mediaeval times, and held up to view for admiration the work of the Church during those times in converting from heathenism the rude tribes of Europe, in changing them from ignorant, fierce, and cruel barbarians into educated, humane peoples; in reconstructing society, establishing laws, and forming out of materials dug from the ruins of ancient civilizations, and united to those existing amongst the barbarians whom the Church subjugated to her clement rule, a civilization that transcends inconceivably in its beneficent influences the civilization of ancient heathendom in its palmiest days.<sup>1</sup>

The Tractarian movement, turning its back upon the Catholic Church of the present, or glaring at her as a hated rival, sought to reshape and change the English Establishment into an exact pattern of the Church of the first ages. The Mercersburg movement studied past ages, mediaeval as well as primitive, not with a view to patterning after their form, but to discover the essential truths, the living principles, that gave them life and power, in the hope that it might incorporate them into the diseased and decaying body of Protestantism, and thus give it a new lease of life; and not only that, but that Protestantism, by the fresh blood infused into it, might be enabled to eradicate entirely the ailments which it was felt were inherent in its constitution. It was imagined that Protestantism by combining with itself truths which it had almost, if not entirely, ignored, but which Catholicity, it was admitted, embodied and preserved, might not only transcend Catholicity, but transcend itself, and become in a CHURCH OF THE FUTURE immeasurably superior to all that has ever yet been realized of the power and beauty of the Christian religion. These ideas and dreams were not all entertained at the beginning of the movement, in definite form and shape as we have described them; but at one stage or another of the movement, and in one form or another, partly as conscious ideas, partly as unconscious longings, they entered into it, or into the minds of one or another of the persons

<sup>1</sup> See articles in the *Mercersburg Review*, from 1850 to 1855, on "Early Christianity," "Cyprian," "Modern Civilization," etc., etc.

who took part in it. We say, "into the minds of one or another;" for, true to its origin as a movement outside of the true Church, the persons who participated in it were not by any means of one mind in regard to the movement itself and still less so in regard to many of the ideas which were associated with it.

These divergencies in opinion have increased and widened of late years, and to a great extent the movement has lost its original coherency, and also its aggressiveness. Like Tractarianism, it is passing through that process of disintegration to which all forms of thought, except those which constantly receive their life and direction from the unchanging faith of the Church, necessarily are subject. In the case of many, perhaps a majority, of the Mercersburg men, the direction of the movement is plainly towards rationalism; in that of others, the truth, that the Church of Christ is a divine institution, commissioned to teach in His name, clothed with His authority, and empowered by Him to dispense, through her sacraments, the treasures of divine grace, is still strongly insisted on. These latter persons, like the high-church Episcopalian, are striving to find some ground in Protestantism on which they can consistently hold the truth just referred to.

But, while the Mercersburg movement has thus lost what of unity and compactness it at first had, or seemed to have, its leading ideas have become more widely disseminated. They have passed beyond the narrow limits of the particular denomination in which they first found expression, and have obtained lodgement in the minds of many earnest and thoughtful Protestants of other denominations. For this reason, it seemed to us that some statements respecting the origin and distinctive ideas of the Mercersburg school of thought would not be uninteresting; and perhaps, too, not unimportant to those whose more especial duty it is to combat error and defend the truths of Christianity. For though a well-grounded knowledge of even the elements of Christian doctrine is a safeguard to faithful Catholics against being deluded into heresy, and though the studies pursued in our theological seminaries furnish weapons by which error in all its protean forms may be successfully confuted as regards first principles, yet, to say the least, it is highly important that those who have to expose the prevailing fallacies of the age in which we are living, and to resolve doubts under the forms peculiar to it, should be prepared to grapple with and refute those fallacies, and resolve those doubts, not only as to their first principles but also as respects the particular forms and shapes in which, for the time being, they present themselves.

These considerations acquire additional force from the fact that theories like that of Mercersburg are far more dangerous than those which distinctly deny the divine institution and authority of

the Church and make it a matter of religion to revile and calumniate her. The very largeness of their admissions gives more plausibility to their errors, and makes their exposure more difficult. With apparent frankness and absence of reserve that is calculated to win confidence, they seemingly acknowledge almost all the truths of Catholicity, but explain them in a manner which, in fact, strips Christianity of its positive, divine character, the Church of all real authority, her glorious mission of all real significance in the past and present, relegating it entirely to some indefinite period in an unknown future ; and thus, while seemingly exalting Christ and His Church, in fact deny them both, and as regards all actually present spiritual realities, make the necessity of faith, which Protestantism boasts and vaunts as its fundamental doctrine, in reality to be of no account.

The leaders and principal participants in the movement have had to endure no little reproach from their fellow-Protestants on the ground that they sought to undermine Protestantism, and betray it into the hands of "Romanism." The terms "crypto-papists," "romanizers," "conspirators," and "traitors to Protestantism," have been used unsparingly against them. Yet nothing was farther from their intentions than to do anything that would damage Protestantism as a religious interest, or strengthen the arguments of Catholics against it. On the contrary, they were alarmed at the rapid progress which Catholicity was making in the United States; they believed that its progress was mainly due to the fact that Protestantism occupied ground and avowed principles which they plainly saw were essentially rationalistic; that it had virtually turned its back upon truths which it had at one time professed in common with the Catholic Church, and had thus practically surrendered up to Catholicity the whole field and domain of what is distinctively and characteristically Christian doctrine.

At the risk of repeating what may be gathered from our previous remarks, it may be well to say that it was not to any system of thought fully matured and formed that the Mercersburg men committed themselves at the outset, but simply to a *movement*, a process which involved in its very nature the possibility and probability of change of position, of an advance, as they believed and hoped, onwards and upwards towards clearer and fuller apprehensions of truth, a movement partaking of the nature of an inquiry, a search for a stronger and higher position than any which Protestantism had previously assumed, as they looked upon it, against both "Romanism" and Rationalism.

It is not to be denied that in the course of time grave doubts did arise in the minds of many of the Mercersburg men whether Protestantism was capable of incorporating into itself truths which

they saw clearly were fundamental and essential to Christianity, grave doubts whether the errors and evils of Protestantism were not incurable as forming constituent parts of its very nature, whether the Catholic Church against which they had been fiercely battling, and whose inheritance of truth they had endeavored to wrest from her, might not, after all, be the spotless spouse of Christ, the true ark out of which there was no salvation, the "holy city" "come down from God out of heaven," and whether, consequently, in their warfare against her they might not in reality be fighting against Christ and His kingdom. These questions undoubtedly did challenge the attention and agitate the minds of the Mercersburg men. But this was after the movement had progressed far beyond the point at which it started.

That these statements are entirely correct, a few extracts from an introductory chapter written by Dr. John W. Nevin (the acknowledged leader and head of the Mercersburg movement) to a work of Dr. Philip Schaff, entitled, *The True Principle of Protestantism*, and published in 1845, will fully prove. These quotations we select from many others of like character that might be made from Dr. Nevin's writings, because they are taken from what may be regarded as the earliest publication of the characteristic ideas of the Mercersburg school, and consequently will best serve to show the animus and intention of the movement at its initial period.

Speaking of the manner in which the book would probably be received, Dr. Nevin says :

"This much, however, is certain. The work will not be regarded by Puseyites and Papists as a plea in their favor. Rather, if I am not much mistaken, it will be felt by them, so far as it may come under their observation, to be one of the most weighty and effective arguments they have yet been called to encounter, in this country, in opposition to their cause. . . . Not with circumstances and accidents must the controversy grapple, but with principles in their inmost life to reach any result. The present argument accordingly, in throwing itself back upon the true principle of Protestantism, with a full acknowledgment of the difficulties that surround it, while proper pains are taken to put them out of the way, may be said to occupy the only ground on which any effectual stand can be made against the claims of Rome."

This is certainly explicit enough. And the whole history of the movement shows that the idea of building up Protestantism by incorporating into it supplementary truths which, the Mercersburg men held, Protestantism had more or less ignored, but "Romanism" embodied, was the primary design of the Mercersburg movement.

The following statement, by Dr. Nevin, of the general misapprehension by Protestants of the real points at issue between them and "Romanists" and Puseyites is interesting on several accounts :

"Some have told us that the controversy comes simply to this, whether we shall have a religion of form or a religion of the spirit. . . . But the issue in this form is false.

Religion is the union of soul and body, spirit and matter. To resolve it into naked forms is indeed to part with the substance for mere sham; but it is just as vain to think of holding the substance, where forms are treated with contempt. . . . No such alternative has any place in the idea of religion. It separates what God has joined together. Not soul or body, but soul and body, is the formula that represents humanity, as truly after its union with Christ as before.

"Again, we are told that the controversy has for its object the question, Whether salvation be an individual concern or something that comes wholly by the Church; the fruit of a private, separate transaction of the subject with God's Word and Spirit, or the product of a more comprehensive, inexplicable force, residing in the mystical body of Christ, and showing itself particularly in and through the sacraments. But here again the issue is false, and those who plant themselves upon it only betray their own incompetency for intermeddling with the subject.

"Ecclesiasticism, as held by Rome and also by Oxford, is indeed a terrible error; but it does not follow that the mere negation of Ecclesiasticism is the truth. The error itself includes a truth; a vast, great, precious, glorious truth; and if our negation annihilate this along with the error, it has become an error as false as the other. The position that religion is an individual interest, a strictly personal concern, a question between man singly and his Maker, is one which it would be treason to reject. He that believeth shall be saved, he that believeth not shall be damned. Every tree that beareth not good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire. Here is a vast, vital truth. But if it be so held as to exclude the dependence of the individual spiritual life on the general life of the Church, it becomes necessarily onesided and false. Individualism without the Church is as little to be trusted as ecclesiasticism without individual experience. Both separately taken are false, or the truth only in a onesided way, and the falsehood, sooner or later, must make itself practically felt. The full truth is the union of the two."

Throughout the remarks just quoted, and especially in the last paragraph, Dr. Nevin assumes that "Romanists" and the majority of Protestants are equally in error, as sundering interests that are in truth united. But in this he misrepresents the Catholic Church. It seems strange that the real position of the Church could be so utterly misunderstood, as to imagine that "ecclesiasticism as held by Rome" is a negation of the truth "that religion is an individual interest," a "personal concern." How can the vigilance and care constantly exercised by the Church in guarding the faith of her children from corruption, in constantly insisting on each one of them believing all that Christ has commissioned her to teach, be reconciled with the charge thus broadly made that she denies or ignores the declaration of our Saviour referred to by Dr. Nevin. Through all ages her voice has been going forth to the uttermost parts of the world repeating His words, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be condemned." It forms the very soul and substance of the Gospel she is ever preaching and enforcing. What other meaning, what other object have had most of her Councils, her jealous care for the preservation of the ancient faith, her vigilant preservation of ancient creeds, her additional definitions of Christian doctrine as new errors from time to time arose and threatened to corrupt the pure doctrine, her condemnation of countless errors, her anathemas pro-

nounced upon heretics, her exhortations to her children to continue steadfast in their belief—what are all these but so many express and solemn enforcements of the truth that each and every “individual” *must* “believe,” in order to escape damnation? And what, again, means the constant insisting by the Church upon the merit of good works (the very doctrine which Protestantism vaunts itself on denying), but that every “individual” *must* bring forth “good fruits,” or he will be condemned? The Church constantly keeps before the individual the truth that religion *is* a matter of the deepest “personal concern;” she does it in her catechisms, her creeds, her preaching, and most emphatically and especially in her confessionals. It is impossible for any to properly approach the sacred tribunal of penance without being made to feel in his inmost soul, that religion to him or her is a matter of “strictly personal concern.” The Church allows full scope for individual action. By her infallible teaching she guards it from taking wrong directions and expending itself upon wrong objects; by her exhortations she animates its zeal, and urges it to unwearied efforts; by her holy sacraments she constantly renews its vigor. It is not Catholicity that separates the two interests, ignoring the one and unduly exalting the other, which Dr. Nevin rightly contends should always be united, which always are in fact united in Catholicity. It is Protestantism that strives to keep them apart. It erroneously holds that they are antagonistic, and endeavors to put asunder what Christ has joined indissolubly together.

Dr. Nevin, in continuation of his discussion of the questions which confront Protestants, says:

“So again when the controversy is made to lie between the liberty of private judgment and the authority of the Church, the issue is equally false. And the matter is not mended at all, but only made worse, when the alternative is exhibited as holding between the Bible and the Church. It is indeed an abominable usurpation, when the Church claims to be the source of truth for the single Christian separately from the Bible, or the absolutely infallible interpreter of the sense of the Bible itself; and so requires him to yield his judgment blindly to her authority and tradition. But it is presumption equally abominable, for a single individual to cast off all respect for Church authority and Church life, and pretend to draw his faith immediately from the Bible, only and wholly through the narrow pipestem of his own private judgment. No one does so in fact. . . .

“Such a thing as an absolutely abstract private judgment we can meet with in no denomination, party, or sect. But if we had it what would it be worth? Or so far as we find anything like an approximation to it, to what honor or confidence is it entitled? For at the least, what sort of comparison can there be between the naked judgment of a single individual and the voice of the Church? The argument from prescription here, is one which no spiritually sane mind can despise. We employ it with overwhelming force against the Anti-trinitarian, the Anti-pedobaptist, the Anti-sacramental Quaker, and the whole host of fanatical upstarts who moderately undertake to make the world believe that the City of God has been buried for eighteen centuries like Herculaneum and Pompeii, and is now to be dug out of the Scriptures for the first time by

such as themselves.<sup>1</sup> Even the theories of a learned man are deservedly borne down by the weight of this authority. . . . The private judgment of a Grotius, *as such*, is a small thing as compared with the judgment of the Church.

"But we are told the issue is properly not between a Grotius or a George Fox and the Church, but between the Bible and the Church, evangelicism and ecclesiasticism. As if the Bible could interpret itself without the intervention of a human judgment, either public or private! There is gross sophistry in the alternative as thus presented."

Whenever Dr. Nevin is engaged simply in exposing the absurdities and fallacies of the "private judgment" theory he is correct and clear enough, but the moment he attempts to find a basis for Church authority he falls into confusion. This is the necessary result of his position as a Protestant. He cannot accept the Catholic basis, for that would leave him no ground as a Protestant to stand on. Consequently he draws near to it, and then like a comet which has passed its perihelion flies away from it, by the centrifugal force which is inherent in Protestantism. He speaks of the Catholic Church as claiming "to be the source of authority for the single Christian separately from the Bible," and denounces this as an abominable usurpation. But the Church does not claim to be the *source* of truth; she claims to be the depository, the guardian, dispenser, teacher of revealed truth. The ideas are entirely different.

Again, Dr. Nevin denounces as a like "usurpation" by the Church that she claims to be the "infallible interpreter of the sense of the Bible itself." But Dr. Nevin when he wrote these words believed, we presume, that the Church is clothed with authority by Christ Himself to teach the truths of divine revelation; and can it be imagined that she was sent forth on her mission of salvation, and yet left so unguarded, so unfortified against error that she would inevitably fall into it, and that the very authority which Christ conferred upon her would become, through the absence of infallibility, the most potent means for corrupting truth, for making slaves of men whom Christ desired should become free, for leading them into greater spiritual darkness, and for defeating in short all the purposes and ends for which He established His Church? The supposition is most monstrous; and whatever may have been Dr. Nevin's notions when he penned the paragraphs which we have quoted, he subsequently held very different views. What he said

<sup>1</sup> But if the argument from prescription be of such an overwhelming force against "the Anti-trinitarian, the Anti-pedobaptist, and the Anti-sacramental Quaker," of how much greater force must it not be against Protestants throughout all their countless variations of names and forms? If Arius and Nestorius, and their followers, who can count five times as many centuries of existence as Protestantism, can yet justly and truly be styled "upstarts," what shall Luther and Zwingli and Calvin be styled? They rebelled more flagrantly against the Church, and more arrogantly refused to listen to her voice, than any of the ancient heretics.

some years afterwards is directly to the point as a refutation of what he has said above.

Speaking of the Apostles' Creed, Dr. Nevin in 1854 said: "To bow to the authority of the Apostles' Creed is, of course, to own as true for all ages its doctrine of the Holy Catholic Church. This article is not in the symbol by accident only; neither is it open as it stands there to any and every construction. It proclaims, as every other article does, a supernatural fact, a mystery which men are to receive by faith, as something that flows with objective necessity from the resurrection and glorification of Christ. Faith in Christ's glorification, and in the consequent mission of the Holy Ghost, completes itself as faith in the institution and heavenly powers of the Church; and without this faith can never be more . . . than a gnostic imagination or dream." (*Mercersburg Review*, January, 1854, page 88.) "It is not enough to confess the inspiration of the Scriptures, if it be not with faith first in the Church. . . . The Bible, great as it is in the scheme of Christianity, could not be substituted for the Church, in the place assigned to it as an article of faith in the Creed, without violence to the whole order and sense of the Creed. In the view of this archetypal symbol it comes rightly for all real faith, not before the Church, but after it. . . . It shines as a light from heaven *in the Church*, and was never intended to be a sufficient and final light for the world as such, on the outside of the Church. Rationalism, Naturalism, Humanitarianism of all types and shapes taking it in such wrong view . . . have no power to understand it, and in their use of it make it for themselves as a matter of course a mere *ignis fatuus* all the world over, 'blind leaders of the blind.'" (*Mercersburg Review*, July, 1858, page 394.)

These quotations are a sufficient answer by Dr. Nevin himself of his previous charge, that the Catholic Church is guilty of usurpation in claiming to interpret the sense of the Bible, and the claim to interpret it at all, under the authority of a divine commission, carries with it by necessary implication the claim to interpret it infallibly. For if the first be conceded, and Dr. Nevin does here concede it, it is impossible to deny the latter without implying that Christ withheld the power necessary to the right exercise of this divinely conferred authority.

But we have something still more directly to the point from Dr. Nevin's pen in the *Mercersburg Review*, of January, 1855, pp. 73, 79, 82, 83: "So when He commissioned His Apostles for their great work all was made to depend on what had thus been accomplished in His own person. 'All power, he said (Matt. xxviii., 18-20), is given unto Me in heaven and on earth; go ye, therefore,'—because it is so, and I am able, as the conqueror of sin, and death, and hell, having all power in my hands, to become the author, the principle

and ground of a new creation, against which the gates of hell shall not prevail; because it is so, go ye, therefore—and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you. And, lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world.' . . . "The terms of that commission are such as of themselves plainly to show that the Church was to be considered as starting in the Apostles and extending itself out from them in the way of *implicit submission to their embassy and proclamation* (the italics are ours). They were to stand between Christ and the world; to be His witnesses, his legates, the representatives of His authority, the mediators of His grace among men. They were to preach in His name, not merely a doctrine for the nations to hear, but a constitution *to which they were required to surrender themselves in order that they might be saved*. (The italics are ours.) . . . The power of the ministry stands not in the wisdom, or eloquence, or art, or policy of men in any form. It is a quality derived from the kingdom of Christ, and answerable to its heavenly constitution. In its own form and sphere, however, it has to do with relations that are most real, and takes hold of interests which are lasting and solemn as eternity itself. It involves the stewardship of the mysteries of God (1 Cor. iv., 2), the administration of the keys of the kingdom of heaven (Matt. xvi., 19; xviii., 18; John xx., 23), the negotiation of the terms of eternal life (Mark xvi., 16; 2 Cor. ii., 15, 16; v., 18–20). All this supernatural force, in the case of those by whom it is thus exercised, is of course official and not personal. It belongs to the institution of the Ministry and not to the men privately considered who may be charged at any given time with the sacred trust. . . . And why should it be thought strange if the . . . law of organized corporate life raised from the sphere of nature to the sphere of grace, and having to do with the 'powers of the world to come,' be represented as carrying with it in the Church by virtue of Christ's Spirit, not only a general moral security, but also an *absolutely infallible guarantee for the truth and trustworthiness of its results?* (the italics are ours). What less can this commission mean, that clothes the Ministry with Christ's own authority, and requires the nations to bow to it under penalty of damnation? Whatever may be said of single ministers in their private character, or in particular acts of their office, *the institution taken as a whole and in its corporate unity, must be held equal in full to the terms of its appointment. It cannot prove false or recreant to its supernatural trust.* (The italics are ours). Christ says: 'He that heareth you, heareth Me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth Me: Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world.' "

We need nothing beyond these words of Dr. Nevin to prove that the epithet "blind," with which he stigmatizes the submission which faithful Catholics yield to the Church, is utterly unmerited. This epithet, and that of "slavish," are favorite words with the Mercersburg men when referring to the obedience required by the Catholic Church and freely rendered by her children. It may not be amiss to say a few words further about it. In their use of these adjectives to designate the implicit and unqualified submission of Catholics to the teachings of the Church on all matters of faith and morals, Protestants confound two things that are entirely distinct, viz., the extent of the submission rendered, and its character. Unqualified and unlimited submission is not necessarily either blind or slavish, neither is qualified and limited submission necessarily either intelligent or free. The limits of obedience or submission depend upon the superior authority that requires that submission, and the relation of the individual to that authority. God's authority over man is absolute, yet man in rendering it is not made thereby a slave, nor is his submission blind if he rightly exercises his reason in obeying. The submission *may be* both blind and slavish—blind, if rendered without understanding on the part of the individual of his true relation to God, and slavish, if rendered unwillingly. But, on the other hand, it may be, and is designed by God to be, both intelligent and free—intelligent as rendered in the exercise of the highest reason of man, in the full comprehension of the glorious perfections of God, and of man's relations to Him, and free as rendered in the exercise by the individual of his own free will.

Thus the angels are a type of the union of the highest intelligence and freedom with perfect submission. They are the messengers of God, employed continually in obeying the divine will, yet doing it with the fulness of knowledge due to dwelling continually in the presence of God, beholding face to face his glorious perfections, enjoying the light, not given to man on earth, of the Beatific Vision, and in the exercise of the freedom which flows from the conformity of their wills with the will of God. So again, in the perfect acquiescence of Mary in the divine purpose announced to her by the angel Gabriel, we have another instance of the identity of submission, perfect submission to divine authority, and intelligent freedom. When informed of God's merciful design, as comprehended in the mystery of the incarnation, in the free exercise of her own will she assented: "*Behold the handmaid of the Lord, be it done unto me according to thy word.*" Again, our divine Lord is the highest exemplification of the union in Himself of most absolute submission and of the most perfect intelligent freedom, submitting in all things to the divine law, yet doing it voluntarily and with the clearest, fullest knowledge. On the other

hand, the brute, that obeys without comprehending the reason of its obedience, is blind in its submission; and, as regards slavish submission, the devil submitting unwillingly, rebelliously, by mere force of compulsion, is the most perfect type of slavish submission.

Catholics, therefore, in implicitly following the teaching of the Church in all matters of faith and morals, are not blind, neither is their submission to the authority of the Church slavish. On the contrary, it is both intelligent and free, in the highest degree; intelligent, because it is yielded for a sufficient reason—the appointment and command of Christ—free, because it is rendered voluntarily, in the exercise of the individual's own free will.

This subject—the relation of authority to human freedom—is so important in itself, and the misunderstanding of it gives rise to so many pernicious errors, as regards the social and political relations of men as well as their relations to the Church, that we may be pardoned for devoting a few more words to it. They shall be, not our own, but those of Dr. Nevin, taken from the *Mercersburg Review* for January, 1850, pp. 110-115. As will be seen, they cut away entirely the ground on which he stood when penning the *Introduction to the True Principles of Protestantism*.

. . . . “Authority, law, truth, as something objective and universal, is just as much a constituent of true freedom as the single will by which in any case it is brought to pass. Will in no union with any law, will in this way purely private and not general, can never be free. The one conception is the precise opposite of the other. And yet we hear on all sides authority opposed to freedom, as though the one must practically exclude the other! Never was there a greater mistake, or one more practically mischievous. Not only are the two necessarily conjoined in an outward way, so that where the law ends, liberty must end at the same time; . . . . they flow together inwardly also in every free act, and in such union form but the power of a single indissoluble fact. The law is not simply the measure of liberty, but its very substance and soul. So far is it from being true that authority and independence oppose each other, the last has its very being only in the sense of the first. To reverence authority is to be free. To despise it is to have the mind and heart of a slave.” . . . .

“The authority which freedom respects and obeys is, of course, always the will of God. All law as well as all life comes from this source alone. It must be well borne in mind, however, that we have to do with this not as an abstraction, brought nigh to us immediately in the way of mere thought. . . . God's will reaches no man in that way, either through the Bible or on the outside of it. It comes to every man in its full force at last only through the medium of the actual living world, especially the living Christian

world, the Church; which, for this very reason, is proclaimed ‘the ground and pillar of the truth,’ ‘the Body of Christ,’ ‘the fulness of Him that filleth all in all.’ No man’s reason or will is to be trusted who sets out with the assumption that he is the organ directly and separately of the Divine Mind, and in this view responsible to God only for his opinions and ways. Rather, such assumption marks, universally, the want of true independence and freedom, as well as the very contrary of all genuine reverence and faith.” . . . .

The following is a practical application of the foregoing, and has all the force of a direct rebuke of Dr. Nevin’s own previous charge that the submission of Catholics to the “authority and traditions” of the Church is blind and slavish :

“ Why should one who believes that Christ has been always present in the course of Christianity according to His own promise, from the beginning, and who counts it a duty accordingly to study with severest homage the footsteps of His majesty and grace through all ages, be less qualified to reach the true mind of Christ in the Bible, than another whose extreme individualism makes light of the Creed, looks down upon the Fathers, sees chaos only in the Middle Ages, and finds Universal Christianity thus at last reflected through the Bible from the small and insignificant *Mantua* of his own untravelled mind? Or yet, once more, why should faith in the Holy Catholic Church, and reverence for her voice, be held a less genial and friendly element for the growth of that true Christian liberty wherewith the Son of God makes men free, than is the atmosphere of a sect, with which all such reverence and sympathy are wanting, and for which its own brief and narrow tradition is of more weight than the ‘*ubique, semper, ab omnibus*’ of whole Christendom besides.”

Beside the foregoing just statements and reasoning of Dr. Nevin, the quotations we have already made and those which we immediately shall make from his previous essay (*Introduction to the True Principle of Protestantism*) will appear strange indeed. Pursuing his endeavor to find some firm ground for Protestantism to stand on, he says :

“ In any true statement of the case, neither the judgment of the Church nor that of the individual is to be exhibited as a professedly separate *source*<sup>1</sup> of truth. Romanism and Rationalism, in this view, fall here in opposite directions under the same condemnation. The only fair alternative lies between the Bible as apprehended by the Church and the same Bible as apprehended by an individual, or by some party or sect to which he may happen to belong. Shall the Church interpret the Bible for the single believer, or shall he interpret it for himself? The question comes at last to this.”

The question does come to this at last, but Dr. Nevin will not

<sup>1</sup> We have already exposed the misrepresentation implied in the word “*source*.”

meet it. The reason is evident. He sees the absurdity of claiming that the individual "shall interpret the Bible for himself;" but to admit that the Church has the right to interpret it "for the single believer would carry with it by necessary implication the acknowledgment that the Church has the power of interpreting it infallibly." This, Dr. Nevin denies. Hence, he says:

"But the issue in such form is false. Neither side of the alternative separately taken is true, yet neither is absolutely untrue. The Church may err, and every man is bound to exercise his own reason, in things pertaining to salvation. But still the Church is the pillar and ground of the truth. The Bible lives and has power as God's Word only in and by the Church, the body of Christ.<sup>1</sup> It is most certain then, that private judgment, extrinsical to all felt communion with the life of the Church as a continuation through all centuries of the life of Jesus Christ, is entitled to no confidence whatever. Private judgment, or if any one please, the use of the Bible in this form, is a sacred right, to be parted with for no price by those whom the truth has made free; but it can hold only in the element of the Church authority. In proportion precisely as the sense of that general life which has constituted the unity of the Church from the beginning, is found to be wanting in any individual; in proportion precisely as it is possible for him to abjure all respect for the organic whole, in virtue of which only he can have any life as a part; in proportion precisely as he is ruled by the feeling that the Bible is to be interpreted as a revelation just fallen from heaven, without any regard for the development of its contents, the stream of its living waters as carried forward in the faith of Christendom from the beginning down to the present time; in the same proportion, I say, precisely, must such an individual, be his qualifications and resources in other respects what they may, be counted as an unsafe expounder of God's Word, either for himself or for others. The Bible mirrored from his mere private judgment, as thus sundered from all proper Church consciousness, is likely to reveal but little of the mind of the Spirit. The issue, then, as made between the Bible and the Church, is false and sophistical; and the polemic who takes ground upon it as though it were of any real force, only shows himself again unequal to the wants of this great controversy.

"The case requires a reconciliation of these unhappily divided interests in such form that the truth which each includes may be saved in the union of both. This, of course, is not to be reached by yielding to Rome. The very nature of the Papacy is that it sacrifices the rights of the individual wholly to the authority of the Church. . . . But as little may we be satisfied with the mere contrary. What may be reached after as the true form of the Christian life, is such a marriage of the two general tendencies as shall be sufficient to make them one."

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<sup>1</sup> These propositions thus broadly and nakedly presented are enough almost to take one's breath away. It is not here a question at all between Catholicity and Protestantism as to whether man is bound to exercise his reason. The question is how, and in what way, and under what conditions. Placing this aside, look at the propositions laid down by Dr. Nevin. "The Church may err," yet "still the Church is the pillar and ground of the truth!" Can the Church (supposing it to be capable of erring) be the pillar and ground of truth, when it is in error? Would she not become then, in fact, the pillar or supporter of falsehood? "The Bible lives and has power as God's Word only in and by the Church, the Body of Christ!" But, supposing the Church to err, how can the Bible have force as God's Word only in and by the Church? And how can the Church if in error be the Body of Christ? Can it be believed that Christ would be the Head of a Body which was not directed by Him? Or that He would not or could not direct it? Dr. Nevin does not, however, stand alone in holding these glaring contradictions. In them he is at one with Episcopalians, High Churchmen, and Ritualists.

Dr. Nevin here seems totally unable to see that the issue made by Protestants between the Bible and the Church, and which he correctly characterizes as false and sophistical, has no existence under the Catholic rule of faith. Under it there is no reason for any such issue. As the truths of divine revelation are committed to the Church to teach all nations, in the fulfilment of that commission she continually holds up and exhibits to men the contents of divine revelation, its ever-living truths not to be interpreted by the erring judgment of men, but to be received and apprehended as infallibly proclaimed and defined by her in the discharge of her own divinely given magisterium of teaching. There is, therefore, no sacrifice to the authority of the Church of any individual right whatever. For the authority of the Church is not human, but divine; and her infallibility being conferred by Christ, rests on the same basis as the infallibility of God himself—incapability of deceiving and of being deceived. It is the duty of the individual, therefore, to accept implicitly the teaching of the Church as true. There is consequently no sacrifice of right whatever, for the individual is possessed of no right to reject truth and embrace error.

This Dr. Nevin, when he wrote the above, seemed unable to understand. He would not, at that time, hear of the individual being under obligation to submit his judgment to that of the Church in the interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures; yet at the same time he denounced fiercely, as we have seen, the notion that the individual's own judgment could be relied on as a guide and director. He strove to find some middle ground on which he might stand, and with strange self-contradictions vaguely talks about the necessity of the individual judgment being "in felt communion with the general life of the Church;" the necessity of the individual standing in the element of "proper Church consciousness," etc. But these expressions, without further definition, are mere words, conveying no distinct meaning. Through whom, through what organs, is that "Church consciousness" to express itself? Who is to determine what that Church consciousness is and what it declares and what it teaches? The Church herself, or the individual? Thus, like Banquo's ghost, which would not be down at Macbeth's bidding, the question, Shall it be the Church or shall it be the individual? will rise and confront Dr. Nevin, despite all his efforts to escape it.

Dr. Nevin's idea, notwithstanding his obscure expressions, we understand very well from his other writings. He means that as an Englishman or Frenchman in order to be a true loyal Englishman or Frenchman must stand in "felt communion" with the national life of England or of France, and as the individual judgment must be conditioned and influenced by the general conscious-

ness of the English or of the French people, so the Christian's individual judgment should, in the interpretation of Scripture, be in felt communion and accord with the general consciousness of the Church. This is all very well, so far as it goes. But suppose the individual Englishman or Frenchman on some question or other comes into collision with the general consciousness of his nation. Which, in such case, is to rule? The individual's judgment, or that of the nation as expressed through its civil tribunals? The issue is one that constantly comes up and cannot be evaded. So, too, in the case of the individual Christian. When his opinions or judgment in regard to divinely revealed truths come into collision with the teaching (the expressed consciousness) of the Church, what then?

The case is not one of supposition merely. It is constantly occurring. Shall the individual adhere to his own private opinions, or shall he submit to the authoritative teaching of the Church? The question cannot be ignored. There is no compromise possible, such as Dr. Nevin tries to make, that will bury the question out of sight. Nor is, indeed, any compromise or "reconciliation" needed. The interests are not in fact "divided," as Dr. Nevin imagines. As there can be no legitimate antagonism of the individual judgment and of the authority of the State in matters that are plainly and rightfully within the scope and jurisdiction of the State, still less can there be room for legitimate antagonism between the individual judgment and the authority of the Church in things which by Christ's appointment fall within the scope and sphere of the Church's authority. The interests are not divided. According to the Catholic rule of faith they are in full and perfect harmony. The individual judgment has its sphere and its limitations, and has perfect freedom within that sphere and subject to those limitations; and there is no more violation of the conditions of man's intellectual and moral freedom in requiring individual judgment to submit to those conditions than there is to his freedom of locomotion in confining him to the earth, and not making it possible for him to fly through the air. The individual who resists State authority legitimately exercised, that is, exercised in regard to things over which by divine appointment in the natural order the State has legitimate authority, is *de facto* a rebel. In like manner the individual who refuses to submit his judgment to that of the Church in the things over which Christ has given her in the supernatural order supreme authority (and here specially the teaching of divinely revealed truth) becomes, in a still higher degree,—as far higher as the supernatural transcends the natural,—a heretic, and if he persists, a rebel and a schismatic.

Dr. Nevin's picture of the condition of Protestantism, his con-

viction that there are radical evils inherent in it; that as it is and on the ground which it occupies it has no power to resist "Popery;" and, that, at best, and "in its present state," is "interimistic," and can only save itself by passing into something else, is so interesting as portraying his own struggles and confused convictions, that we would be glad to give it in full, but space remaining will not permit. We quote only a few sentences:

"Taking the present state of Protestantism as ultimate and complete, we must despair of its being able to stand against its enemies. Our faith in its divine mission can be intelligent only as we confidently trust that it will in due time surmount its own present position, and stand forth redeemed and disenthralled from the evils that now oppress it, to complete the reformation so auspiciously begun in the sixteenth century. The necessity of some such new order of things is coming to be more and more sensibly felt, and may we not trust that the way for it is fast being prepared, though to our narrow view chaotically still and without light, in the ever deepening and expanding agitation with which men's minds are beginning to be moved, as it might seem, all the world over, in this direction. . . . Still we will hope that the end of all these things is destined to be different from what might seem to be their tendency at this time. All is included in the chaotic struggle by which the way is to be opened for that new epoch which seems to be at hand, and which, it may be, with good assurance, expected, will be not a retrogression of the Church to papal bondage, but an advance, by the grace of God, to the true standpoint of Protestant Catholicism."

It is impossible to read these words without sympathy for the writer in his evident earnestness, and yet without wonder at the sentiments advanced and the confusion and self-contradiction of thought which they involve. "Taking the present state of Protestantism as ultimate and complete, we must despair of its being able to stand against its enemies." "The necessity of some new order of things is coming to be more and more sensibly felt," and for this new order of things "the way is fast being prepared, though chaotically and without light, in the ever deepening and expanding agitation in which men's minds are beginning to be moved." As though Christ, who came to establish order in place of the chaos that had been existing in men's minds, to give light to those who had been in darkness, had failed to realize His mission as respects the past and the present, embracing a period of nearly nineteen centuries, and only now, through revolutions and chaotic movements, whose direction and end no one understands or can perceive, will interpose by ushering in a new epoch!

Yet amid this confusion and darkness, this confession of the impossibility of Protestantism (as it has actualized itself in the development of its own inherent evils and errors) being able to maintain itself, this wail almost of despair, Dr. Nevin persistently refuses to look to the Church of all ages, from which a clear and steady light has ever shone, far and wide, over the conflicting chaos of human opinions, for the truth which he vainly strives to reach by a theory of compromise between Protestantism and Catholicity. "Popery"

is a danger to be dreaded and opposed. Its evident advance, its power and strength are grounds with him not for congratulation, but for apprehension and lamentation. The "system" which guided and directed the undivided Christian world for sixteen centuries, and which is still full of the vigor of constantly renewed life, through which the saints in all ages attained all sanctity, and doctors all their power of apprehending, explaining, defending, and illustrating the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven—this system inspires in Dr. Nevin no other feeling than that of a desire to rob it of its glories, its "vast and precious truths," its manifest power and vitality, in order that with them he may plaster the leprous<sup>1</sup> sores, infuse fresh blood into the veins, of the decrepit, decaying, dissolving body of Protestantism, and then call it "Protestant Catholicism."

To those unacquainted with the history and ideas of the Mercersburg school this will seem inexplicable. The query will naturally arise how could the Mercersburg men possibly cherish, in their waking moments, such contradictory notions? We give the answer in a few words of Dr. Nevin:

"Christianity, we say, is organic. This implies, in the nature of the case, development, evolution, progress. The idea of such a development does not imply, of course, any change in the nature of Christianity itself. It implies just the contrary. It assumes that the system is complete in its own nature from the beginning, and that the whole of it, too, is comprehended in the life of the Church at all points of its history. But the contents of this life need to be unfolded, theoretically and practically, in the consciousness of the Church. Christianity can never become absolutely more than it has been from the beginning, in the person of Christ and in the truth of the Gospel, but it must pass over into the life of the Church. This implies development. In its very constitution the Church involves a process which will be complete only when the 'new heavens' shall reflect in full image the new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. And still all this will be nothing more than the full evolution of the life that was in Christ from the beginning, and the full power of which has been always present in the Church, struggling through all ages towards this last glorious 'manifestation of the sons of God.'"

Here is the central thought of the Mercersburg theory. Christianity is organic, and as such is subject to the law of development which governs all organic life. In this process of development it passed through the forms of Primitive and Mediæval Christianity, and at the epoch of the so-called Reformation it was sundered; Protestantism embodying in itself the main stream of its life, and the great body of its doctrines, in a higher, truer form than they had ever before been held, and "Romanism," clinging slavishly to the past, has preserved only, or in principal degree, their dead forms. But still Protestantism has ignored and left out of view some important truths which "Romanism" embodies and promi-

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. Nevin calls sectism a "leprosy."

nently exhibits; and on some higher, and, as yet, undiscovered ground, but which will be reached by earnest striving amid the chaos of conflicting opinions, or will be brought to view by some revolution or convulsion ushering in a new epoch, the seemingly antagonistic interests of Protestantism and Romanism will be reconciled and brought together into a true harmony, and Christianity will develop and exhibit itself in a more perfect form than the world has ever yet seen. This was the dream which deluded the Mercersburg men, and to this theory, amid confusion and contradiction of thought and opinion, they tenaciously held.

Without criticizing the fundamental idea of this theory, or attempting to separate its modicum of truth from the errors it embodies, we confine ourselves to a few concluding remarks:

i. The very principle on which Dr. Nevin undertakes to vindicate Protestantism from the charge and guilt of schism, and to defend it as a legitimate form of Christianity, condemns Protestantism. If it can only make good its right to challenge for itself faith and veneration, by proving itself to stand in organic connection with the Christianity of the Middle Ages, and of the earlier ages of the Church, then Protestantism has no ground to stand on.

The unchangeable, universal law of organic development is identity. The oak grows from its germ, sends up its slender stem into the air, puts forth branches; the slender stem becomes a huge trunk, and the branches giant boughs, but the oak preserves throughout its original identity of type. It grows and increases in size, but it can never grow into the palm or the olive. The lion's cub increases in age and strength, but remains always a lion. It never becomes, never can become, an ox or a rhinoceros.

So with Christianity. According to Dr. Nevin's own theory it must ever preserve its identity. It cannot be one thing in one age, and another and a contradictory in a succeeding age. And, obviously and according to the confessions of Protestants from the very outset of the Reformation, Protestantism has no identity with mediæval Christianity. It started in an act of rebellion. It denounced the Church from which its authors went forth, as "the mystic Babylon," the "Mother of Harlots," the home and palace of Antichrist. Ever since it has maintained the same posture and attitude towards the Church. There is no ground, no semblance even of a ground, the declarations of the whole body of Protestants being witnesses, for claiming that Protestantism is an outgrowth of the life of mediæval Christianity. Its historical connection is that simply of a rebel resisting the authority under which he had lived, and by which he had been protected; of an unfruitful branch severed from its parent vine. The fig-tree, true to its type, can never send forth a shoot that will grow into a bramble bush; nor does

the true vine produce thistles. As Dr. Nevin himself has acknowledged,<sup>1</sup> the saints of the earliest ages of Christianity as well as those of mediæval times, if brought again upon earth to-day would not feel themselves at home among Protestants, but would feel themselves at home, and with their brothers and children, among Catholics. Protestants have felt this so strongly that not a few of them have endeavored to trace back a historical connection, between themselves and the Apostles, through the sectaries and errorists of mediæval and primitive ages—the Waldenses and Albigenses, the Lollards and Cathari, and earlier heretics of past times; but the majority of Protestants have contented themselves simply with the theory that no historical connection is necessary, and that the possession and use of the Bible is a sufficient foundation on which to build.

2. The law of organic development requires that the progress which it presupposes shall go on *within* the organization or body in which the organic life dwells, not outside it. The severed branch or limb becomes fruitless, lifeless, dead. The law presupposes and requires, too, not simply life or soul, but life united with a body. As Dr. Nevin himself contends, “soul *and* body” is the normal, necessary form of Christianity. The Church is the body of Christ, the organism in which He dwells. All real progress or development, therefore, according to Dr. Nevin’s own theory, must go forward within the Church. Protestantism, consequently, in separating itself from the Church, has excluded itself by the very act from the operation of any such law. Its activity is not the result of the life of the Church; it is abnormal, outside of the law that controls the supernatural organism in which Christ continually dwells.

3. The idea of an organism presupposes unity, both external and internal; unity not of soul or life only, but also of body. But Protestantism has no unity. We have been speaking of it as a system, but only for the sake of convenience. It is admitted that it has no external unity; and, in fact, it has no internal unity; the absence of external unity is only the evidence and result of the absence of all real true internal oneness. Here, again, “not soul or body” but “soul *and* body” is the norm and rule of Christianity. According to the very theory for which Mercersburg contends, Protestantism is plainly hopelessly condemned. It can show no marks or evidences of any unity, of holding any common doctrine, of being animated by any common principle, except the negative principle of hostility to the Church, rebellion against her authority.

If it were necessary to enforce this argument we might appeal to

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<sup>1</sup> “Early Christianity,” *Mercersburg Review*.

the history of Protestant sects since the "Reformation." Just three hundred and fifty years have elapsed since "Luther's hammer" on the Church door, at Wittenberg, awoke the spirit of revolt against the authority of the Church, and during this period of time whatever movements have taken place in and among the sects which quickly sprung into existence, the tendency has uniformly been to depart farther away from the Church and farther away from each other. Their "life" so involves the principle of division, of endless disintegration that individualism is the rule; and even where the adherents of sects are seemingly united it is not on the basis of a common authoritative creed, but simply on that of expediency, the spirit of a party or faction, or of individual opinion. Their original creeds or confessions of belief, containing fragments of truth torn from the body of Catholic doctrine, are no longer acknowledged as authoritative, even in the sects which at their outset adopted them. Each individual believes them or not as he chooses, and as much as he chooses.

We are reasoning the matter on the ground chosen by Mercersburg; and it is directly to the point when we say that the divided, contentious, antagonistic attitude of Protestants, from the sixteenth century on to the present, towards the Church and towards each other, is becoming daily more marked and obvious, and utterly forbids the adoption, by Protestant sects, of any theory involving the idea that Christianity is organic. On the contrary, true or false, to whatever extent and degree, the theory utterly condemns the Reformation movement and places it outside of the normal action of Christianity.

Protestants generally perceived this from the very start of the Mercersburg movement, and urged against it the very arguments we have here stated, though in different form and spirit. They instinctively felt that Mercersburg had "given them away;" that there was no possibility of defending themselves from the charges of schism and heresy on Mercersburg grounds. Hence there was a universal outcry in all the various Protestant sects against "Mercersburgism." Mercersburg men were denounced as "Crypto-papists," as "Romanizers," as seeking to betray the cause they professedly were defending. From Lutherans, "Dutch Reformed," Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, and sects of every name, one common cry was raised against the Mercersburg men. The newspapers which represented prevailing opinions in all these various sects came out against them; and in their "Synods" and "Assemblies" they were denounced, while in the particular denomination to which they belonged they were not less fiercely attacked.

The Mercersburg men met these attacks undismayed. They had firm ground to stand on in opposing their Protestant adversa-

ries. Their arguments against the absurdity of the private judgment theory, their denunciation of sectism as an evil and a leprous disease, and their arguments in favor of Church authority, their Protestant opponents could not answer. When the charge was made that their theory condemned Protestantism, their answer, in substance, was: "It is the only ground on which Protestantism can be defended from the charge of schism, and schism excludes us from any part or lot in the kingdom of Christ. We believe Protestantism can be defended on this ground, but if not, then it is a confessed and acknowledged schism; and to admit that, would be to pronounce our own condemnation."

To the denial of their Protestant adversaries that mediæval Christianity was a legitimate continuation of the Christianity of the first ages, and that Protestantism must prove itself to have an organic connection with mediæval Christianity, the Mercersburg men replied, in substance, "Well, if you deny this, then, again you only condemn Protestantism. It is a fond delusion, a mere dream without any substance of truth, that Protestantism is a reproduction, a 'repristination' of the Christianity of the early ages. We can prove that in the first ages of the Church existed all which you object to and characterize as superstitious in the Church of the Middle Ages, the invocation of saints, veneration of relics, belief in miracles, purgatory, prayers for the dead, confession, the Catholic belief in Baptism, in the Eucharist as a real sacrifice, belief in the Church as the true ark of salvation, in its unity and authority, in Apostolic succession—these were all believed and held in the fourth century. They can be traced in the third, and their existence then, not as novelties, but as established practices and beliefs handed down without controversy from a prior period, proves that they were previously existing, and carries you back to the days of the Apostles or those immediately succeeding. Therefore, you must either admit that the Church in the Middle Ages, as well as in the first centuries, was a legitimate development of Christianity, and show that Protestantism stands in organic connection with the mediæval Church, or you must declare that Christ's promise to be with, to protect, and preserve His Church, has failed, and that it failed as soon as the last of the Apostles fell asleep."

With the horns of this dilemma the Mercersburg men persistently gored their Protestant opponents. Their opponents could not answer them, but denounced them as defenders of the "idolatry, superstitions, and corruptions" of "Rome."

"Very well," was substantially the reply, "if we are idolaters and superstitious because we stand up for mediæval Christianity, we are in good company. Bernard and Anselm, and a host of saints and doctors, whose spiritual knowledge, learning, virtue, sanctity,

even infidels are compelled to confess, were mediæval Christians. And, to go farther back, you must denounce Hilary and Venerable Bede, Augustine, Ambrose, Chrysostom, the Gregories, and the two Cyrils, Athanasius, Basil, Cyprian, Irenæus, the spiritual grandson of St. John, Polycarp and Ignatius, his spiritual children, and Clement of Rome, whom St. Paul calls his collaborer, and whose name, he says, is written 'in the book of life.' If *you* choose to cast your spittle upon these saints of God, *we* do not."<sup>1</sup>

Every fresh onslaught of their opponents drove the Mercersburg men farther over upon Catholic ground. Their opponents continually cried out: "You are Romanists at heart, why do you not become so in fact?" The reply was: "We are *true* Protestants, not 'Romanists.' We look not backward, but forwards. We believe there is higher ground in Christianity than has ever yet been discovered, up to which, some time or other, God will lead both Roman Catholics and Protestants, where they will be joined together in the bonds of an indissoluble marriage."

To the scornful challenge, "Where is that ground? Show us the way to it," the Mercersburg men replied in substance, "We do not profess certainly to know the ground, nor can we clearly see the way to it. Our work, in the present, is to remove stones and drain morasses which plainly impede progress in the right direction. If we are earnest in our work and in our search, God will doubtless dispel the mists which now obscure our vision, and point us to the right way and the higher ground in whose existence we believe. Meanwhile, all that we can do, hemmed in with difficulties on all sides, is to stand still, and wait till God brings us deliverance."<sup>2</sup>

Thus the conflict surged back and forth; and, as the fight grew hotter, fierce invectives, sweeping denunciations, and bitter criminations were mingled, not seldom, with more solid arguments.

Thus we leave now and here the Mercersburg men and their Protestant opponents.

<sup>1</sup> See articles in Mercersburg Review: "Early Christianity," "Cyprian," "Modern Civilization," "The Dutch Crusade," "Dr. Berg's Last Words," &c.

<sup>2</sup> In a sermon preached before the Synod of the Reformed Church of the United States, Dr. Nevin likened the situation of Protestants to that of the Israelites, when pursued by Pharaoh's hosts and hemmed in between the mountains and the sea, and defined their duty to be to stand still and wait till God would open up a way of escape. Does not this posture of Mercersburg resemble that of the Jews towards our Divine Lord, in the days of His flesh? He had come and was in their midst, and yet they remained expecting His advent, and denied Him. Has not Christ already come and filled the Church with His presence and grace? Has He not already become the *way*, the *truth* in all its perfect fulness, the life and the light of men?

## BOOK NOTICES.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY, FROM DESCARTES TO SCHOPENHAUER. By *Francis Bowen, A.M.* New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1877.

There are many things in Mr. Bowen's work that will interest the general reader, and assist him to form for himself some general notion of "modern philosophy," so far, at least, as the writings of the thirteen authors reviewed in this book are an exponent of "modern philosophy." The author has surely made some successful efforts to put light and meaning into the dark reveries of Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, etc. There is an ingenuous declaration in his preface that leaves us no liberty to question the goodness of his intentions in devoting so much time and study to the speculations of these particular theorists: "the result is, I am now more firmly convinced than ever that what has been justly styled 'the dirt philosophy' of materialism and fatalism, is baseless and false. I accept with unhesitating conviction and belief, the doctrine of the being of one personal God, the Creator and Governor of the world, and of one Lord Jesus Christ, in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." It may also be true, as he seems to believe, that his commendable profession of Christian faith will have all the more weight with many readers, because he is not a clergyman.

As Mr. Bowen proposed to treat of modern philosophy, it will be thought by not a few of his readers, that he should have taken a broader view of his subject than he actually has done. The only authors whose opinions are specially considered by him are skeptics, idealists, materialists, and pantheists; and their writings mainly constitute what should rather be styled the erratic philosophy of modern times. The view, then, which the author presents of "modern philosophy," is open to the charge of being narrow and one-sided. But we shall now notice more particularly and minutely some of his statements and reasoning.

The author seems to be pleased with Descartes's boast of having ventured to cast aside the philosophical teachings of the past, in order to build up *a priori* a system that would be consistent. Descartes lays down as the one only certain first principle of philosophizing, "Cogito, ergo sum; I think, therefore, I exist; I am certain this act of reflex consciousness is true, but I am not certain either that the testimony of my senses is true, or that external objects are really what their impressions on my senses represent them to be." As regards these first principles of the system, namely, that the testimony of reflex consciousness is certain, and the testimony of the senses is uncertain, Mr. Bowen finds that "so far, Descartes is unquestionably right, and his doctrine rests upon as firm a basis as the first truths of geometry," p. 34-6. But does he not fail to see that when one premise of an argument is uncertain, the conclusion is thereby made uncertain, and therefore that the testimony of reflex consciousness, *cogito-sum*, alone being certain, while the testimony of each and every sense is uncertain, any conclusion from that testimony to the external world must be uncertain? This primitive thesis of Descartes's doctrine does not rest on so "firm a basis as the first truths of geometry," because it makes all our direct knowledge of external objects uncertain, while on the contrary, we know them with certainty on the certain testimony of the senses, as we shall take for granted and which is admitted by all except skeptics. Mr. Bowen denies the logical validity of the argument *a priori* for proving the existence of

God, from the very idea of God as *ens necessarium et realissimum*; it was proposed by Descartes, but it is said that St. Anselm was the first to use that argument. Mr. Bowen's objection to this species of reasoning seems to be a conclusive refutation of it; from the purely ideal, he contends, that there is no certain and valid illation to the really existing object, and therefore, to infer the existence of God from the mere idea of God is not consequent reasoning. Then by what canon of legitimate and valid argumentation can we conclude from purely subjective certainty to the external objects of sense? This is fallacious reasoning, because it too is arguing from what is only subjective, to what is external and objective; it is illation from the merely ideal to the real, which he concedes is not legitimate. It follows then, that if we lay down as the basis of philosophy that the testimony of reflex consciousness is alone certain, and that the testimony of all our senses is uncertain, all our conclusions which regard the external world must be uncertain.

The author also defends the theory of innate ideas, but not with arguments which are very cogent and convincing. It can scarcely be supposed that Cardinal Manning intended his distinction between a power (for example, the intellect as active, and that power as passive or receptive); and his affirmation of the fact that mankind never lost the primitive revelation of God's existence, to be understood as a defence of innate ideas, or as showing that the idea of God is innate to us; indeed, what he says does not really bear on that subject at all. The author thus introduces the testimony of that eminent prelate: "In further elucidation of the leading doctrine, the innateness of the idea of God to the soul of man, let me present the same dogma as set forth and defended by one of the ablest thinkers and most eloquent writers of our own day, I mean Cardinal Manning, formerly of the English, now of the Romish Church," pp. 41, 42. The citation as taken from Manning: "The first relation of reason to revelation, is to receive it by intellectual apprehension. It is like the relation of the eye to sight. There are, I may say, two kinds of sight, the passive and the active, that is, in plain words, there is a difference between seeing and looking. In the former, the will is quiescent; in the latter, it is in activity. We see a thousand things when we look at only one; we see the light even when we do not fix the eye upon any particular object by an act of the will. So the intellect is both active and passive. And the intellect must first be in some degree passively replenished or illuminated by an object, before it can actively apply itself to it. Though the existence of God may be proved by reason, and from lights of the natural order, it is certain that the knowledge of God's existence anticipated all such reasoning. The theism of the world was not a discovery. Mankind possessed it by primeval revelation, were penetrated and pervaded by it before any one doubted of it, and reasoning did not precede, but followed the doubt. Theists came before philosophers, and theism before atheism, or even a doubt about the existence of God. St. Paul says, 'the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead, so that they are without excuse.'"

There is surely nothing in this language of Cardinal Manning to justify the inference that he holds our idea of God, or any other idea which we have, to be innate to our minds. It would seem that the author does not apprehend passivity and activity of the intellect, precisely as meant by His Eminence; this is the less improbable from the fact that his technical accuracy is still more plainly compromised by what he says in another place: "God alone exists *per se*, since he is *causa sui*—self-

caused, every other being exists *per aliud*." Is God self-caused? By what authority of custom or reason does he say, "God alone exists *per se*, every other being exists *per aliud*?" By established usage the expression, "to exist *per se*," means to exist without inhering in another thing, and thus every substance exists; to exist *per aliud* is to exist by inhering in another thing, as in a subject that sustains, and thus all qualities or accidents exist. God is said to exist *a se*; only a created substance is usually said to exist *per se*.

We shall adduce another instance to illustrate the author's manner of explaining elementary principles: He says, on p. 16, that throughout the Middle Ages, by a misunderstanding of Aristotle, the syllogism was accounted a means of discovering truth; while on the contrary, "as Locke remarked, we must know a thing first, and then only can we prove it syllogistically." "Then only can we prove it syllogistically" to whom? Not to ourselves, certainly; for, by the supposition, we already know it. If the thing is "proved syllogistically" to another person, then the syllogism is at least a means by which that other person discovers or acquires truth, unless the syllogism be mere nonsense. But the syllogism is not something nugatory, which the human mind devised; it is not a principle or norma by which the mind may, or may not, direct its operation of reasoning; it expresses the law and intrinsic form of all genuine ratiocination. It is not necessary for rightly using it, even to know its name; since it is the mode and rule of action by which human reason naturally and spontaneously derives the knowledge of one thing from the knowledge of other things by means of the relation which it sees to exist between them. What else is the acquiring of knowledge by illation, or inferring truth from its reason, than the comparing of concepts or ideas to a medium, and discovering that they agree, or that they do not agree? The mind first discovers a conclusion as proved by its argument or reason, when it discovers the medium or middle term as such; just as the mind only then first sees that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the two short sides of the right-angled triangle, when it discovers that this square, and the sum of the squares on the short sides, are respectively equal to the sum of the same two rectangles; in other words, the mind may first discover that two given things are equal to each other, by learning that they are each equal to one and the same thing; and this is to discover truth by "reasoning syllogistically." The author seems to confound the syllogism as a mere abstract formula, that may be uselessly applied to matter already known, with syllogism as expressing the norma of all ratiocination from truth to truth. A man may vainly attempt to discover, by mere "reasoning syllogistically," and *a priori*, what by its nature, and unlike mathematical truth or pure metaphysical truth, cannot be discovered by reasoning; but whenever he does discover truth by argumentation, and this our minds are doing daily, the operation of his reason is always syllogistic, or it is always by comparing things to a medium or middle term, with which they are found to agree, or else to disagree; whereby they are concluded to agree, or else disagree with each other.

It may be affirmed truly, then, that if some reasoners of the Middle Ages erred by misapplying the syllogism, or by employing it to discover even facts and objects that cannot be learned except empirically, Locke falls into still greater error by denying that the syllogism can ever be the means of discovering any truth.

The author devotes one chapter of his "modern philosophy" to an explanation of Bishop Berkeley's "New Theory of Vision," and the various hypotheses defended by that eccentric thinker. Mr. Bowen's de-

velopments are so clear and full that from them the reader may derive a pretty correct notion of the principles and arguments by which the speculative bishop reasoned himself into pure idealism. He bestows far more praise, however, on the "New Theory of Vision" than is accorded to it by the learned world in general. We may, perhaps with justice, apply to this production the criticism which Talleyrand is reported to have given of a volume on phrenology: "What is true in this book is not new; and what is new in it is not true." Mr. Bowen accepts Berkeley's main conclusions in regard to ocular vision; after saying, and correctly, too, that the eye does not see the image on the retina, he asserts that "we do not see the outward world. The eye sees only color; strictly speaking, the colors seen do not belong to the external world, but exist only in the mind, . . . and these effects do not even resemble their causes." And on p. 146: "We may accept, then, as demonstrated, Berkeley's conclusion in his own words, that to a man born blind, and afterwards restored to sight, 'the sun and stars, the remotest objects as well as the nearest, would all seem to be in his eye, or rather in his mind.'"

Passing by his mistake against the elementary principle in philosophy, where he asserts that these effects of color "do not even resemble their causes," despite the axiom according to which every effect must resemble its cause, either by a specific or an analogical likeness; aside from this, together with its consequences for Berkeley's theory of idealism, we may ask: If the eye does not see the image on the retina, and he rightly concedes that it does not; and if the eye does not see any object in the outward world, then what does the eye see at all? If it does not see either anything within itself, or anything outside of itself, then there is surely nothing else left for it to see; and Berkeley's idealism must be true as regards this external sense, how much soever it contradicts the facts and teachings of common experience.

But it is not a fact that, as Mr. Bowen thinks, the only object which the eye can see is color; nor is it a fact that Berkeley was the first to show that a correct knowledge of figure, size, distance, and the like, cannot be acquired through the eye alone. It is true that color is the only proper or exclusive object of the eye, since no other external organ can perceive color. But the eye can also see what, for ages before Berkeley's day, were styled "common sensibles," or objects common to more senses than one, because more senses than one can perceive those objects, namely, figure, size, number, motion, rest. The truth was always familiarly known to mankind that no object common to more senses than one can become perfectly known through only one sense; or that it can be accurately learned only through all the senses that are able to apprehend it. "The only object which the eye can see is color;" while it is true that a sense can perceive no object perfectly, except its proper or special object, yet, will the author deny the fact that the eye can see a triangle, circle, straight or curved line? To these truths regarding the senses, Bishop Berkeley really added no new light; but, on the contrary, he explained the action of the senses falsely, and so as to deny that their objects are external realities; and in this opinion Mr. Bowen appears to concur when he affirms, "we do not see the outward world. Strictly speaking, the colors do not belong to the external world; they exist only in the mind."

The truth is, however, that what our senses actually perceive is their external objects. Undoubtedly if the eye does not see figure, as this triangle, this circle, etc., but the mind only infers figure from what is

seen, it is then true for the same reasons that the eye does not see color; or rather, that the eye sees nothing at all, which is proving too much.

We cannot follow the author through his entire work, for this would exceed our limits.

It is certain that some acquaintance with the opinions of many great thinkers on different subjects is useful in its degree; but it is also true that sound and valuable knowledge of philosophy does not consist merely in being able to state in more or less accurate terms what numerous eccentric minds have excogitated; just as genuine knowledge of a science does not consist in merely knowing how a multitude of authors wrote and speculated about it, but in knowing its conclusions as following demonstratively from their principles. Far the greater part of the volume, *Modern Philosophy* is taken up with Kant, and the transcendental idealists that followed him, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Hartmann. Though the author does not by any means agree with all that they say, yet he explains, and in some things refutes, their bold, dogmatic, and obscure assertions, in such a manner and spirit as to give the impression that they alone wrote "modern philosophy," they alone teach the high truth, and what they do not teach is scarcely worth knowing. But whether he believes the statement or not, there are numerous small elementary treatises on the subjects of philosophy from any one of which more can be learned of that truth which is highest, most universal, and most absolute, than can be found in all the transcendental philosophies ever written by the school of Kant.

While we have criticized what we regarded as faults in *Modern Philosophy*, it would be unjust not to credit the author with also saying many good things on very difficult questions of philosophy. Especially has he done a service for those readers who may desire to attain to some conception of pure subjectivism, and the transcendental idealism of the Kant school, without the study required to get through a number of very difficult works. The author performs this laborious task for the reader, and leads him through the differences that separate the mazy theories of his chosen writers with the patience and perseverance of a devotee performing a work of love. Descartes says much that is objectionable; but he is often sound, and he is always intelligible. These transcendentalists say little that is wholly free from error; they are sometimes unintelligible, and they are always obscure: such are the productions in speculative philosophy in which Mr. Bowen has the merit of pointing out some thought and method.

**THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY, WITH A VIEW OF THE STATE OF THE ROMAN WORLD AT THE BIRTH OF CHRIST.** By George P. Fisher, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale College. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1877.

This book is in the main an excellent defence of the foundations of our holy religion. It is welcome particularly as the work of a distinguished member of Yale College. The European universities have become, in many cases, laboratories of the most baneful doctrines with regard to the origin of Christianity. It was to be feared that the evil would spread extensively in this country; and it has, in fact, already obtained a large following. But if our high colleges are preserved free from the taint, there is hope that it will be limited and soon disappear. The *Beginnings of Christianity*, by Dr. G. P. Fisher, is a very opportune work on that account.

The first fifteen chapters embrace a view of the Roman and Greek world at the birth of Christ; a much shorter statement of the social and

religious condition of the Jews; an extensive discussion and defence of the four Gospels and other books of the New Testament; and finally, the beginning of the ministry of Jesus, his *plan*, and what is called "the separation of the Church from the temple."

The view of the Roman and Greek world comprises five full chapters. It is the work of an eminent Latin and Greek scholar, and will be found extremely interesting by all educated people. The object of the author, however, is to consider the subject with regard to the way in which it prepared the advent of Christianity; and it is the only aspect of it that must be kept in view. In the vast amount of classic information presented to the reader, this is occasionally lost sight of. The views of the author on that preparation, more or less perceptible here and there, are best expressed at pages 138-39: "There was a seeking after God in the heathen devotions. The subjective sentiments which belong to religion could not reach their perfection of development, or meet with satisfaction, until the one object worthy of them, who might be 'ignorantly worshipped,' was revealed in its attributes. There was thus an unfulfilled demand in the religious nature, which impelled the soul of the earnest worshipper on the path towards a goal that was hidden from his sight, prior to the Christian Revelation." This is as true as it is well said; but it means only that the Christian religion, coming from God, could alone satisfy the highest aims of our nature, which paganism could not do; and thus paganism was, in reality, no preparation at all, except in a negative way.

As to the preparation for Christianity derived from Greek philosophy, the ideas of Dr. Fisher are much more precise. Setting aside what is said in the book on Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian philosophy, which had scarcely any bearing on Christianity (because in the time of Christ very few men went so far back in their studies, and almost every discussion was reduced to the opposing antagonistic doctrines of Epicurus and Zeno), the very thorough analysis of Stoicism which follows deserves to be read entire. In our age many intellectual men appear fully persuaded that Stoicism was in fact a stepping-stone to the coming in of the Gospel. Dr. Fisher entirely dispels the delusion.

The part of the book, however, which is most important at this time in this country, is contained in the five chapters in which the author speaks of the books of the New Testament. In them he discusses the rationalistic theories of the age, particularly those that belong to what is called the "Tubingen school." It is well known that these groundless and purely fanciful theories have obtained almost universal admittance outside the Catholic Church, in Germany and England. They evidently undermine the foundations of Christianity by throwing discredit on its records, that is, on the whole collection of the New Testament books. There can be no doubt that many minds in this country have been infected by this pest. It has not made as much noise among us as in Europe, because of the respect which is still professed at least for the Bible. But the constant advocacy of those doctrines in books and reviews, particularly the *Westminster Review*, which circulates widely on this side of the Atlantic, precludes the hope that a few only have been inoculated with the virus. The antidote is now presented by a non-Catholic hand, and we sincerely hope that all those who have been deceived or thrown into doubt by this delusion will read what the eminent Professor of Yale College says on the subject.

The views of Baur, one of its strongest supporters, come up for discussion in the tenth chapter of the book, on the *Gospel of St. John*. It is impossible in reading it not to be struck with the masterly manner

in which Dr. Fisher disposes of all the objections raised by this infatuated modern school against this most precious of all the books that exist in the world. What the gifted author writes in his too brief chapter is evidently prompted by his heart, and we honor him for it; but his mind expands also, and bright sparks of learning and genius enlighten the discussion. It is remarkable that here he does not follow so strictly the rules of the usual dry and doubting criticism which he generally adopts, as do all non-Catholic authors. He here depends more on "tradition," and seems in one passage "to beg pardon" for it. We only wish he had availed himself of tradition oftener. The last two chapters cannot be passed over without notice. Unfortunately there are in the second of them some points which are far from being unobjectionable. In the previous portion of the book also there were expressions, here and there, in which we could not, as a Catholic, altogether concur.

The author had already, in one of the chapters on the New Testament books, entitled "Watermarks of Age," alluded to "changes of polity in post-apostolic times" (p. 377), and spoken of "the rise of a sacerdotal theory of the ministry," which evidently, in his opinion, "did not conduce to the interests of a pure Christianity." These expressions were startling, and appeared connected with a theory of development, of which he speaks at about the same time and place. The whole explanation of it comes in at last, towards the end of the book, at page 546 and the pages following. In describing the meetings of the first Christians, he says that "they joined in a common meal, which concluded with a solemn partaking of bread and wine—the whole being a commemoration of the Last Supper of the Lord with his disciples." A few lines further on the writer calls this "the Eucharist." At page 553 the previous idea of "the rise of a sacerdotal ministry" is fully explained. He says, "the early episcopacy was purely governmental. The sacerdotal conception of the ministry is not found in Ignatius, in Clement of Rome, . . . or in any ecclesiastical writer prior to Tertullian. Bishops were the custodians of order; their functions were those of oversight and superintendence. . . . The ministry were held to represent the congregation of believers, and not to be distinguished as a higher and separate order from them."

Not only is the whole sacramental system thus swept away, but even the "office of teaching" does not come from a superior mission. Bishops teach or do not teach, as they like or as they feel the inspiration. In fact everything in the primitive Church depends only on the promptings of the Holy Ghost, who is the only bond of union among the faithful.

We merely state the theory of the writer; the great questions which it involves have often been discussed, and the Church has long ago decided them. But a remark of importance cannot be omitted. Dr. Fisher admits the theory of development, and explains by it the "changes of polity" which have taken place in Christianity. Among these changes he enumerates "the rise of the sacerdotal theory of the ministry," and he states somewhere that Irenaeus speaks as if that "theory" had always been held and practiced among Christians. That is, Irenaeus thought that the congregations of the faithful had always had at their head *priestly* rulers exercising sacerdotal functions; call them bishops or presbyters, or whatever you like. But the episcopacy in his time was in full sway; and his time was the latter half of the second century. He had himself known Polycarp, and Polycarp had known St. John. Is it not then likely that Irenaeus better understood what

had been the belief and practice of the Church from the very beginning, than the most acute reasoner of our time, who has only to guide him a few words of the New Testament, which can be interpreted in various ways, and were never intended to instruct us on the "constitution of the Church?"

In the second place, the theory of development, as understood by Dr. Fisher, supposes that a simple meal of bread and wine among the Christians becomes before long a partaking of the body and blood of Christ; and at the same time a man having only a governmental office, a police officer, if you choose to call him so, becomes in the same short period of time a grave hierophant, invested with functions of a higher import than all those of previous priests and pontiffs. Would this be a development; would it not rather be for Dr. Fisher's school a total subversion of primitive Christianity?

The scope of the volume embraces only the Roman and Greek world. Nothing is said of Christianity outside of the limits of the Western Empire. The "Apostolic office," nevertheless (of which very little is said in the book), embraced the whole world according to the solemn injunction of Christ: "Go, and teach all nations." We do not remember, in fact, to have met with any mention of this significant injunction in the book. Again, the Church had been prepared and announced from the very beginning. It existed in germ in previous institutions, and no allusion whatever is made to these. This reduces Christianity to very small proportions, which do not increase much even when the remarkable phenomenon takes form and shape after Pentecost. It looks, indeed, according to this theory, as if Christianity had very little to do with the general history of mankind. It is not thus in the eyes of Catholics, who take a higher and wider survey of the whole field as embraced in the designs of Providence.

These considerations, however, do not compel us to change the estimate already expressed of the book as a whole. It strongly defends the supernatural character of the Christian religion, and it demolishes many of the objections raised against it in this age.

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NEW IRELAND. By *A. M. Sullivan*, Member of Parliament for Louth. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1877.

It is not easy for a person residing out of Ireland to understand the intricacies of Irish politics. Of late this difficulty has increased, owing to the subdivisions of parties and the widening antagonisms that have come to prevail even among those who are striving to attain a common end. Years ago, the writer of this notice was led by the necessities of his position at that time, as well as by his attachment to the land of his ancestors, to study the Irish Catholic political question, and he learned to appreciate and admire, even to love, the heroic attitude of the Irish members of Parliament, who in their national and religious character presented a bold, defiant front to the British premier, and actually succeeded in bringing him to terms. Every kind of abuse was heaped on them. They were called the "Irish faction," the "Catholic party," the "Pope's brass band." Yet as long as they held together they were a power, before which even the Russells and Palmers had to bend. But the evil day came. The Keoghs, and Monahans, and Sadliers were purchased by British gold in the shape of office or patronage. The Parliamentary party was broken up, and what might have been the salvation of Catholic Ireland and of Catholic interests throughout all Europe was ruthlessly sacrificed to the perjury of a few degenerate traitors. It was

the old story as one of Ireland's poets has told it: "Where your tyrants joined in hate, you would not join in love."

As for the work before us, it is a readable and entertaining book ; interesting as a sketch of personal incidents and of occurrences and events with which Mr. Sullivan was more or less closely connected ; but it disappoints the expectations created by its title. We look in vain for solid facts from which the reader can form a clear idea of what "New Ireland" is, and on which he can base the belief that "New Ireland" exists at all. After reading the volume through, and giving due weight to all the author's statements, the suspicion remains undispersed that "the progress" of which he speaks is more in his own imagination than in reality, and that the Ireland of to-day, with some few changes, is Old Ireland, still suffering from the cruel and oppressive policy persisted in by the British government.

The work, to speak plainly, is too sensational to be reliable, even where the author's views and judgment can be accepted as entirely correct. That his opinions cannot be thus implicitly accepted, is evident from the fact that during his whole life he has been an active partisan and politician, and is, according to his own statements, a man of "decided views." It is ground for just censure that he has permitted the sensational element to enter so largely into a work which will be regarded by thousands as intended, and which in fact seems to have been intended, as a calm, careful, historical sketch of the leading events and changes that have occurred in Ireland during the last thirty years. Isolated instances of agrarian crime, and collisions between opposing partisans, less violent than those which occur here in America, at every Presidential election, are given a prominence in Mr. Sullivan's work that is calculated to make a reader unacquainted with Ireland imagine that it is a cauldron constantly boiling over with unrestrained passion, and that murder is not there regarded as a crime.

The effect of these pictures is untrue und most unjust. We do not charge Mr. Sullivan in this with intentional injustice, but he is justly the subject of censure in not duly considering and guarding against the false impressions which in thus writing he produces. He devotes a whole chapter to the abduction of Miss Arbuthnot, in 1854, as though it were typical of the state of things that then prevailed in Ireland. This shows as bad judgment, we will not say as gross injustice, as it would be in an American writer if, when depicting the condition of the United States, he were to devote a chapter to an account of cattle-raids on the Mexican border, or of murders in the mining regions of Colorado or Montana.

Mr. Sullivan's discussion of the progress of Ireland is superficial, and, as we have already intimated, singularly deficient in reliable statistics and definite statements of facts. The few meagre statements he does make on the subject suggest, indeed, a conclusion opposite to his own. He claims that "the agricultural classes in Ireland have made a decided advance, and a decided increase in the national wealth has thus been acquired," but he is compelled to admit that this "has risen less from extension of earning power or of productive area than from a rise in the price of certain agricultural products," and says hopefully that "if nothing occur to send back the prices of beef and mutton, milk and butter, eggs and poultry, Ireland will have established a solid gain in material prosperity." We are uncertain whether Mr. Sullivan here is speaking seriously or not. Whatever his meaning no more bitter irony, in fact, could be uttered.

We have only room to say that his judgment of Daniel O'Connell

shows an utter want of ability to appreciate the benefits that illustrious patriot conferred upon Ireland. Mr. Sullivan thinks he ought to have died in 1829. Had he then died, Mr. Sullivan, in all probability, would never have been a member of the British Parliament, nor would Ireland have enjoyed the substantial benefits that have since followed from the tardily and unwillingly granted Emancipation Bill.

In like manner we might point out Mr. Sullivan's mistakes in regard to the national school system, and his utter misapprehension of the motives and reasons of the course pursued by Irish bishops and clergy, but remaining space will not permit our treating this important subject at length. Suffice it to say that Mr. Sullivan seems not to understand the great lesson taught by the history of his country, viz., that religion is a deeper and greater power in preserving and elevating a people than mere political measures, and that Ireland owes her wonderful survival under unexampled oppression and misrule to the fact that her people have preserved the ancient faith, and are to-day true children of St. Patrick.

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MONOTHEISM, in the main derived from the Hebrew Nation and the Law of Moses, the Primitive Religion of the City of Rome. An Historical Investigation. By the Rev. Henry Formby. London: Williams & Norgate. New York: Scribner, Welch & Co. 1877. 8vo., pp. xxxvi-360.

This historical essay is not only entitled to the consideration of every Christian student by reason of its intrinsic merit, but also because it has been a real labor of love on the part of the reverend author. He brings with him to his task not only great learning, but likewise an enthusiasm which cannot fail to captivate the reader. He undertakes to prove that Rome's religion in her infancy was Monotheism, and that her earliest legislation, in the days of Numa Pompilius, was based on the Law of Moses. Some of the fathers and apologists of the Christian Church, who wrote against paganism, had some knowledge of this fact and used it to a certain extent as an argument against their heathen adversaries. But it never has been brought forward with such strong light of evidence as in these pages of Rev. Father Formby.

Numa was the representative of Rome's wisdom, as Romulus was of her military glory. And any one who has read Prudentius cannot fail to recall how appropriately he puts into the mouth of the dying martyr, St. Laurence, when praying for the conversion of the Roman empire, these words:

Fiat fidelis Romulus  
Et ipse jam credat Numa!

A bold figure! but how expressive of the martyr's dying wish, who would have Rome to be Christian because her very walls had been built, not by Romulus or Remus, as the vulgar tradition had it, but by the hands of God Himself, that it might be the capital of the Christian world.

O Christe Numen unicum!  
O Factor Orbis et poli,  
Atque AUCTOR HORUM MOENIUM!

Rome's wisdom personified by Numa, and her martial prowess as represented by Romulus, were to learn the saving truths of Christianity and to be pressed into the service of the Most High, who had created them and built their city for His own glory and the benefit of His Holy Church. In a word, as the poet boldly put it, Romulus and Numa were to become believers.

Old pagan Rome was in more senses than one a type and predecessor

of the Christian Church that succeeded to her inheritance of the seven hills. Her universal empire presfigured the worldwide rule of the Christian Pontiff whose dominion was to extend over countries that had never been subdued by Roman arms, justifying the boast of one of the Fathers (St. Prosper) that Peter's See had secured to Rome a religious sovereignty far greater than had ever been won by her military sway :

Roma Petri sedes, quae pastoralis honoris  
Facta caput mundo, quidquid non possidet armis,  
Religione tenet.

Another strong point of resemblance between the Catholic Church and the old Roman commonwealth may be found in that consciousness of invincibility in which both shared alike. The Church lay hid for three centuries in the Catacombs, but she knew full well that her days of blood and martyrdom were to be succeeded by a happier season of repose and even of triumph. Almost in our own day, some eighty years since, when French infidels carried off Pius VI. to die in bondage and proclaimed to the world that modern civilization had buried the last of the Popes, she quietly folded her arms over the grave of the martyred Pontiff and calmly awaited the day of her deliverance, not knowing nor caring to know when it would come, but perfectly sure that come it must in God's own good time. And the time came. He sent his servants, the heretic and the schismatic, the armed hosts of England and of Russia, to prepare the way for the freedom of His Spouse, and to bear back her Highpriest, Pius VII., in triumph to his See. So, too, it was with old Rome. When Hannibal was thundering at her gates, one of her citizens bought, at public sale, the very ground on which the hostile army was encamped. He, like the rest of his countrymen, knew well that Hannibal and his hosts would pass away, but that Rome was immortal. It was ever in the day of defeat and prostration that her children shone to the best advantage; for it was then that they showed most unmistakably their undying faith in the vitality and ultimate triumph of Rome. And we cannot but sympathize with her poet (Claudian) who boasted of her as greater in her hour of disaster and defeat than in the full noontide of her glory and conquest.

Nunquam succubuit damnis et territa nullo  
Vulnere post Cannas MAJOR Trebiamque fremebat.

We sincerely hope that Father Formby's book will be extensively read, not only because of the subject that he discusses, full of interest to every Catholic reader, and indeed to every one who has any acquaintance with Roman literature, but also because of the great learning with which he has handled his theme.

THE WRITTEN WORD; OR, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SACRED SCRIPTURES. By William Humphrey, Priest of the Society of Jesus. London : Barnes & Oates. 1877.

In his preface Father Humphrey very modestly says that "this volume is little more than an attempt to popularize, in English, some of the more dogmatic chapters of Cardinal Franzelin's admirable treatise, *De Divinâ Traditione et Scripturâ*." The author's object, and it has evidently controlled and determined the plan of his work, is to deepen in the minds of his readers "their appreciation of the inestimable treasure which they possess in the Sacred Scriptures."

In the development of his subject Father Humphrey, for the purpose of meeting Protestants on their own ground, departs from Cardinal

Franzelin's order of topics, and in his first three chapters points out the means we have of knowing which are the inspired books of Scripture. In these three chapters he shows, first, "The belief of the Jews as to their Sacred Scriptures, and the confirmation of that belief by the doctrine and practice of Christ and His Apostles;" second, "The idea of the Inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures, as contained in and derived from the idea of their Divine Authorship;" and, third, "The inefficacy of internal evidence, or of intrinsic arguments, to demonstrate Inspiration; and the necessity of an extrinsic testimony to make known the fact of the Inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures." He then, in the following three chapters, considers "The divinely instituted means for the preservation and propagation of Christian doctrine and discipline, and the place held by the Sacred Scriptures in relation to this means;" showing that "our divine Lord in His institution of the apostolate as an authoritative organ in order to the first promulgation of His Gospel, instituted a perpetual apostolic succession as the authoritative organ of preservation and propagation of the same Gospel;" that this divinely instituted economy or means for the preservation and propagation of Christianity continued after the books of the New Testament were written. This opens the way for speaking, in the seventh chapter, of the idea of tradition, as it is distinguished from Scripture, and of the mutual relations of Scripture and tradition. The nature and value of certain criteria of divinity of doctrine, viz., the consent of the faithful, the doctrine of the Fathers, the teaching of the schools, are considered in the next chapter. Chapter nine contains a statement and explication of the supreme rule of interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures, and of an explanation of the revealed doctrine which they contain. Chapter ten proves that the whole body of revealed doctrine by our divine Lord and by the Holy Ghost was completed and sealed up in the deposit of faith intrusted to the Apostles. "It was so completed as that not only should there be *no new economy* of a more perfect order, and with a more ample revelation; but also that, in the present economy, there should be *no increase* of the deposit of faith." The following chapter explains the important subject of "The Growth of the Faithful in their Spiritual Understanding of this Completed Revelation." The two concluding chapters treat of "The Authoritative Version of the Sacred Scriptures," and "Human Apprehension of Divine Revelation."

The work is characterized by clearness of statement and great conciseness. Perhaps this latter quality has been carried to an extreme. In a number of instances the topics touched upon might have been advantageously treated at greater length. The style, too, might be improved.

These deficiencies will probably diminish the popularity of the work, but do not detract from its intrinsic merits. It is an important and valuable addition to Catholic literature on subjects which form the points against which the assaults of the skeptical spirit of the age are specially directed.

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THE MIRROR OF TRUE WOMANHOOD: A Book of Instruction for Women in the World.  
By Rev. Bernard O'Reilly. New York: Peter F. Collier, 1877.

The design of this work may be gathered from a few words in the author's preface. It is not intended for Religious nor as a work either of ascetic meditations or didactic instruction, but a book in which in the form of pleasant attractive reading, valuable practical lessons are conveyed, which may assist women in every sphere and station in life, and of every age, young, middle-aged, and old, poor and wealthy,

highly cultivated and imperfectly educated, the young maiden, the sister, the mother, the "stepmother," the milliner and dressmaker, the saleswoman, the women working in manufactories and at service in private families and hotels. All these may obtain from it words of valuable advice, and counsels of holy encouragement. It may be read consecutively, or it may be picked up in a moment of snatched leisure, with benefit and edification.

The author in his preface, to which we have already referred, indicates the thought and motive which impelled him to publish his book. "The chief object," he says, which he had in view in "undertaking to write this book was to help, so far as his abilities permitted, in withstanding the spread of naturalism, which is daily invading more and more our homes. . . . If one can preserve the home from this pernicious poison by making of every mother" a woman "living a life of faith, loving above all things self-denial and self-sacrifice," "the home in our midst will bring forth men and women, unselfish, pure, truth-loving, trustworthy, and devoted to the best interests of country and religion."

In these words the writer points directly to one of the great evils of the times,—naturalism,—an evil which is insidiously creeping into almost every family, which infects the whole intellectual atmosphere of our country and age, and the pernicious influences of which, like malaria in the air we have to breathe, it is impossible to escape without constant care and vigilance. The shapes and forms this evil assumes are countless, and its poisonous influences, insidiously sapping the foundations of virtue, are to be traced among persons of every rank and condition in society and in every relation of life.

The work before us in combating this evil seeks to fulfil a most important purpose. It is well calculated in its plan and style, and in the familiar, popular, and attractive manner in which it presents the different topics with which it deals, to subserve that purpose.

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THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND. *By Henry Maudslay, M.D.* New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1877.

This book is a mass of the grossest materialism. It seeks to endow matter with all the qualities of the Deity, and teaches that matter has of itself the power of developing into the highest forms of organization; that man is not the highest form of matter, but that development will continue until the greatest possible perfection is reached.

The author adopts substantially the proposition of Cabanis, that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile, and asserts, as might be expected, that the soul is not a distinct spiritual entity, but a mere abstraction, having therefore no existence apart from the brain.

The common idea of will is rejected, and in its place we have a certain power inherent in every nerve-cell of obeying or not the impulse received from its afferent nerve, when it has one. This power is as purely mechanical in the higher operation of the brain as in any simple cell into which an afferent or sensory nerve enters.

Memory is supposed to be the result of some change in the nervous system produced at the time of any given action, and leaving it disposed readily to reproduce the same nervous action at another time. It is compared to the change effected in the system by small-pox, the virus of which remains in the system for years after the original disease has disappeared.

The mind as a spiritual entity being rejected, mental action is supposed to be a process purely mechanical and analogous to the working

of the telegraph. Sensations pass along the afferent nerves to the ganglia, where they are moulded as it were into the form of ideas in the nerve-cells, and are forwarded on to some other ganglia or not as the will-power of the ganglia may determine. A substance similar to electricity, and called the vital force, is the agent which operates these changes.

Every supernatural influence being discarded as superstitious, all the phenomena of life are attributed to the pure mechanical force which is supposed to be inherent in matter.

There seems to be two principal sources of error, physiologically considered, in this book,—first, the author assumes as absolutely true what in reality is only probable or possible, and second, he draws conclusions which would not follow even were his assumptions true. No one knows better than the author that of all parts of the animal economy the least understood is the nervous system, as to its action. There are found in it fibrous and cellular matter, and that is all the physiologist knows about it. Whether the nerve-cell originates and the nerve-fibre conducts ideas, impressions, etc., is with all our knowledge only at best probable. Even were this true, it would by no means follow that the process was carried on by mechanical force, yet the Doctor assumes both the one and the other.

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THE DESTINY OF MAN, proved from Reason, and the Infallibility of the Catholic Church, proved from Reason and History. By *Rev. L. I. Miller*, of the Seminary of Our Lady of Angels, Suspension Bridge, N. Y. Wm. Poole, Printer, Niagara Falls Gazette Printing Establishment, 1877. 12mo., pp. 216.

The reverend author has, it seems to us, taken the most accurate and sensible view of his subject. It is useless to talk to men about the true religion, or the way that God has appointed for all to know and serve Him, unless we first convince them that they are really interested in the question and its correct solution. How many have the idea in their minds and give it free utterance, that matters of religion do not concern them, that they are fit only for women and children or for persons who make an external profession of piety. There are hundreds of this class among our countrymen, we are sorry to say. Brought up amongst them, we know their state of mind—or to call things by true names, their moral wretchedness—and we thoroughly sympathize with it. They will not even examine the evidences of Catholicity; or, if pressed, they would rather admit their truth than go through the trouble of investigation. They do not regard it as a matter which in the least concerns them. The author of this valuable little treatise has recognized this difficulty and has begun from the true starting-point. He takes up the destiny of man and shows conclusively that man is in the world for a certain purpose, which is something far above the American notion that one comes into the world merely to enjoy himself or to make money. And it is a shame and a scandal that the average American parent (and to our disgrace be it said, too often even the Catholic father or mother) has no higher standard to put before their children than temporal prosperity or worldly advancement. The true purpose of man's existence in this world is unfolded by Father Miller in a way to compel conviction. After proving the cardinal doctrines of the spirituality and immortality of the soul and man's free will, he comes to treat of the evidences of the Catholic religion by which alone man can secure his last end. In speaking of the indefectibility and infallibility of the Catholic Church, Father Miller discusses fully and learnedly some of the objections made against the infallible teaching of the Holy See.

We think this little book is well worthy of circulation amongst Catholics, and we are sure they could not present a more useful book to those of their Protestant friends who have any claim to be classed among those whom Our Blessed Lord calls the "docibiles Dei."

**THE CHRISTIAN REFORMED IN MIND AND MANNERS.** By *Benedict Rogacci*, of the Society of Jesus. The Translation edited by *Henry James Coleridge*, of the same Society. London: Barnes & Oates, 1877.

Those who are acquainted with Father Rogacci's excellent treatise on "Confidence in God," which itself is but a small portion of his larger and highly esteemed work styled *L'Uno Necessario*, will not need our assurance that the book before us is admirably adapted to the purposes it is designed to subserve. Like all Father Rogacci's works it is remarkable for clearness and solidity. Father Rogacci spent the greater portion of a long life in giving retreats in the religious houses of the Society of Jesus. He was a thorough theologian as well as a fervent ascetic, and the work we are noticing, which was composed almost at the end of his life, embodies the results both of his studies and of his vast experience in conducting retreats and directing souls.

The learned and devoted author was averse to publishing this volume, probably from motives of humility, and was constrained to it by the pressure brought to bear upon him by a religious friend in the hope that the book would be useful to sincere souls. The whole substance of the Exercises of St. Ignatius seems to have been worked up in it, though in somewhat different form from that of the Exercises, so as to suit the special purpose which it is designed to assist.

The meditations are intended for all classes of persons, secular as well as religious. There is nothing in it bearing directly on the special duties of the religious state.

The plan of the work supposes that the exercitant is not able to give more than eight days to the retreat, and the subjects for meditation are arranged in accordance with this hypothesis. Four meditations are given for each day; also an introductory meditation to be made on the evening before beginning the exercises, and a meditation on choosing a state of life to be made at the close of the retreat. The author tells us, however, that it was his own practice not to give more than three meditations a day, with a repetition in the afternoon of their substance, or some practical considerations helping to a reformation of life. In the work before us, accordingly, and to supply the place of this repetition, he gives sixteen considerations for practical self-reformation, to be made during the exercises.

The work, as we have already intimated, is characterized by an entire absence of exaggeration and imaginative considerations; it is solid, direct, and practical, enforcing the solemn truths which it brings home to the mind of the exercitant by substantial theological reasons.

**TO ROME AND BACK:** Fly-leaves from a Flying Tour. Edited by *W. J. Anderson*, S.J. London: R. Washbourne, 1877.

Narratives of travel, letters describing tours, journeys, and pilgrimages, have become so common nowadays, that a series of letters simply giving an account of a visit "to Rome and back," must be of more than ordinary merit to attract much attention, and still more to merit special notice. And the letters which make up this little volume are of unusual merit. They are lively and lifelike, vigorous and truthful, and describe the scenery along the road, the people, the country, the castles, the churches, the picture galleries and paintings, with a power of graphic pen-painting

such as few persons possess. Then they have to the Catholic reader a still higher interest. They are sketches of a pilgrimage to Rome during the Jubilee of the Holy Father, Pius IX., and are redolent of a spirit of piety and devotion. Religion is not lugged into them; in fact very little is *said* about religion, but its spirit breathes through the writer's descriptions of shrines and churches and holy personages, as the fragrance of a rose perfumes the air around it.

Our only fault with the volume is that it is too small. Yet the sketches, though concise, are so graphic, and present such perfect pictures of what they describe, that each sketch and each page is *multum in parvo*, conveying to the mind more ideas and clearer and fuller impressions than many works of much larger size and far greater pretensions.

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THE MONK OF THE MONASTERY OF JUSTE; or The Last Days of the Emperor Charles V. An Historical Legend of the Sixteenth Century. *From the Spanish.* By Mariana Monteiro. London: R. Washbourne, 1877.

In this volume, under the guise of a legend, perhaps, indeed, a true story in greater part, the writer brings before us Charles V., in his day by far the most powerful monarch in Europe, and the manner in which he spent the remainder of his life in the monastery to which he retired after abdicating his throne and authority. In this he has accomplished a twofold purpose. First, he has given us a very attractive and interesting tale, and, secondly, he has incidentally but effectually dispelled many of the false impressions that have been created by persons who have misrepresented Charles V., less through positive intention than through their disbelief in religion and consequent inability to understand the motives that could induce a monarch possessed of such vast territorial dominions, such lofty station, and such immense earthly power as he, to lay aside his regal pomp, to abdicate his throne, and retire as an humble obscure person into a Religious House.

The work is exceedingly interesting, well depicting the personages and incidents of the story, the ideas, manners, and customs of the age and country in which the scene is laid.

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#### BOOKS RECEIVED.

These works have not been reviewed for want of space.

THE SPIRIT OF ST. VINCENT DE PAUL; or, A Holy Model, worthy of being imitated by Ecclesiastics, Religious, and all the Faithful. Translated from the work of the learned M. Andre. Joseph Ansart, Conventual Priest of the Order of Malta, Advocate in Parliament, and Doctor of Laws in the University of Paris, etc., etc., by the Sisters of Charity, at Mount St. Vincent, New York. *Permissu Superiorum.* New York: P. O'Shea, Publisher.

THE FINAL PHILOSOPHY, OR SYSTEM OF PERCEPTEBLE KNOWLEDGE ISSUING FROM THE HARMONY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION. By Charles Woodruff Shields, D.D., Professor in Princeton College, Member of the American Philosophical Society. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1877.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF MARY. By Rev. J. De Concilio, Pastor of St. Michael's Church, Jersey City, author of *Catholicity and Pantheism*. New York: Catholic Publication Society Co., 9 Barclay Street, 1878. 8vo., pp 315.

DELLA VITA DI GESU CRISTO. Libri Tre di Vito Fornari. Libro Secondo. Firenze: G. Barbera, 1877. Royal octavo, pp 551.

TRANSCENDENTALISM, with Preludes on Current Events. By Joseph Cook. Boston: James R. Osgood & Company, 1878.

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We are pleased to announce that Father Thebaud's work on "The Church and the Gentile World at the First Preaching of Christianity," has been completed, and will be issued from the press of P. Collier, New York, at the end of March or beginning of April next.



